The Effects of the War.

Cromwell Argus, Volume I, Issue 45, 21 September 1870, Page 6

The Effects of the War.

[The Times, July 16.] The aim of France in this deplorable war is well known. She claims the left bank of the Rhine. On the other hand, Pnusia has often protested that if she was ever driven to take the field against France, she would not lay down her sword till the ancient German provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were restored to the Fatherland. We know, therefore, the primary cause and real aim of the war. The champions in the lists are only two, and the prize lies within each other's territory. Could their differences be settled by arbitration, or the couteat be decided by one great battle, no other country in' Europe need be affected by the change. This amounts to saying that no State in Europe need join in the fray, or, in other words, that the war can bo localised. And yet what probabilities are there of a long-continued observance of the laws of neutrality ? Belgium and Holland, the countries most immediately exposed to the trampling of the contending hosts, have lost no time in declaring that they will stand on their independent rights and the inviolability of their territory. But there is hardly a precedent of a war being waged on the Rhine without the immediate occupation of those fertile plains; and the unprincipled attempt to involve the King of the Belgians in the Hohenzollorn quarrel opens no very cheering prospect before those who rely on the sacredness of international treaties as a safeguard to Flanders or Luxembourg. On the other hand. Austria, under the influence of Von Buest, hastens to declare that she will keep aloof from the strife so long as two combatants alone are in the field, but " not if a third power takes part in the struggle"—an intimation which seems mainly aimed at Denmark or Italy, should those States look upon the concentration of French and German forces ou the Rhine as a favourable opportunity either for an inroad Into Schleswig or an attempt upon Peter's patrimony. Till something decisive has been achieved on the Rhine, nothing is more likely than that there may be peace on the Danube, on the Tiber, and the Elbe. It is only when exhaustiou sets in on either side that the rancours, jealousies, and ambitions of bystanders will have full play. Unless powerfully awed bv Russia, it is difficult to imagine that Austria will long remain neutral in a struggle, the miin objeot of which is " Vengeance for Sadnwa ;" nor is it very certain that all the other-sufferers from that victory—Hanover, Hesse, Frankfort, Saxony, Bavaria, War temburg—will not rise in full cry against Prussia the unraent she exhibits any signs of faintness in her death-grapple with her chief antagonist. France has doubtless reckoned on all this chapter of accidents, and she will exert herself to the utmost to insure a first advantage. But many will fe«l incline 1 to back German steadfastness against French impetuosity, and will have little hesitation in looking upon another Jeua only as the natural forerunner of another Leipsic. Few men will be so ingenuous as to imagine that the conscientiousness of a righteous cause will be of much avail against the preponderance of big battalions. Yet there can be no doubt as to the side on which the world's sympathies will bo enlisted, and, whatever may on former occasions have been the offences of Prussia, she will in this instance have on her side all that moral support which is seldom denial to those who take up arm 3in self-defence. It is otherwise with France, whom nothing short of a long, victorious career will rehabilitate in European opinion. It is still difficult to conceive what infatuation can have committed the Kinperor Napoleon to a course which is as impolitic as it is criminal. We cannot admit that foreign war was prompted by the necessity of guarding against the disturbance at home. The Plebiscite ha 3 re-established Imperial omnipotence in France. In Emihe Ollivier, Napoleon 111. has found as passive and as serviceable an instrument as in the more brilliant aud genial Rouher. Legal opposition showed utter incapacity for organisation, and ultra-de-mocracy was dying of its own rage. What better foundation to his throne could the Emperor wish for than his eight millions of peasant votes? Or how could France lie more helplessly at his discretion? It was, it seems, fated that the ideas of the First Empire should from beginning to end be tho bane of the second. The Emperor himself, however, had drawn the proper line of distinction that was to separate the two epochs. The empire of the 2nd of December was to be peace, and Napoleon the Third had good reason to doubt the popularity even of his successful and not wholly unrighteous war*. But the Prussian war now opening, will, when the first feverish enthusiasm abates, appear indefensible even to tho most selfish and vain-glorious patriotism. It is important that the Emperor should act upon his favourite maxim —" strike soon and strike 'hard.'" If the expenditure and hardships of the campaign be prolonged, the French people and the French array itself will find that even the Rhine mav be bought too dearly. Woe to the Emperor if the ardour of his troops has time to abate—if there is anything UTte a check in the enterprise—still worse a repulse. There is no possible return for him. except as a cmiiuerot, and a conqueror on the soale to which Aunterlitff and Wagrara accustomed his uncle's subjects. But it is very questionable whether one Solferino will dispose of Prussia as easily as it did of Austria ; even were Prussia utterly overcome, foroes may ho found drawn up behind her in second line.