Why Court Quashed Price Order

Chronicle (Levin), 15 December 1949, Page 9

Why Court Quashed Price Order

- w WELLINGTON, Dee. 14. A writ of eertiorari removing into the 3upreme -Court and quashing an order af the Price Tribunal was granted by !Hr Justice HutcMnson in a judgement made available today. The plaintiffs, F. E. Jackson and Co. Ltd., of Auckland, had' sought the writ against Price Order No. 1001, which set the arbitrary deadline at May 23 of this year for downward revision of prices of fast moving hardware lines following appreciation of the £NZ on August 19, 1948. Three main points raised at the hearing on October 11, 12 and 13 by Mr A. H. North, K.C., who appeared with Mr A. M. Cousins for the plaintiff"company, were answered by his Honour 's judgement. They were whether the Price Tribunal were a statutory body exereising judieial or • quasi-judiciai f unctions ; if the Tribunal were a judieial or quasi-judieial , body, whetheT Price Order 1001 were made in viola tion of the principles of natural justice; whether the Price Order were void because the Tribunal did not comply with its statutory obligations.

Af'ter quoting authority, his Honour expressed the opinion in answer to the first . main point that a price order is legislative in substance and effect, as is an industrial award, but went on to say: "The Tribunal 's powers are not thoSe of reeommendation, but of deeision, and the statutory obligation, generally spea'king, to sit in publie, along with other indieations referred to, in my opinion imposes an obligation on it to act judicially." ; ' Dealing with the seeond point, his Honour said that the plaintilfs' application to the Tribunal had been for a public hearing at which it would be given the opportunity of .adducing evidence on " (a) The effect which your proposals will have upon the trading position of our company; (b) the effect which such proposals will. have on the national revenue; (e) the effect of such proposals on employment in the hardware distributive trades. " His Honuor did not think that the Tribunal was bound to listen to the plaintiff company on the effect that the • proposed price order would have on

the national revenue, or on employ- , ment, but the plaintiff had a right to 1 be heard on the first head of -its application. The Tribunal claimed in substance that it already knew what the plaintiff wished to say, and had considered it. It Seemed, howevfer, tliat the plaintiff claimed that it had more to put forward than appeared in its previous letters. "Whatever might be the position if , the attitude of an individual or small group were not known, ' ' said the judgment, "I think that, when its attitude has been strongly put forward, when it has dissoeiated itself frdm the bulk of those in the same line of business in any agreement with a propoajiRl price order, and when it has sought an opportunity to be heard, it should be . given that opportunity. "In this case the plaintiff was not advised that its request for a public hearing had been deelined until the price order had been made. I' think that this amounts to a violation of a fundamental principle of natural justice within the authorities." Ground for Success 'His Honour considered it unneeessary to consider the third point in detail, beyond saying that he would hesitate to say that the departure in. a procedural matter from the striet

intention of. the Act would justify issue of .a . writ of eertiorari. The plaintiff was entitled to succeed on the seeond ground diseussed. "In my judgement," his Honour concluded, "the plaintiff is entitled to the writ of eertiorari sought, _ and to its costs, which I fix at 75 guineas and disbursements. ' ' The defendants were the Price Tribunal, comprising Jjudge William John Hunter, phillip North Holloway, and the Director of Price Control, Henry Leslie Wise. The Solieitor-General (Mr H. E. Evans, K.C.), with him Mr E. A. Haughey, appeared for the defendants at the hearing.