The Dominion. MONDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1907. MULTIPLICITY OF CANDIDATES.

Dominion, Volume 1, Issue 76, 23 December 1907, Page 6

The Dominion. MONDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1907. MULTIPLICITY OF CANDIDATES.

The Premier, in his speech at the Liberal and Labour Federation's gathering, stated that he will, next session, introduce a Bill to secure majority rule at the coming general elections. There can be no question that there is room ' for improvement in existing conditions, but we' doubt whether either of the three theoretical methods of ensuring that the majority shall win, from which, if we follow him correctly, the Premier is likely to make his choice, will achieve the desired result. The three methods arfe: (1) The second ballot; (2) the absolute' majority; (3) the preferential voting and proportional representation scheme. This last, it will be noted, aims to cover a wider field than the others, in.that it attempts to give proportionate, representation to minorities. The first scheme, and the one which Sir Joseph has hitherto favoured, but easily tEe least desirable, is simple in design. Where three or more candidates stand for one seat, and no candidate obtains a clear majority over* all his opponents combined,- a second ballot (confined probably to the two leading.candidates) is held a week or so later. There are two obvious objections to this scheme. , Expense.is one, but, if it,stood alone, it might be -faced. The other is, that a very large 'number' of those who voted at the first election would most certainly neglect, or be unable, to do so, at a second ballot, at so short an interval. Consequently, the successful candidate would be elected by a very small proportion of the electorate. The winning number of votes would, probably, be less than the absolute majority of those cast at the first election. The Absolute . Majority . scheme is a system of preferential voting. , Every voter' is supposed to number the candidates, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, for example, in the order of his preference. If a candidate, at the first time of asking, gets more first-choice votes than all the others combined (which will rarely happen), he is elected. If no candidate achieves this, the candidate lowest on the list is struck out, and his second choice votes are added to the totals of the candidates named. If this does not result in an absolute majority for some one, the candidate now at the bottom is struck out, and go on, until some candidate has obtained an absolute majority, The objections' to this scheme are that it is far too complicated for the average constituency, especially with female suffrage, and that no method can be devised, 1 which will ensure that all the voters will exercise their full voting rights and, unless they do, the scheme fails to justify its existence.

The third scheme is altogether more ambitious than the others, for, while using the preferential idea of the second scheme, it 6eeks also to ensure representation of minorities in proportion to votes cast. We -prefer the theory of this plan to either of the others, for under them there must obviously' be considerable minorities, as now, totally unrepresented, whilst under- this, the minorities still unrepresented would be trifling in votevalue. But, unfortunately, it has all the objections /urged against No. 2 scheme, and at least one more peculiar to itself. Our space will not allow us to give full details of this scheme. It must suffice to say that as, under it, the country would be divided up into fourteen huge constituencies, the expense to candidates would be prohibitive, and electors would, in many cases, be voting for candidates whom they had never had an opportunity of seeing or hearing. It is undoubtedly true that the present system is not perfect, and that all the members have not'been elected by an absolute majority of the votes polled. But we may say of all the three schemes mentioned that the remedy may prove worse than the disease. It seems to us that they all entail the use of a Nasmyth hammer to crush a small pebble. The main cause of the evil is tho multiplicity of candidates, whose chances of success are farcical from the outset. Wo except Mr. Isitt from this, because he, admittedly, is nominated wherever it is necessary to obtain a no-license poll. At the last election, excluding double candidatures, there were 207. candidates for 76 seats. Of these no fewer than 40 failed to poll one-fourth of the votes gained by the_ successful canand. 11 others did.apt 'EpU. fines-

half. "We agree with the Premier in holding that this multiplicity of candidates is a serious and growing evil. We differ from him in viewing it as a mere question of party advantage. It is a question of national importance. This multiplicity of candidates does a very real injury to the country. It causes great waste of money. It confuses the issues placed before the electors. It often leads to the defeat of .candidates who would he a credit to the -Legislature, and, incidentally, to the election of men who are very much the reverse, and thus lowers the prestige of our Parliament abroad. The remedy is simple, but probably unpopular, and it may _be considered undemocratic. It is to increase largely the amount of money, to be deposited by candidates, making it either non-returnable in any event, as in England, or returnable only to the two leading candidates. While this reform will not debar any genuine Labour or other candidate from standing, who has the hearty support-of his fellows—we see this in England to-day—it will abolish the evil we are discussing, produce a much clearer answer from the electorates, and reduce the number of- members, who are not absolutely majority members, almost to vanishing point, and far more effectually than any of the three schemes we have outlined.