THE GERMAN SPHINX.

Dominion, Volume 2, Issue 471, 1 April 1909, Page 7

THE GERMAN SPHINX.

1 NICE WORDS TO FRANCE. WHY GERMANY SUPPORTED AUSTRIA. (iiy Titr.EGttiru—rnE.ss association—coi'iaioiiT.) Berlin, March 30. Speaking in tho Reichstag, Prince Bulow, Imperial Chancellor, sympathetically referred to Franco's position in Morocco. Dealing with tho Nearer East, ho said: — "If Germany had not supported Austria she would havo encouragcd an attempt to inflict a diplomatic defeat on Austria, thereby weakening tho German position in Europe." SERVIA'S SURRENDER. WILL NOT PERMIT IRREGULAR BANDS. (Rec. March 31, 11.40 p.m.) Belgrade, March 31. Sorvia unreservedly accepted the draft formula (prepared by Sir Edward Grey to end tho crisis with Austria-Hungary). Servia will deliver her Note at Vienna to-day. It promises that Servia will no longer protest against Austria-Hungary's annexations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, will discharge her reservists, and will not permit tho formation of irregular bands (whose irruptions into Bosnia havo been feared). THE KRUGER TELEGRAM. WHOSE WAS THE AUTHORSHIP? Berlin, March 30. Princo Bulow, Imperial Chancellor, speaking in tho Reichstag, declared that tho famous "Kruger telegram" was a. Stato act, the result of official counsels, and in no wise an act undertaken on tho Kaiser's personal initiative. London, March 30. Tho Berlin correspondent of "Tho Times" definitely adds:—"The Kaiser drafted tho telegram, which was toned down as tho result of his counsels." THE NEW VERSION OF THE KRUGER MESSAGE. It was asserted in January, in a book by Herr Ad)lf Stein, that tho telegram sent to Kruger b.v tho Kniser on the occasion of tho Jameson Raid ii) 189G was in reality drawn up by the German Foreign Office, and that the Kaiser was not responsible for it. _ The importance of to-day's cablegram is Prince Bulow's authoritative and official confirmation that the telegram was not the result of the Kaiser's personal initiative. Herr Stein, who states that he has obtained liis information from the best sources, gives tho following account o£ events of that period:— Four weeks before the Jameson Paid, when proposals to carry it out were discussed in Pretoria, the Transvaal Government addressed an inquiry to Berlin as to what attitude Germany and the other European Powers would adopt towards the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and the two Boer Republics. The reply of tho German Government, which was communicated through Barou von Waltzahn, a German nobleman then living in South Africa, was to the effect that tho Transvaal Government could count on Germany's diplomatic support, inasmuch as German interests would bo served by the maintenance of the independence of tho Boer Republics, but that Boers could not expect anything more than diplomatic help from Germany, or from any other European Power. This reply u'as on its way to South Africa by mail when tho Jameson Raid ensued. The text of the famous telegram to President Kruger was composed, Herr Steiu states, in tho German Foreign Office. It congratulated President, Kruger that "without appealing to the aid of friendly Powers, you and your people liave succeeded in repelling with your own bands the armed bands which had broken into pour country; and in maintaining the independence of your country against foreign aggression." Princo Hohenlone, the Imperial Dhancellor of that day, together with Baron \larschall von Bieberstein, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and now Ambassador n Constantinople, had an audience of the Emleror on the morning of January 3, 1896. The telegram announcing the Jameson Raid lad arrived at Potsdam (luring the night, and ;he Emperor came to Berlin in tho early mornng, and drovo straight from the station to Prince Hohenlolie's official residence in tho IVilhelmstrasse. Prince Hohenlohe and Baron tfarsehall von Bieberstein both told the 3mperor that it would be advisablo to contratulate the Boers on having repelled an ittack by their own strength without foreign issistance, this being a polite form of indicatne that they could not expect any foreign aid. The Emperor raised several objections to ending this telegram, but ultimately allowed limself. to be persuaded by the two statesmen o sign the telegram. The "Kruger telegram," vhich was so often ascribed to (ho Kaiser's mpulsive haste, was thus, according to lien' itein, really tho result of the wisdom of the jerman Foreign Office. The telegram produced t wave of pro-Boer enthusiasm in Germany; md was not understoid in Pretoria as a gentle lint that foreign aid could not be expected, mt as an encouragement to pursue an antiIritish policy. In England, of con.'so, it was regarded as n insult by the whole nation. ar.'l exercised an xtremely unfavourable influence on Antrloicrman relations. Notwiths'nnding the effect o produced, no one responsible German sfatrsnan found i'. neces-'ary to correct f!orn:an pubic opinion by explaining tiiat the telegram ras only meant to be a poiile indication to ho Boers that they could not expect any active ssistance from Germany. ,