Auchinleck Refers To "Weak N.Z. Division"

Chronicle (Levin), 16 January 1948, Page 5

Auchinleck Refers To "Weak N.Z. Division"

(N.Z.P.A.-

-Reuter

CoquriqM)

Received Thursday, 7.0 p.m. LONDON, Jan. 15, , General Sir Claude Auchinleck, when the British forces fell.bhch to E1 Alamein in 1942, was coneerned about the Eightli Army's weaknesses and in oue appreciation of the position referred particularly to "the weak New Zenland Division," The War Office, in the London Gazette, has now published his dcspatehes relating to. the period from November 1, 1941 to August 15, 1942, when he handed over to General Sir Harold Alexander. His appreeiation dated July 27, 1942, discusses the possibility ' of attacking the Germans and Italians before' they were able to build up strength to go on to the Nile delta. Gen. Auchinleck 'says: "None of the I'ormatious of the Eiglith Army is now sufficiently well trained for offensive operations. "" General Aitchinleck said one of Ihe prolilems of devising an attack was how to, find troops,. "The only formation whieh might be used is the weak New Zealanc] l)i\isiou. Failure would make this division unfit for further operations for a eonsiderable time. Ilaving in mind the weakness i'n numbers and training of this division, the chanees of success can only be rated as 60.-40. This attack seems hai'dly advisable." General Auchinleck, in lus re vicw of the offensive of 1941, describes the New Zealand Division 's attack on Sidi liezegh and hoxv the New , Zealand eys incurred j heavy casualties. He says the |Gcrm.ans reaeted strongly and that tlie fil'th South African Bri-' gaiie which, through no fault of its own, lacked training, arriyed too late to assist the New Zealanders. who had to retire in the face of powei'i'ul attacks. "Two-thirds of the New Zealand Division had .been cut to pieces and had to/be withdrawn to refit." General Auchinleck, deseribing how he was obliged to •' 1^1^06" General Uunningham, says General Cunningham was perturbed by the general situation which he considered crifieal owing to the small number of tanks in ruuning order he had left. If he continued to attack as he had been doing since .Xovember 19, he might, he 'said, lincl himself without any, sevviceable tanks at all and Egvpt's safety might aggin be endangered. ''I was never in doubt about the riglit course because it looked as if tlie enemy was liard pressed and stretcheu to the liuiit and I at once instfueted General Cuuninghani to continue the oifensive. General Cunningha.m accepted ihe deeision loyallv but his anxiety undoubtedly grew when the enemy put in a powerful counterstroke, and when I returned to. Ca,iro on November 25 1 •onsidered the whoie question and confluded that in so critical a, situation 1 ■otild not retain a commander in whose ability to carry out my instructions L had not complete confidence. " General Auchinleck adied that he seleeted General Eitehie to succeecl General Cunningham, orderipg him to cake over command at onei and receiving the Government '& imm.ediate ap.proval oT his deeision. The xgithdrawal of the two Australian Di,visions from, Syr.'.a and Palestine to the Pacific was one o.f the ±aetors which aifected General Auehtnleck's strategy in the Middle East du'ring 1941-42. General Auchinleck ctis-i-usses this question' of troop withdrawals among other prob'lems in his review of his dtspatches. While he was hoping to resume the oTfensive froin Uyrenaiea onward into Tripoli, the two A ustralian Divisions were reealled to ihe Pacific theatre. Gene-rai Auchinleck fnakes another reference to this withIrawal in epeaking of the need to secnire his northern flank from the Gernan threat through the Caucasus. - He iavs: "After the Australian Divisions were withdrawn, the situation beeame nuch worse. ' '