PART IN DESERT WAR

Chronicle (Levin), 17 January 1948, Page 5

PART IN DESERT WAR

(N.Z.P.A.-

- Reuter ,

General Auchinleck Praises New Zealanders

Copyright)

Reeeived Friday, 7 p.m. LOXDOX, Jan. 15. The recapture of Bel Hamed and Sidi Rezegh llidge by the Germana after they had been forced otf these two key positions by the Xew Zealand Fourth and Fifth Brigades on Xovember 25 and 26, 1941, was eliiefly 'due to the mability of the Routh Africah First infantry Brigade, with supporting British armour, to- arrive in time to reinforce the Xew Zealanders. This opinion is expressed by the then eommander-in-chief of tlie Middle East, Rir Olaude Auchinleck, iu dispatches now released for publication by the •War Oliice. bir Olaude Auchinleck pays several tributes to the Xew Zealanders' fighting qualities during these operations. "There were several reasons wliy-the Routh Africans were delaved, " lie states. "The division was new to tlie desert, and its training in ilesert movelnent had been cut short. The advance of its First Brigade was therefore liampered by the iarge liumber of velucles it had to marshal and coutroi. i'he brigade had trequentJy to lia.lt, change Uirection, and start again, aiul the pace of its general movement was therefore slow. New Zealanders Praised. It had been lioped, he continues, that Ihe Routh Africans would arrive at their objective on ihe nioriiing of Xovember 2i), in time to release the Jiritisli arniour, so that it could fntervene at Ridi Rezegh. ' Unfortunately, *owing to their slow movement and also a breakdown in wireiess communicutioiis at a cruciai time, the Routh Africaus were still 390(1 yards short of their objective at dawn on December L' In the meantiine, the German tanks, though twice beateu ol'f by tlie Xew Zealand Rixth Brigade, liud succeeded in dislodgiiig them from Ridi Kezegli Ridgo. ' ' 'i'liis New Zealand brigade, ' ' states General Auchinleck, "was only overwhelmed after galiant resistance. it had. been reduced to harely one-third of its hghting strength, and witn only two supporting tanks left, was assailed oy 50 enemy tan^s and iarge niuuners of infantry." While tlie Routh Africans were still trying to dislodge tlie Germuns on December 1, enemy tanks aud infantry attacked the Fourth Brigade 011 Bei iiamed, and again succeeded in overwhelniing tlie Xew Zealanders by force of numbers. "As the New Zealand Division had had extremeiy heavy casuaxties, anct was now in danger of hecoming entirely cut off, General Norrie gave the order x'or them to withdraw," continues Rii Uiaude. ' ' Having repuised iurther attaeks on Zaffran during the day, they wichdrew dunng the nignt with tne survivors of the First Army Tank Brigade, tne partners m tneir successes, and reached the Egyptian frontier in the eariy hours oi' the morning of December 2, exnaiiSted, hut in good heart. ' ' crerman Tanks Were Greatly Superior General Auchinleck inakes frequent

reterehces lo tlie superioritv of Gerinai armour and to the lessohs, botli in tank varfare and design, which this superior ity imposed on the British forces during the desert fighting in Xovembei and December i-)41. Referring to the battles round To'orulc, lie says: "Judg- • ng by the results it is obvious tliat not uniy were all our tanks outgunned In ihe German cruiser tanks, but alsc that our tanks were niechanically in-i-enor under battle couditions. Though Ihe Ameriean light tanks, as fighting machines, could not conipare with our own or the German medium tanks, tliev \>ere niechanically far more reliabie ihan ihe British mediuin tanks. The infeiior arniaiueut and niechanical unlelxability of our tanks was aggravated our great shortage of anti-tank weapons compared with tlie Germans." D ealing with British tank tactics at this stage in ihe war, General Aucltinieck says: ' ' it also was obvious tliat the staiidard of leadership and tactical iiandlmg of our armoured forces niust oe improved. Our tank tactics were inrerior to those oe tlie Geriuans because | we faiied adequatelv to co-ordinate the actiou of tanks, intuutrv and artillerv- ^ 011 the battleJield. Tlie three arms must assuciate inuch more continuouslv and closely in training and in battle." General Auchinleck also pays tribute lo tlie section of Italiau arniour: "The italian Mark 13 tanks which, as the result of experiences in the previous campaign, we had been inclined to dismiss as valueless, fought well and had an appreciable effect 011 the battle. fhere is little doubt that the presence of German troops had s'tiifened tlie 1 tahau niorale. " Bummarising his impressions of this stage of the desert warfare, General Auchinleck concludes: ' ' In the open desert country of Cyrenaica, superiority in armour, in my opinion, is essential to any ofiensive. To acliieve this we needed at least half as many tanks again as the enemv, taking into account tlie reiative efficiency oi' the German tanks and our own. Over aml above tliat we ueeded a reserve equal to at least 25 pei cent. of tlie liumlier deployed with UUltH. "