EASTER MANOEUVRES

Dominion, Volume 2, Issue 479, 12 April 1909, Page 6

EASTER MANOEUVRES

WITH THE ORINGI FIELD FORCE. • A STRENUOUS SATURDAY. ORINGI IS IN PERIL. (BT teleqkaph—special keportee.) Dannevirko, April 11, 'At the time of telegraphing, the encampment of Lieutenant-Colonel Bauchop's field brigade—situated picturesquely in a terraced slope on the right bank of the Oruakoretaki stream, a short distanco from its junction with the Manawatu River—has been seriously menaced by that extremely niobilo factor in peaco manoeuvres, a "skeleton onemy." The advanpo attack of tho enemy has been driven in, and . tho main attacking forco has retired upon its base, covering the movement with a heavy rearguard action. The Gamp Fired Upon. Shortly after 9 o'clock on Saturday evening the camp itself was fired upon, much to the jonsternation and disgust of the gallant lefenders, who wero either snugly tucked up In bed or on tho point of settling down for » quiet yarn, after a very strenuous day. Omitting important, but mystifying, details. Hie soon comes face to faco with results and underlying principles. Friday passed uneventfully, the whole of tho daylight being given up to preparatory drill in company, battalion, and regimental formations, and tho evoning to very much-needed rest. Saturday was the first of the field days. If the present downpour continues, as "seems likely, it will be tho only day. In Saturday's operations tho whole of tho brigade was actively. engaged. The "skeleton onemy" (of which moro later) was believed to have left Ormondvillo and was directing the heads of its littlo columns towards Dannevirko. As it was no part of the intention of tho defenders to allow Dacnevirke to fall an easy proy to the invaders, an advance was made 111 that direction for a distanco of some five or six miles. A strong "contact" squadron of horso, ander Captain Morrison, was sent out early in the morning to "feel" for tho enemy, and, oaving found him, to remain in touch with him and report constantly to brigado headquarters. The work of this squadron throughout tho''entire day was indeed excellent. Captain Morrison's rolo was a double one, for, having proved himself in his original ■rapacity as commander of the contact squadron, ho was required in tho afternoon to turn bluo, i.e., becomo tho enemy, and rend his former friends if he could. He certainly did. A 15-Pounder Captured. ._ 'A hostile 15-pounder gun, escorted by a detachment of mounted infantry, 'was also 111 evidenco, and this engine of the invader carter breaking up a battalion of infantry and most certainly spreading destruction among »me reckless squadrons of horse, was captured, its defenders fighting gloriously. As iomeone remarked, slightly paraphrasing Canrobert s famous saying about tho Light prigaue, It was magnificent, but it was ~1™: b y a long, long chalk," tut this is rather anticipating the march, of Tvents. lo grasp the main features of the Situation, let it be understood that about Uringi which point may be called A, there lwept two sectors of a great circle whoso tn f c ?\ converged upon Aas the f " ds converge upon the centre rf its face from 9to 3 o'clock. Dannevirko the objective of both the invaders and the defenders was at ;'l2 o'clock,"'while two taportant strategical positions—"Okev's Peak and Battery Hill"-wero . situated Respectively at 10 o clock and 2 o'clock. , e . skeleton enemy" worked round on h |rM f ?°. e - and Posted a gun battery Hill, which commanded tho ligh road to Dannevirke, and also a considerable stretch of flat country. ' The nosihZll 1 gU !l,T as gQod > but it was b^dlv rn-, l if S -Ti -be seen " Al °ng this high road, well within range, in troops, columns of fours, and sometimes twos, galloped with a 1°? n ra i d ' Squadro ! 1 after squadron! ? g« n , fitting incessantly atthem. They should have opened out into extended line but did not, and therefore should have been ruled out of action. Curiously enough 1 they continued to live, and move, and have their being, and galloped this way and that. Having survived its d T'T' on ? s 9 uad ron ultimately did O ood work along the water course of a t r s ?T ba ? m wound in the direction ri ' The troopers dismounted Alii f m t( iT ards the &eful gun, finally establishing themselves in a good position, _and concentrating an effective fire mon r hi " tim a battalion of h' a i ? r Jj'eutenant-Colonel John Watt had . deployed in skirmishing order in fi ® lds ., w hich lay in front of the gun £kL+? Jeither flank, takin" thl wf 6 t excellent cover afforded by the logs, stumps, and rushes with which this area was plentifully dotted.

The Point of Decisive Attack. ,J? 6 battalion skirmished right up to the foot of the hill arriving at the point of decisive attack about the same time that the troops referred to established them"JS+ m i, P° sltlon - Here the _ skeleton enemy basely ignored its hapless gun which—defrauded of its legitimate. conquest, the squadrons-now ™ntrl h*%° n th ® 6(126 , 0f th '° terrace > S e i b ? ( lts sunnors and supported vali- « scort > wlllch on the grass at the approaching peril until every had been shot away. I i i° -1 5 ® ton eneroy" schemo of wWtfH • re ™Sniso the probable Necessity of reinforcing the gun. Furtherbom'th^f 2 "? s hV Id i hare be «n withdrawn from the front of the terrace, thus affording the gunners and also the escort, better opportunities for firing from cover. Probably, T* i t s £ ele , ton had other things in new Indeed, ho had, for the officer commanding the Onngi brigade soon had his attention directed to the necessity of witharawing thp_ whole of his advance line and Bam attacking force, and fighting a rearJriwn'L ° n *o°! , ' ee r n e tlle retirement of his origadejipon Ormgi.

InvatJars Seize Dannevirke., J™l ijl n aders '- greeted by Captain Morrison, seized Dauncvirko, pushed rapidly forward m arge numbers, and menaced "Okey's 7 iliil. Lioutenant-Colonel Okoy, whose command held tho position, realised too late tho necessity of evacuating this ground. His ind re hT n fnll W?S + by , the "skeleton," and ho fe!l into tho hands of tho enemy. Developing their advance with great determination and speed, Captain Morrison's men ■not only pressed heavily upon the rearguard, thn [pf? y ir r ° W skirmishing parties on .tho left, holding a lino on the "watch face" well lound to threo o clock, and hnrassina tho retii-ement of tho -brigade right back to Urmg -The situation was saved by the rearguard actlon of the field artilIpT™ i rC ft- g i' ns ' c which concentrated a heavy and eftectivo fire upon the main advance of tho enemy. Tho brigade eventually fnr C P al d Pe | -? S0 at orinßi sbortl y be " «Wlfr ft n P S Were P lcket « d all round shortly after J p.m., and some of tho skeletons skirmishers tripped over an alarm wire which had been fixed in position by tho engineers, whoso work throughout tho lay was very good, constant and reliable communication being maintained botwecn tho front and brigade headquarters by some miles M cable which lay unobtrusivelv along tho highway. The unlucky trip over the alarm vire set in action an ingenious mechanism ■Therewith by chomical action a vivid flaro illuminated tho darkness. It was tho llarm. "Bcgbio" lamps winked unceasngly their imperative messages. Evorv fight in camp was extinguished except those of tho brigade staff which offered admirable targets for tho sharp-shooters of tho hostile skirmishers, whoso rifles, by this time, wore barking viciously, spitting vivid flashes from their unseen muzzles. Every man stood to his arms, his horse, or his battery, and comploto silenco prevailed. After a wait of about ten minutes, during which the strength- of tho alarm turnout was ascertained, the strain was lifted, the enemy presumably being driven off, and the camp at last sottled down. The Results Analysed. So much for Saturday. Tho results analysed revealed tho strength of some and tho,

weaknesses of others, as Colonel R. H. Davies, C.8., Inspector-General of the Forces, observed in tho courso of somo critical romi«iks addressed to tho brigado staff in camp yesterday. Tho day's operations had shown clearly that tho army must creep boforo it walked. In other words, preliminary training, and moro eilicicncy in details, wero required from companies and battalions, before brigado operations could bo successfully attempted. Good battalion work was not to bo cxpected if tho company units of tho battalions wero imperfectly trained, ror was efficient work to bo looked for from a brigade whose battalion units were imperfectly trained, and therein lay tho solution of their c'.ifficuUies. Somo Personal Observations. From tho. writer's personal observations taken at variojs points during tho day's operations tho impressions gathered woro somewhat conflicting. So far as could ho deduced tho inference was that the head, the body, and tho tail expected something from each that was not vouchsafed. Tho head — i.e., tho brigado staff —expccted that orders had merely to bo issued from headquarters to tho battalion units to bo obeyed severally and conjointly, and tho parts would logically fit into a tactical whole. Tho battalion units—tho body—assumed rightly or wrongly that tin parts allotted to them in tho game would be expressed in such tenns that the relation of separate movements to tho whole would be thoroughly grasped. The tail— tho companies—also assumed rightly or wrongly that their individual parts would bo explained, not only in relation to their battalions but to tho general and spccial ideas for the whole. The Inference was that (a) tho brigado did not get tho response from tho battalions which it had evidently assumed would eventuate as a matter of course, or (b) tho battalion commanders woro not made thoroughly acquainted witli tho general scheme as they had evidently assumed they 1 would, or (c) the company officers wero not given an intelligent " appreciation of tho -situation " as it affected the whole. I infer this from tho fact that quito a number of officers, including a battalion commander or two, did not appear to quite understand tho situation, and tho battalion had nothing to do all day. One reason, of courso, is that tactical situations do arise where company units or battalion units must, in accordancc with tho trend of events, remain inactive. What is. not quito clear is the inaction of tho battalion I have referred to. Another inference suggested is that the secrecy of the operations precluded detailed explanations, that may have been so. While this may have operated successfully in one direction, it very probably would have failed in that the .initiative on the part of some commanders was to a certain extent paralysed; Fault or no fault tho fact remains that a degree of uncertainty, a vagueness of objective, was apparent. Again, all may bo traceable to tho indefiniteness of tho "skeleton enemy." Ono of the most difficult tilings imaginable is to strike, at an invisible foe, who by a process of military mathematics is understood to bo capablo of covering a certainarea of ground and effecting certain strategies within a given period. / The Human Factor. The peculiarity of tho situation is that, while the forco and fighting effect of tho imaginary enemy can be estimated, tJie possibilities on the side of the real force must also bo moro or less estimated. There is no concrete effcct; There are no allowances for dash and valour, those indefinable quantities which frequently turn the scale in the face of odds which are strategically impossible. . It is all geometrically sounfl may-be, but the human factor must always tell, geometry or no geometry. Obviously more practice is required in skeleton work. It is work of such a nature as demands a high state of discipline from companies and -battalions, and that standard of discipline has not yet been attained. Somo Figures. Tie total number of men in camp is 1930, made up as follows General Staff, 3; Brigado Staff, 19; D Battery, 96; Engineers, 55; Wanganui Mounted Regiment, 99; Wellington Mounted Regiment, 71; Palmerston North Mounted Regiment, 70; Napier Mounted Regiment, 36; Wanganui Infantry Battalion, 236; . Wellington Infantry Battalion, 562; Napier Infantry Battalion, 110; Taranaki Infantry Battalion, 189; Woodville Infantry Battalion, 108; Garrison Band, 19; Field Ambulance, 19; Medical Staff, 5; Veterinary Staff Permanent Force, 9; unattached officers, 6; cadets, 317. There are 192 officers, 426 non-commissioned officers, 51 buglers, and 1261 privates, all told. Sunday has been a clay of steady and persistent rain, and tho outlook for Monday is distinctly gloomy.