The Dunedin Libel Case.

Cromwell Argus, Volume V, Issue 221, 3 February 1874, Page 7

The Dunedin Libel Case.

t*# . (From the. Daily Tims.) We cannot say that we are surprised at the verdict of the jury in the case Orkney ®, Bell, ‘ The special jurymen who awarded fifty pounds to Captain Ot-kney"because a letter had been ' published calling him a “ Bumble,” only followed the example of other Dunedin Special Jurymen. Indeed, there has never been art action for libel brought against the Press but what has - always resulted in the defeat of the Press-. We would therefore not comment so ■ much oh the special circumstances of the case . just decided, but rather point out some of the corollaries that necessarily follow from ’ ■such verdicts as those given in Orkney ®j Bell. One, and perhaps the most important ■in newspapers, undoubtedly is, that the plpss forming the,special jurymen in Dunedin does . - not desire acriticalPress. This result again frpntv. nsriy causes. Ip a small town, •or amongst a small community, there.,is, a of everyone- by his , neighbour •which makes any criticism at all approaching that of a personal kind extremely unpopular. That there is such a cause as this a perusal of many of the British papers abundantly manifests.. Were .a Dunedin paper to pub* • lish articles such as appear in the Scotsman, the Fall Mall Gazette, or the Dublin FreeJournal, there would be enough employment for all the lawyers in libel cases ’ only. And this very knowledge of every one hy his neighbour is preventive of the growth ■ of any such thing as public opinion. In New ■ ‘Zealand there is no New Zealand public •opinion ; and as for public opinion in the provinces, there is nothing deserving such a name extant in any of them. The Provincial ■system is blamed for this, and no doubt the want of a common centre in the Colony—-the want of a head to our body politic—is one of the causes of this lack ,of public opinion. But the <£ knowledge of every one by his neighbour” is also prejudicial to its existence. .If the various libel cases that have been tried in Otago had been tried in a place where the parties to the actions were unknown, we believe the verdicts would have been different; arid such being the case, this last 'verdict, coupled with those that have preceded it, is siittplv the newest warning to journalists, that in the treatment of any subject they must deal in vague generalities, and avoid nslikrp of personal criticism, In fact, journals must recognise that.there is in New Zealand as active and vigilant a Press censor as ever •existed in Louis Napoleon’s palmiest days, (From the Guardian.) The unsatisfactory state of the law of libel was further illustrated last week in, the Supreme Court of Dunedin. The plaintiff, as in the Napier case upon which we commented ■the other day, is a public servant holding the office of deputy harbour-master of the port of - Dunedin-; the defendant, Mr George Bell, is proprietor of the Evening Star, long known and deservedly respected as a journalist. The -cause of action was trivial, if not childish ; and • idle result was remarkable in this, that though dhe publication complained of was proved by " the plaintiff’s own witness, and immediate superior, to have had the effect of increasing his superior’s confidence in him, and although be failed himself to cite a single instance in which it had any prejudicial effect, the special jury awarded him £SO as a salve for his wounded feelings. Such a finding is simply preposterous, and should induce the Government to prepare a bill during the recess for the amendment of the law of libel. It is a ■matter of the greatest urgency, for, should the law remain as ibis, anything like independent criticism of public men, or comment upon matters of public .interest, will be impossible, except under the peril of heavy penalties. The jury, in actions of libel, is constituted judge of the law and the facts ; and it is not going too far, we think, to say that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the finding of juries in all such actions would he inadmissable in any other cause. In fact, the whole matter is at the discretion of the jury, which may be influenced in its finding by a variety of motives outside the evidence. In the case before ns, of Orkney v. Bell, the ■finding is clearly against the evidence and the Impartial and intelligent charge of the Judge, although this result may have been the consequence of that state of mind attributed to the Dunedin- Magistrate by the plaintiff through Mr Branson, and from the same •cause, “ namely, that they were thoroughly * fogged’ by counsel learned in the law.”