How the Prussians Meau to Get into Paris.

Cromwell Argus, Volume 1, Issue 52, 9 November 1870, Page 1 (Supplement)

How the Prussians Meau to Get into Paris.

—o—(San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 10. ) A Lieutenant-Colonel of tho Prussian staff says that three armies are in full march on Paris, by way of the Moselle, of the Vosges, and of the fort. The Gorman strategist brings these armies, badly cut up but still very strong, to our very walls. They mean to find their way in at all hazards. But Paris is a vast entrenched camp; it is not an ordinary strong place; it is defended by half a million of men, and protected by an enceinte of 28 kilometres (17|- miles) in circumference, strengthened with 93 bastions, and fortified thoroughly. These walls are still further protected by 15 detached forts, provided with seven great I external works, whose fires cross and | form a second enceinte, whose guns can | crush everything around them. Paris is I further guarded by the Seine, the Marne, J and with an internal circular railway. I Such a place cannot bo invested in the j regular wav-—it must be assailed at some i vulnerable point. Now, which is the ■ vulnerable point? The eastern forts, i Romainville. Boisy, Rossuy, Nogent, Yin-1 cennes, are advantageously situated on a: plateau covered by the Marne, and they form such a strong line, our Prussian admits that it would be imprudent to attack on that side. Then again, it would not do to attack by Charenton, for after carrying that place they must cross the fires of Vincennes, Ivry, and the! ramparts. On the south-west, the attack j would be against Charenton, Ivry, and the \ Bicetre—decidedly unadvisable. Then the \ southern forts, Montrouge, Vanves, and j Isay, on the steep heights between j Sceaux and Versailles, are very impracti- j cable. Mont Valerien is the only work j on the west; and then Paris is behind the Seine, which makes a double curve. The banks here are hilly and covered with I wood, furnishing abundant shelter to the I defenders. The besiegers, then, are limited to St. Denis. The Prussian! Colonel says the points of attack are naturally on the north and north-east—■ they are the weak sides. The eastern fronts are partly covered by the Marne ; the south and west are strong, and their \ attack might compromise the besiegers' line of retreat. On the north, the Paris and Strasbourg railway would serve for j transport from the Rhine. Admitting that the Prussian army must be stronger ; than the French army, and that the' French in the field, being kept at a distance, cannot annoy a besieging force, St. : Denis should be the first point of attack, j We might then advance on Montmarte l without the risk of a flanking fire from j the forts. We should attack simultaneously the three forts of St. Penis and that of Aubervilliers, and then make a j feint on the east. The siege would re- i soluble that of Sebastopol. St. Denis is; on the right bank of the Seine, which leaves a tongue of land that must be seized by the besieging force. The besiegers will then observe the citadel of Mont Valerien ; they will cut railways on the left bank of the Seine, and throw a bridge across to communicate with the troops on the right bank. To accomplish this, the Prussian officer's arrangements are simple. lie sets 50,000 against the three forts of St. Denis, and on the tongue of land between St. Denis and Mont Valerien, and 20,000 more in front of Aubervillieis: and all these, covered by the forests of Bandy and other points of res'stance in that direction, could maintain themselves against any force sent to dislodge them. Thirty thousand at Xeuilly could operate against the Rossuy fort, but their main use would be to secure the line of retreat. Place before St. Denis 50,000, north of St. Denis 20,000, in the forest of Bondy 30,000, at Bouyet 20,000. at Nenilly 30,000, between Nenilly and Villeneuve 50,000 ; total, 180,000, which would form the siege. But these would not be enough. To protect the besiegers an army of observation would be needed. This could be done by 1 the army of the Upper Rhine, 120,000 strong ; and another army ought to enter by way of Switzerland, without paying ■ any attention to the neutrality of that i petty nation. In this way there would > be an effective force of 400,000 men. The ■ duty of the last-mentioned army would be ■ to intercept convoys and cut off railway communication between the provinces and i the capital. This plan was formed and - promulgated some seven or eight years i ago ; but, in conclusion, we must allow . the author to speak for himself—" A defeat of the besiegers might attain the ; most disastrous proportions, if the popula- ■ tion should take an active part in the war, Y :&li& should join the garrisons in cutting , oif the convoys of the invading army."