Those Fateful Days Before The Munich Agreement

Chronicle (Levin), 18 February 1949, Page 5

Those Fateful Days Before The Munich Agreement

* (N»Z.P.A.-

Reuter .

Covyrmht)

Received Thursday, 7 p.m. LuNUQN, February 17. Any lingering. doubts that may remain about the eoiirse of British t'oreign policy priur to the liunieh agreement, wili be removed by the publieation of the latest instaiinent oi' offieial Foreign Offiee doeuments covering the period 1919 to 1939. The docuraents make it plain that the British Uoverninent under Mr. Neville. Chamberlain, supported by the strongest representntions from its Ambassador in Berlin, Sir M'evilie Henderson, brought increasing pressure to bear upon the Czechs to capitulate to dennan demands. Tliese papers, as the Manchester Cuardian points out this morning, shouid once and for all destroy the myth that Mimich was a blunder into which the British (lovernment stumbled unawares. The offieial records show that it was the result of -delL berate British policy. This poliey, it is disclosed, developed immediately al'ter the German aimexation oi Austria.

Very soon ai'ter this took place, the tnen Hritish Mimsier m rrugue, Mr. Newton, wroie to me Foreigli Uilice: "ISutiiiiig \ve t.r hranee could do coiuu r>avc Czechoslovakia from bemg overruii, thereiore Czecnosxovakia snould be encouraged to aajust her position to the cimimsiaiices oi tue postwar Liuope." Sir JNeviiie Henderson supported this point oi view and at dilferent times. vvrote strongiy to tiie tlien Foreign Secretary, Lora Haiifax, urgmg, to use Jiis ovvn vvords, that "L)r. Henes lnust be niade to swallow a disagreeabie pill. ' ' Tn one of his communication.s Sir, Neville dscribed the Czee.iis as "incwrigibly pigheaded people." The records show that aJthuiign the Foreign Uilice and Lord Haiifax did not iinreservedly approve Sir N'eville's reeommeiulat ions. their inain preoceupat ion was 1hai Sir Neville shouid restrain German aggressiveness until the Czechs were willing to give way peacefully. The attitude was apparently dictated by Mr. Chamberlain 's belief that France and Britain were not strong enough to oppose German designs. At a meetings of French Ministers which he attended in April, 1938, the British Prime Minister said frankly he did not consider Britain and France had the necessary strength to do this. . About this tinie both Mr. Newton ' in Prague and Sir Neville Henderson in Berlin, reiterated their arguments that Ihe Czechs shouid he urged to give way to Hitler's demands. "ti Czechoslovakia wants to survive at all. slie must eome economieally withii. the orbit of Germany," remarked Sir Neville Henderson. Later he siiggeSted that in order 1o foi'ce the Czechs to adrnit this point of view, Britain shouid support a plebiseite which would liavo the effect of detaehing from Czoe.huslovakia ' the Sudeten" - Cermau areas oii the i'rontier between Germany and Czechoslovakia. The records show that in i'aee of this pressure, the Czechs agreed to invite Britain to sciul the aboitive mission headed by Uord Runciman, in the hope that if 1 h\\ made sonie concessions, Britain would give them stronger support. Sir Neville Henderson, at this stage, plaeed eonsiderable fajth in vvliat he termed the "modcrate elements" around Ilitler and rc present od to Lord llalil'ax ihal il the Czechs gave way, they would reeeive fair treatment from the Germans. In order to appease German de mands, the British Governmcnt urged the Czechs to disarm and made it plain it was not prepared to give them any security guarantees. At the same timo Mr. Chamberlain was urging the French Government to adopt the British line. It was realised, he said, that the French were comyiitted by trealy obligations to assist the Czechs but he made it plain that Ihe British Uovernment did not consider itself similarly eommitted. Later he urged the French to repml iate their allianee with Czechoslovakia uiiless J)r. Benes made furlher concessions. Tlie archives do not disclose whether or not the British Fhuhassy in Moseow was kept in toueh with tliese deve.lojmients or whether any steps were taken 1o ascertain Eussian reactions. This is important, in view of subsequent Eussian assertions that Ihe Soviet Union was prepared to give ■ guarantees to the Czechs. ;