ATTACK AND DEFENCE.

Dominion, Volume 2, Issue 334, 22 October 1908, Page 2

ATTACK AND DEFENCE.

LECTURE BY COLONEL DAVIE3. ' . ' "THE POSITION HERESY." IDT TEI.EGIIANI— I'IiESS iSSOCUTION.) Cliristchuroh, October 20.' Some valuable and important advice rela tive to tlie carrying out of volunteer manoeu vres was : given by Colonel Davies, Inspector l General, at a meeting of the officers of tha Christchurch Garrison last night. The lecture was the outcome of'the manoeuvres which took place on Saturday, and which Colonel Davies said were absolutely wrong. , At the beginning, Colonel Davies said that before any force could hope to be in any way proficient it must be trained in the field. It did not matter how good the rank and file were if tho commanders did not know their work, for the force would collapse in war for an absolute certainty. There was no way to learn to handle troops except by getting into the field and handling the troops, and having tho operations criticised. He pointed out that it was useless for a commanding officer to make his disposition until ho knew exactly what'the eupmy were doing. This "position heresy,"- as it wag called, was liable to lead to absolute disaster. It had been said years ago, and quoted by a French general, that the man who depended on this "position heresy" had branded defeat on his brow. The enemy's force should'be made the objective. He did not know what an officer wanted to take up a position for when his object was to destroy the enemy. Tho enemy had got to walk round the flank and he was rendered immobile. He pointed out to one of the officers .that the communication he .had with his force, on Saturday was so bad that he did not know exactly .where his force was, and that his force was so extended that if the enemy had attacked the flank they would have crumpled his force up. The proper way to carry out that sort of thing was for the officer to keep the force well in hand, provide for its protection, and send scouts far away from liirr to give him information about the enemy. If the enemy were going to sit down and tha officer knew where they were,.then-lie could send out very nice orders, but it was absolutely impossible to work his force properly unless he knew what .the enemy was, doing. If an officer let" his force get out of communication it' was not much use, as it became immobile. The enemy could walk "round .him and he could do nothing. ",j — ' There was only one really sound means of defence, and that was attack. They had to I defend one position while they attacked in another. There was no sense in taking. up a. position until they knew what the enemy; were doing. Tho soundest way of dealing with the enemy was to hit thein where they least expected it. .. Dealing with gttn positions, Coloney Davies said that there was no sense in putting guns into position until the officer knew what he was to fire at. The-enemy only got away. He should keep the guns until he knew .what he wanted to use them for. , Ho pointed out that a number of dispatches were not what they should have been.' Sonie pf them that came into his possession ..wero not addressed, were not signed, had no.place on them, no date, did not say whether the troops were their own or the enemy's; they did not sav which way the troops were travelling, north, south, east, or west; they were not of the slightest use. Unless- the man who went to find out ' the information fully informed his commanding officer it was of no avail. AVhen an officer issued orders he must tell his men what to. do, but not havs' to. do it! The man in charge of a unit must know how to handle that unit under all conditions before he was fit to fight. When ha told a subordinate to attack the enemy oil the right flank he could not tell him how to attack it, but must leave it to that subordinate, and must train him to do the best under tha circumstances. • , In reference to. the country chosen for thi manoeuvres, -'.tlißjspeaker -thought it was entirely suitable." \ T'liey had to adapt their fighting to the^ country, not.vice,versa..