PILOT BLAMED FOR KAKA CRASH

Chronicle (Levin), 22 January 1949, Page 5

PILOT BLAMED FOR KAKA CRASH

Press Assoeiatioii)

Board Of Inquiry Says More Navigation Aids Are Needed On Route

(Per

WELLINGTON, January 21. r Neiv Zealand's worst air disaster which oecurred 011 Oetober 23 last when National Airways Corporation's machine Kaka crashed on .Alount Rnapehu with the-loss of 13 lives resulted from an error by the eaptain of the aireraft in caleulatihg his course. Ilowever, the aeeident probably* would not have happened l]ad there been additional radio homers installed on the route. These opinions are given by the Board of Inquiry in its report on the aeeident which was released today by the .Air Minister Ilon. V. Jones). The Loard comprised Sir Harold Johnston K.C. (chairman)., 'aptain K. A. Brownjohn. of Tasman Empire Airways, and Wing . •ommander J. W. II . Bray, R.N.Z.A.F. Replying to one of its terms of referenee: "Did any act or oinission of the eaptain and erew cause the aeeident? " the Board says : "It is the Board 's opinion that ihe reason for the aireraft L'oing off its prescribed course was due to an error by the eaptain in ealculating the aireraft 's eourse." The Board found that there were no othei' faetors whieh eontributed to the aeeident. T'le Board was asked what steps, if possibility of the aireraft becoming out , v should 1)0 taken to eusure that the of.eontrol under instrument flying con- . -i of similar aeeidents is eliminatecl ditions was also elimiuated.

iiiiuiiiiised ? Its report states: -■Wo have 110 eviden.ee l/efore ns i.-ii I'liahles us to make a general re- , • ii'inlation in regard to the safety , . airliaes in New Zealand sueh as installation of radar in eertain m ios or the installation of any one ■« r: h-ular system to replaee the present - i(Vt! of radio ranges and homing v;in,!i-.. Wo have been told that sueh a 1 ialions would be governed by . o-i.i'iih- I'onsidorations or by teehnieal • ih- iiiiies which aro still the subject • iiii i-rnatioiial diseussion. But we also 'been told by Mr. A. G. X.A.C. oj)erations manager, a! liio system iii use in New Zealand ■!.- ilescont. ••Thf Wanganni-Hamilton stage of • Whenuapai-Paraparaumu fliglit is - .. country the most difiieult in New v ,iaml, and immediate steps sliould be ■r, ;-.-n 1'or the installation of one or radio homers botween Wanganui ' Hamilton to onsnre that at no time an aireraft on that route out of of homing beacons to assist the • ft to make good its track. ' • The present arrangements whereby a pilot receives inadequate briefing and its permitted to depart from an airfield without a flight plan, or is asked to sign an nncompleted fliglit plan appears unjustifiably loose. In our opinion steps should be taken to prevent any recurrence of such laxity. "licsnito a snggestion made at the licar'.ng that the pveparing of pre-flight esiia.atos of ilrif't bv a standby pilot uas useloss and should be abandoned, w i ■ i-.oisider t his praetiee would assist tlic -omimi mler of an ain-rafl in making hi- a Iraia! ions and is a sonnd one pro- . idcd. «if course, that the oflieer making : i! i- alralation is, as he should be, i'udy (jualilied to perfonn this duty." The Hoard found that all the occuaris of the aireraft must have met f-iaiif death when it crashed into the ■ ">.ntain. The absence of evidence f: ua rhose in the aireraft made the en- : i ry into the cause of the disaster dif- ' ; ti 1 1 . particularlv as in this ease no • >r«l of the fatal flight appeared to ti-. c been taken by either the eomardcr or eo-pilot. "Ilowever, the evidence given as to • ■ :c point of deviation from the norrnaL • ate, as to the ' position the plane • stdied — 20 miles off its course — and ' >nndition when found, so narrowed ■ ■ jmssibilities that a reliable conclu■■•fi *m the cause of the disaster could "-'.nably be reacTied. The Board ders that the Kaka's radio equip- • nd ground navigational aids were ' ■ ating normally and in no way ! t (mI to the aeeident. "At the same time the Board considers it is established that the radio aids for this route leave much to he 'wsired, and that had there "been additional radio homers on the direct line bf'lween the Wanganui homer and the Hamilton homer, so that the aireraft was at no time out of range of at least one of these installations, it is highly probahle the aeeident would not have oecurred since with such additional homers any navigational error would have been immediately apparent to the pilot. "The evidence given by three other piiots who were flying the same route al approxiinately the same time indicales that there was a partial radio blackout in the area where the Kaka crashed, and it appears that this eonchliun invariablv exists during bad weather conditions, and in partieular vvlien there is a liigh static level." Ihe Board considers it, most unlikely that there was an constructional defeet in the aireraft. Locklieed Electras have a particularlv good record and, in the opinion of pilots who have flown them, are of robust and rugged design. There was notliing to indicate that either of the engines failed in th.e flight, and both were well within their ])re.s,-ribed time for overliaul. The Board seriouslv considered the possibility of the aireraft having been struck by lightning on either its southbound oi* northbound trip, causing nonajiparent conqiass deViation, but formed the opinion that the possibility of instrument defects because'* of an eleeIrical discharge could be dismissed. All the other instruments had apparent ly been working satisfactorily on the outbound trip and were well within their prescribed periods for overhauJ. The Board said meteorological hazards such as lightning discharge, icing or structural failure due to high turbulence hud uot eontributed to the ac'eident. The

j The report says that«the Board, considering that weathax- conditions at the time of the aeeident to be of niajor importance, went to some trouble to check the analvsis of the weather subnutteu to it during the inquiry by the Meteorological Division. It was unfortunate that Commander Hare made no effort to keep a record of the drift he anticipated or of the courses he intended to steer on the north-bound journev. "It is plain, however, from the forecast he received that he was not enlitled to mahe an allowance for a driff ■ of less than 11 degrees. This would be calculated from his track and air speed coupled with the i'oreeast of wiud of 310 degrees true at 30 knots. Three other coiumanders flying the same route at appr.oximatelv the same time had tlusarne information on weather conditions as Commander Hare, and we consider he should have acted as thev did and made an allowance of considerably more than 11 degrees for drift. These commanders did not experience any partieular difficulty in navigating the route on that partieular day, and eacii appears to have flown a reasonably accurate course, although oue said that the Wanganui and Hamilton homers were unreliable and he had to rely ou broadcast station bearings as, navigational aids. | " If Commander Hare had made the minimum possible allowance for drifi, tliat is 11 degrees. and had flown at an air speed of 130 miles an hour for the iirst iive minutes after leaving the Wanganui homer — that is while he was climbing from -±300 to (50U0 t'eet — aua theu had flown at his cruising air speed of 15fl miles an hour until the time of the crash, it would have required a wind from 203 degrees true at 71 knots to take liiin to the scene of the crash. ''Analvsis of weather conditions from all sources of information available exelude the possibility of wind of such velocity at the time of the aeeident. The evidence establishes that the wind at the time was from 320 degrees true at 17 knots, whereas Commander Hare 's "forecast indicated wind from 310 degrees true at 30 knots. He may, , therefore, have allowed for wind of onlv . the latter strength. The investigation shows that the actuai wind a\ tht time ; would certainlv have taken him to the east of his desired track, but he would | still not have come closer than seven ' and a-half miles to the actuai scene of the aeeident. ! "In the light of this evidence the i Board can onlv conclude that in some manner Commander Hare miscaleulated his course. "It was suggested during the liearing that he may have used the j drift he encountered on his southhonnd trip for his north-bound trip, | and inadvertently applied it the wrong way. While the Board agrees that this theory does fit in extraordinarily well with the events as they happened, it cannot in our opinion he considered as more than a remote possibility. ' ' In the seetion of its report dealing with the manner in which the aireraft was operated over the route by N.A.O., the Board says various matters arose during the investigafion which call for coinment, although in this case they J cannot be said to have had a direct influence on the caiise of the aeeident. But as air aeeidents are generally associated with a combination of errors, eacli of which taken alone would not necessarily be disastrous, laxity of adniinistratioil in. even seemingly uniin-poj-t details adds to the chances of disaster. ' ' The evidence diselosed that in this flight there was in soijie respects a waut of eare and attention to essential detail. The procedure laid down for this seetion of the route is sound, but in some particulars it was honoured more in the breach than in the observance. The evidence showed that on arrival at Paraparaumu Commander Hare hurried th rough llis meteorological brieflng, and he signed an incomplere flight i)lan.