WHY HE URGED A TOUGH POLICY WITH RUSSIA

Chronicle (Levin), 16 October 1947, Page 5

WHY HE URGED A TOUGH POLICY WITH RUSSIA

Former U.S. Ministers "Sensation Packed Memoirs"

Received Wednesday, 7 p.m. NEW YORK, Oct. 14. Details oi' his behind the seene rows with Mr. Molotov and hundreds of ineidents which inspired him to advocate a tougli policy towards Russia with a determination to back it up with force if necessary, are given by the former Sccretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, in what the United Press describes as "sensation packed memoirs" entitled "speaking f'ratikly". Mr. Byrnes believes that United States should answer Russia 's obstruction on the atomic energy eontrol and the dennan peace treaty agreements with better and more atomic bombs coupled with a decision to drive the R'ed Army from Germany by foree if necessary. Mr. Byrnes writes that he reluctantly eame to the conelusion that United States would have to make peace with Germany, Austria and Japan without Russia. He believes Russia 's ultimate goal is to dominate iii one way or anotlier* all Europe. He proposes that the only way to meet such aims is to confront Rnssia now with the knowledge tlrnt each act of aggression will be taken to the Security Council and that each Soviet veto will bring a call upon other United Nations to act eollectively to stop Russia. Mr. Byrnes wroU . "For many reasons the Soviets don't want war. They will, I believe, retire in a very decent manner but if other Powers don't hold firm then, as Marx warned us of the Czarist Russians, conquest follows conquest and annexation follows annexation. ' ' Mr. Byrnes explained that was why he reversed his "patience and firmness" policy and now advocates that emphasis be placed 011 firmness. Mr. Byrnes revealed' that captured German documents showed that Hitler, on November 12, 1940, offered Mr. Molotov at a conference in Berlin, to make Russia the fourth partner of the Axis, giving her the eastern half of the British Empire and all territory south oi

Russia to the Indian Ocean, as the Soviet share of the world loot. Ho wever, Mr. Byrnes writes: "Mr Molotov greatly overplayed his hand and comfiiitted tlie major diplomatic lilunder of insisting upon a settlement of Eastern Europe first." Mr. Byrnes believes. Hitler made up* his mind then to make war 011 Russia. Mr. Byrnes described the HitlerMolotov conference as "a decisive point in history — the turning point of the war. ' ' Mr. Byrnes points out, at the sanje time, that Russia and -Germany were joilied in a non-aggres-sion pact whereunder Russia had been given half of Poland and was recognised as having a special interest in the Baltic, and was given the Rumanian province of Bessarabia. Russia, in turn had promised to supply the Nazis with 300,000 tons of raw oil but the Kremlin demanded Bukovina as well whereto Hitler objected, hence Hitler 's conference with Mr. Molotov. Mr. Byrnes declares that a settlement with Russia would be obtainable tomorrow if United States would agrce to give Russia 10,000,000,000 dollars in German reparations together with an equal voice in the eontrol of the Ruhr. Mr. Byrnes says that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden reaehed an informal secret understanding with Marshal Stalin in 1944 whereunder Russia gave Britain a free hand in Gl'eece in return for a Russian free hand iil Rumania. Mr. Roosevelt's ill-fated Yalta declaration 011 liberated and exenemy countries, Avas an abortNe attempt to break this "sphere of influeiice" understanding. Mr. Byrnes declares that Mr. Churchill and not Mr. Roosevelt was to blame for the Soviet 's three votes in United Nations. Mr. Churchill, fearing Soviet objections to giving India a vote, pas--sionately supported Marshal Stalin 's request, saying: "My heart goes out to "White Russia bleeding from her wounds while beating down tyrants."