HEADACHES FOR BEVIN

Chronicle (Levin), 7 January 1948, Page 5

HEADACHES FOR BEVIN

(N.Z.P.A.-

-Reuter,

Germany Centre In Maze Of Problems

Copyrioht)

Received Tuesday, 7.0 p.m. LONDON, Jan. 6. The emphasis given by Mr. Attlee in his broadcast on Saturday night, to tho importance of tho British wav oi' life as the alternativo to oithor Communisra or Americanisiii, is regarded by some British nowspapers as an indication oi' the linos whioh inav bc l'ollowed by tho restatement oi' British 1'oreign policy Alr. Bevin will Hiibniit to Fab'met this week. Tho Foreign Secretary is known to liavo l)oon at work on this statoinont sinco bol'oro Ohristnias /. :ind rabinot meetings liavo al/'^oady boon thriee postponed to x oilablo hioi to oomploto it. This • weekend ho oimilatod a confldentiiil niemorandum to liis oolloaguos so that thoy oould con-, sidoi' his viows prior to a l'ull Cabinot meeting. AI r. Attloo's spoooh is takou as an indioation that British policy will bo to contiiuio to sook a middlo way botwoon Russia and tho United Statos but with a cloar indioation that Britain will mako no J'nrlhor coiioossions to Fommunist prossu ro. Two 1'acts ovorshadow the maze of ooinplox. ])ro.blonis and considerations throiigh whioh Mr. Bevin nnist ondoavonr to stoor a course. Firstly. all attompts to reaoh anv roasonablo basis oi' international understanding with Russia liavo l'ailod and. sooondly. Britaih cannot doal with hor overseas balanoo of paynionts probloni withont i'urthor and continuing help i'rom tho Fnited Statos. Thoro is no doubt that thoro is in Britain. and partionlarly within tho ranks of tho Labour Party itsolf, strong opposition to anv incroaso in Britain 's snbordination to tho United Statos. ( )n tho othor hand no oue is ablo to suggest how Britain, in hor present oiroinnstanoos, oan do without i'urthor Aniorioan aid and tho obligations it will unquostionably o.arry with it. It is beeoming incroasingly ovidont that sooner or lator tho Fnited Statos and Britain, oithor jointly orsovorally, mnst bo ])roparod to take a dofinito stand upon.tho cncroachmonts of oastern ]>owor politics. Thoro havo boon strong hints that Ihe rooont sorios of pacts eonolndod botwoon tho Soviot Balkans satollitos, portond tho einergonoy of a military allianee whioh inay broak tho torms of the poaco troatios with Rinnania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Britain nnist mako np hor niind whai to do if this ooonrs and also what to do to del'ond tho throatonod indepondonoo of Oreore. Mr. Bovin nnist likewiso dooide upon a now policy in tho Middlo IOast in tho light of tho Palostino withdrawal and the throat of a wholesalo Arab-Jewish oontlagration. This. in its tuni, is olosoly oonnectod with tho question of tho Sudan and tho strainod j'olat ionship botwoon Britain and Fgypt and with runiours of inoi'oasing- Russian pressuro upon Porsia and Tur'key. rrho oontro of tho wholo mazo of probloms is, of course, (Jcrmany and Austria and liero again Britain 's dopondenoe upon American finanoial aid preohules any strong--' ly individual lino. Mr. Bovin. in spito of his dis-. a])])ointniont over tho failure oi' tho London confertfnce, and his misgivings about Russian policy, is known to bo anxious not to dismanlle tho niachinory of tho Foroign Ministors Founcil premaluroly and to g-ive tho Russians any possible opportuni ty for coo])oration. Ho must doeide how 1 his oan bo done without upsotting Ihe Aniericans and without en-emirag-ing Russian intransigonoe. To assemble just a fow of the tho Foroign Secretary as part of this situation, ho -must docido whothor to continue to maintain British troops in Groeco and whother to reinforce theni with troops withdrawn froni Palostino. He must dooide on what torms ho oan reopen talks with Fgypt over' the Sudan and tho torms of tho now troatios now under negotiation with Iran and Transjordan. Ho must determine to what extent Bvjtain will back Turkoy and ,'j^fsia in the. ovont of tho rumoiirotf ostablishmont of a Russian puppot Stato in Azorbaijan and i'urthor Russian pressure to obtain a sharo in control of the Dardanolles and hnally he must dooide how many men and how much monoy Britain can aft'ord to devoto to coutinuing the oeoupation urgent problems which confront f'f Gormany and Austria.