The Dominion. MONDAY, MARCH 22, 1909. NEW ZEALAND AND THE NAVY.

Dominion, Volume 2, Issue 462, 22 March 1909, Page 4

The Dominion. MONDAY, MARCH 22, 1909. NEW ZEALAND AND THE NAVY.

10-day s cable messages respecting the: naval crisis contain two very regrettable items. Tho Leader of the Opposition has decided to move a vote of censure on the Government as a protest against the inadequacy of its programme. On the other hand a member of the Government, the Master of Elibank, has been censuring the Unionist party as the true authors of the present trouble, for it was a UnionistGovernment which built the original Dreadnought, thereby not only greatly accelerating the increase of naval expenditure, but also, if the Dreadnoughts alone can count iu comparisons—a disputed point—wiping out in one moment the incontestable superiority of Great Britain over any two foreign Powers. The harm, however, has been done, and it is the duty of all parties to combine for the ono end—the preservation of tho nation's power at sea. It is not a time for squabbling over original responsibilities or settling the burdens of blame; there is a possibility of serious danger in making a party question of a situation upon the gravity of which all parties are agreed, and for the right handling of which united action is necessary. The other cable messages merely indicate that the seriousness of the position was not over-estimated in the first shook of tho debate. In Germany, apparently, it is not considered necessary to cover up the real position by any of tho customary diplomatic methods. To New Zealanders, of course, the most important aspect of tho situation is its bearing upon tho duty and tho finances of the self-governing colonies. Australian Ministers havo been prompt in expressing their sense of tho gravity of the position, and although Sir Joseph Wajid has not yet made any statement, his fre-quently-expressed views as an Imperialist leave no room for doubt as to his readiness to act in tho cause of the Empire. The crisis must bring home to the oversea citizens of tho Empire the fact that thoy must rocast thoir views in many re-

spccts as to their attitude on Imperial defence. Let us consider our own case, which is in essentials the same as the case of tho other States of the Empire. We have all heen living as if peace and a moderate contribution to the British Navy were the permanent and unchangeable sum of our existence as a nation. Nothing has occurred until now—we speak not forgetting the South African war—to suggest the possibility of our having one day to make a sudden and very heavy sacrifice in the Empire's interests. The present 'crisis has made it clear that the overseas dominions are not free from liability to contribute very heavily indeed to the Navy, not only as a matter of policy and for moral effect, but as a matter of positive, material necessity. But we have made our arrangements as if nothing was likely to ever occur to demand from us any greater contribution to the Empire's "naval defence than, say, the £100,000 a year which we now contribute. If, to-morrow, events made it necessary that we should begin to contribute a yearly million, we could not discharge our duty without seriously dislocating our finances. Wo liavo been living as if peaceful days would never cease—we have never seriously faced the possibility of real danger to the Empire. There is, of course, no cause for immediate concern, but it should be realised that the time is opportune to consider the question of shaping our future so as to leave us able to meet at any time any reasonably possible demand upon us for naval defence. The aim of British statesmen is to keep taxation as low as possible, ' and to bear in mind always the strain that war must place upon the nation's resources. In Great Britain the taxation from all sources, direct and indirect, [ amounts to about £2 15s. per head—a : figure that is considered quite high ' enough, as leaving little enough to fructify in the public's pockets against the day of trouble. In New Zealand the i taxation is over £o per head. While our taxation lias been rising to this abnormal figure, we have put nothing by: we have : lived up to and beyond, in times of peace, \ a revenue that is collected on what would : be called a war basis in Great Britain. Clearly we cannot look to extra taxation . to make that provision which" the present . crisis plainly shows to bo the simplest • prudence. We believe that a return to ' economy of administration would provide j the reservo that is required. The rail- ] ways, on a moderate estimate, show a i loss of £250,000 a year. That would be a j very useful sum to save. If the railways j showed a profit of only 1 per cent, on i capital—the Now South Wales railways '■ returned a final profit in tho last financial i year, after paying all charges, of £648,- * 356, or nearly lA per cent, on capital— . we should have another quarter of a mil- ( lion. Sound administration of the rail- ] ways, that is to say, would provide half- j a-million a year at once, and provide it ' without the public as a whole feeling it ( at all. What economical methods would i achieve can be left to the public's imagiu- : ation: clearly tho saving would be an J enormous one, as we should expect from ' the richness of the country's resources < under careful government.. The position i revealed by the naval debate, we must J make up our minds, has come to stay. , And New Zealand must prepare to meet \ that position. ]