MADE NORMAL FLIGHT

Chronicle (Levin), 13 December 1948, Page 5

MADE NORMAL FLIGHT

Coun^el's. Submissions At - Kaka Inquiry WELLINGTON, Dec. 13. ' The submission that the Kaka was fully efficient' and equipped, that its crew were competent and expertenced/ and that the - aircraft made sS normal flight northward from. Paraparaumu as far as Wanganui homer was made by Mr. D. W. Virtue, for National Airways Corporation, when the final day of the inquiry into the Ruapehu disaster on October 23 began before the board of three members, with Sir Harold ■' Johnston, K.C., as chairman. Mr.- Virtue said The corporation joined in expressing ; regret at the loss of so many valuable lives, including one of its most experienced commanders and the second ofidcer. Mr. Virtue said that when the Kaka, began 'its fiight.it had the necessary certificates of airworthiness and had behaved satisfactorily on the southward- trip. .No recent log entries: pointed. to anything which might" have caused it to be so far off its course. The inspector of aircraft accidents had fairly said that the Kaka was fully airworthy when it left Palmerston North for the Iast time. The crew were fully qualified by the Air Department requirements and the corporation's standards. Commander Hare had been clieck tested only three days before ' and promoted in his route grading, continued Mr.- Virtue. He had received a complete instrument course, including navigation. He had made eight surtey trips on the route before the service began and five return trips after the service was started.' Second Officer Russell was fully competent to take over jn an. emergency. The evidence showed that the Kaka was properly loaded and despatched at Palmerston North. ^ Suggestion. Fantastic Some mention had been made of the fact that the aircraft was running late, said Mr. Virtue, but that was not a factor in the inquiry. A delay of 15 minutes was not unusual and all aircraft that day were late., Any time made up by the Kaka was gained on the ground and not by any impruaent fiying. Any suggestion that Commander Hare" was anxiaus to get back 'to Auckland because a paper found in the plane showed that he was rostered to lea've- for- Norfolk Island next morning was fantasticz He was not so rostered, but had considered an exchange of duties with another pilot who was due to make the Norfolk Island trip. The corporation ' did • not approve of the exchange and the paper found in the plane was,. no more than an aftennath of tlie suggestion, which had not been pursued. Mr, Virtue said that the absence of a completed fiight plan did not contribute to- the accident. The essential features of flight plans were primarily for use by the air controi authorities in preventing collisions in the air. Only in respect of drift allowance might . the flight plan be of some navigational assistanee, but the evidence of other pilots was that they made their own drift calculations. Moreover, a computer found in the wreckage showed that the Kaka's crew made their own drift reckoning on the southward trip and would probably do the same going north. It was unlikely that Commander Hare was influenced by the wrong entry of drift on the flight plan at Paraparaumu as port instead of starbbard. The evidence made it doubtful if he even saw that entry. j Commander Hare had had a wea- ; ther briefing at .Whenuapai and knew the weather on the route from his own experience on the southward run. He had on board all the necessary information to calcuiate the drift and there was no additional weather data which the forecaster at Paraparaumu could have given him. Commander Hare's failure to pick up the flight plan at Palmerston North showed that he intended to use the 'forecasted drift. Mr. Virtue said that the absence of signals from the plane after leaving the Wanganui homer did not inuicate that it was in difficulties or that the radio was. faulty for that was the normal period of silence. The aircraft was at a normal Jheight on a normal route, and the occupants from the evidence in the wreck feie conducting themselves normally at the time of the crash. Cause of Drift It would be impossible to determine precisely wnat set the plane so far oit its course, contmued counsel. The Air Departments navigation expert had said that he t'ounct it hard to believe that both the commander and co-pilot fell into tne same error of appiymg the drift calculations wrongiy. The board would have to consider, therefore, the possibility that the winds that afternoon differed greatly from those in the forecast used by Commander Hare, consequently putfing the plane well ofi its course. The chief aviation meteorologist had given evidence that the winds in the area were iikely to change consideraoiy after 2 p.m., backing from 320 to 270 degrees at 6000 feet and increasing to 40 or 50 knots/ compared with which the forecast used by Commander Hare indicated a slight backing to 31 degrees and a decrease to 30 knots. "I submit that the winds encojantered may have been the stronger. There is no evidence that tjie more violent and westerly, winds did not arrive some hours earlier than was anticipated. The possibility that winds dead on the beam and of much greater in-

tensity than was anticipated were experienced cannot be ruled out. Such winds would have hullified Commander Hare's calculations." Mr. Virtue said That the farmer who sighted the plane just east of the Wanganui homer estimated the ground wind then at 40 m.p.h., compared' with the forecast surf ace wind of 18 to 20 knots. If this witness Was reliable and the surface winds were stronger than vthe forecast. winds at 6000 feet/ they might similarly have reached a speed' which was not expected until about 5 p.m.