WAR: TWO CONTRIBUTIONS,

Dominion, Volume 2, Issue 502, 8 May 1909, Page 4

WAR: TWO CONTRIBUTIONS,

In to-day's issue appear two contributions having intimate referenco to the absorbing question of military training. One of theso appears under the heading Colonial Goose," and the other is in the form of a letter to tho Editor in the correspondence columns, undor the caption War: Attack—Defence." Both writers show a close acquaintance with thoir subject, and, by a coincidence, both while treating tho subject from different points of view, endeavour to indicate its unsuspected complexity, and tho . need, first and foremost, for the training of officers of a type, superior to the general class of volunteer officer as known here. And indeed it is a formidable list of branches of study which the word "war" connotes, comprising as.it doos (1) strategy, or the art of manoeuvring bodies of troops on an extensive theatre of war; (2) tactics, or the conduct of forces in tho immediate presence of .the enemy; (3) logistics, or the art of moving armies (including commissariat and, field hospitals); (4) engineering, or tho attack and defence, of fortifications; (5) military law; and (6) statesmanship in its relation to war.' In each of the first five branches tho student of military matters' might conceivably find;, tho work of a lifotimo. The principal theses set out by one of tho contributors aro the fallacies of current literature on war, and the rather startling proposition that the ■ introduction ,of rapid-firing weapons has not favoured the defence, as is. popularly supposed, but. the attack. Both these are important since, if they could be demonstrated beyond doubt,, they would almost certainly exercise an important influence on the national attitude to tho whole, subject of war. That every introduction of more rapid-firing weapons favours the attack more than the defence was first contended by the German authority Von Soherff ("Theory of Modern Infantry," 1873), and sinco re-adopted by the German general staff. after the, introduction of tho magazine, rifle. To English ears it sounds a most revolutionary.'doctrine, 1 but it was the .doctrine taught tho Japanese by yoN Meckel, and round; it for the present is gathered all the. glamour of successful .war. Of course, its acceptance or rejection in New ,Zealand lneans a great deal, one- way or the other, in.', the important matter of training officers, The writer of the loiter "War: Attack —Defence" touches this question of train-, ■ing the trainers of volunteers in greater detail, and his views, having respect to the current theory of democracy, are also revolutionary. At first sight they will probably be unpopular, but when'- the searchlights of military history aro thrown on his position, it seems almost unassailable by any logical process. He maintains that an officer must be something of a despot, superior in status and education to thi rank and file, and that (inferentially); many, of the' very qualities' that make a : man estimable as a citizen and friend in civilian life rather unfit-him for being a successful officer,; In support of this thesis one rocalls. at once/the < of the elected Boer leaders, and more especially the comparative non-success of the North in the opening stages of the; American ■Civil Wah 'the Confederate General' B. E. Lee was able to hold back the vast northern , of the Potomac" from' 1861! till the summer of 1863 at least,'"(the;'. Wilderness, and Petersburg operations not included) was due to the superior, stamp and education of tho somewhat despotio Confederate : company, regimental, brigade, and army leaders. The North, on the other hand, suffered by the system of electing "popular".company and- regimental. commanders,: and by. the 'continued political interference with: the and corps commanders of the Federal armies. In the end, of course, the Union broke up the Confederacy, by weight of numbers, but it was a costly operation, extending over more than fonr years. Had the Northern officers been competently trained at the time of the opening advance into Virginia, the war would certainly have been concluded- long before 1865. As both our contributors point out, the question of tho training of officers is one bristling with .complexities, and their .views are decidcdly. interesting whether one accepts their conclusions or not.