KAKA WAS FLYING AT NORMAL SPEED

Chronicle (Levin), 6 December 1948, Page 5

KAKA WAS FLYING AT NORMAL SPEED

Inquiry Iflto Ktiapehu Crash Commences WELLINGTON, Dec. 5. An examiflatiofl of thie wrebkage indicated that when, on October 23, the Lockhee'd Electra aifcfaft Kaka, opefatdd by the Naltional Airways Cqrporation^ liit tlie perpendicular rock face on Mdurit Ruapehu, it Was flying at llbfmal speed and the occupaiits, Who were probably all kill'ed i'nstahtly, hdd no warning of the i'mpehding disaster. This was stated by Mr". W. II. Cunningham, appearirig for the Air Departmenty when the Bo'ard of Inquiry into New Zealand's greatest air disaster began its hearing today. Sir Haroid Johnston, .K.C., is chairman of the board. The. other members are Wing Commander J. W. H. Bray, R.N.Z.A.F., and Captain K. C. Brownjohn, of Tasman Empire Airways. Mr. D. W. Virtiie appeared for . National Airways Corporation, Mr. P. K. H. Smyth for the next-of-kin of the second pilot, Flight Offlcer B. C. Russell, and Mr. J. Meltzer for the widow of Mr. F. J. Follas, one of the passengers. The board is asked to determine the cause of the accident, if any act or omission of the pilot contrlbuted to the accident, if any factor apart from the actions cff the crew contributed to or caused. the accident, and to suggest steps to avoid or minimise the risk of similar accidents in the fiiture. Mr. Cunningham said he would produce every piece of evidence it was within the department's power to produce. Mr. Cunningham, detailing the circumstances, of the Kaka's fatal flight, said that at 1.38 p.m. she reported by radio telephohe that she was at Wanganui homer at j 4500 feet and climbing to 6000. jThis message- was received by Ohakea control, which asked the ! aircraf t to supply the weather conditions, to which the tKaka replied that she was flying in rain and ten-tenth cloud. Ohakea then transmitted an altimeter setting, which was immediately acknowije^lged. That was the last message ; received from the aircraft, which was then 140 miles from Hamilton. Despite nearly 400 hours of flying by 46 aircraft, it was six days before the Kaka was found, continued Mr. Cunningham. 'The inspector of accid.ents, as Was usual, began .. invesfigatiohs' , immediately after the accidehti and jhis evidence would be fieard, ' All ;on board having. been kil.iqd, ( thefe fperished with them the Qnly'„posisible source of . dir.ect evidenq'e. as to the factors which may have caused the aircraft to strike the mounltain. The boafd = would, therefore, be faced with drawing such inferenees 'fro"m the; fact-s adduced as regards the cause of the accident as it thought justified. Detailing the evidence --to. be called, Mr. Cunningham, .said it would indicate that • snow fell on Ruapehu for.at least 24 hours following the accident, and the base of cloud on the mountain did not lift above 4000 feet until the fifth day after the accident. Had these conditions been less favourable, much more time might have been taken before the wreck' was located. Riiotographs would be produced, taken on November 5 when the snow had melted appreciably and exposed the rocky outcrops, which wouid show the difficulty of picking up such objects as the alu'minium wreckage. The evidence would include an analysis of the weather over the route on the day of the accident, accounts of pilots who flew over it .at about the same time as the Kaka, and evidence of the steps taken to reach the wreckage, investigations &t the scene and the salvage of essential documants and parts. , It was certain that all the occupants had been killed instantly by the tremendous impact when the plane struck the rock face at not less than 150 m.p.h., Mr. Cunningham said. Other evidence would deal with the qualifi^ cations of the members of the air crew, the condition of the aircraft and its instruments when the certificate of airworthiness was issued on October 22, a description of the navigational aids available, * and cthe epect of the weather conditions in relation to the aircraft's Instruments and navigational aids. National Airways Corporation had its own operations manual dealing with the operation of its serviees, ahd the decision as to whether any pariicular route should be opera'ted in any given weather was a matter for N.A.C.,

continued Mr. Cunningham. The section of the flight on which the aircraft was lost was flown under instrument flight rules, requiring the aircraft to r'eport at Wanganui homer and at New Plymouth East. The preparation of the flight plans under the instrument flight rules was governed by the Air Navigation Regulations issued under the authority of the Minister. Air traffic Control required the flight plan to be lodged and a proper clearance for the flight to be obtained by the pilot in command before any flight eould be undertaken. Under the instrument flight rules, the piiot obtained his clearance through Palmerston North and it was fouhd in the aircraft. The hearing is proceeding. Mr. Cunningham said that Air Traffic Control was chiefly concerned with the prevention of cbllisions ih the air, and controlled the heights at which aircraft were allowed to operate under the instrument flight ftfles.. but was not concerned to check the accuracv of 3alculations as to he courses "ini ) t N. ^

ended to be flown, as submitted in the flight plan. The procedure iaid down for pilots in command in lodging the flight plans required them to consider reports of the prevailing and likely weather on the route. One copy of the plan was lodged with the aerodrome control, the pilot taking the other on the aircraft. An examination of the wreckage indicated that the Kaka was flying at its proper operational height at normal speed, that the co-pilot was in the /passenger cabin at the time of the accident, and that the plane ^truck the mountain without warnmg. The weather over the route, which would be described in detail, was not unsafe for flying, and the board would chiefly be concerned with consideration of Whether proper navigational precautions were taken and whether there Was ade-

quate pre-planriing to eflsure safety for this flight. The board's attention would, during the evidence, be called to certain features iri regard to aircraft maintenance procedure and practice, Which w'ere di'sclosed during the prelimihary investigation , into this accident and which, while they might not have any dir6c£ bearing on the cause of this pal'ticular accident, were features which it might consider should feceive attention by the responsible authoritiefe to ensure that the mainteiiarice . procedure as iaid down is adequate for maxlnitihi safety, and that such procedure is strictly adhered to.