WHEN DOENITZ HAD THE EAR OF HITLER

Chronicle (Levin), 13 September 1947, Page 6

WHEN DOENITZ HAD THE EAR OF HITLER

Two further instalments of the German naval archives captured at Tambach just before the end of the war, containing / minutes of the "Fuhrer Conferences" attended by Doenitz, as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, have now been pubjished by the Admiralty. The first of these instalments is of particular interest because it covers the closing months of the war, from January 1, 1945, when Doenitz was in- growing favour with Hitler. As he attended almost every conference that was held, and took an evergrowing share in the general direction of operations and administration of the forces, the naval minutes provide, in the translator's words "almost a day-to-day account of the closing stages of Germany's defeat."

The editor points out how greatly the powers of Hitler and his advisers had deteriorated in the closing months of the war. Eighteen months earlier Hitler had been able to view the war situation as a whole, to foresee and often to avert disasters; the measures with which he met the. Italian collapse, for instance, succe'eded in delaying the Allies for more than a year. |But by 1945, neither he nor any of his followers could take a wide view at all. "Where one would expect an acceptance of military defeat leading to plans for guerilla warfare and for continuing the fight underground," says the editor, "there are instead nothing but a series of tactical schemes for bolstering individual sections of the three fronts, neither related to nor coordinated with any . general strategy . . . The conferences give a clear picture of Hitler and his staff, desperate in the face of a situation they could no longer control, and so harassed that they could not think beyond the immediate requirements of battle." The impression of Hitler is that of an exhausted- man, whose old energy intermittently ' breaks out in spasms of rage, as on February 20, •when he suggests denoancing the Geneva Convention, or on March 19, when he gives his famous order

to destroy "everything of value in the Reich that could be of immediate or future use to the enemy." Doenitz himself shows an imper- ! turbability bordering on iiisanity, steadily presenting encouraging reports and a hopeful countenance. He at least had something as a basis for those welcome contributions to the proceedings for as late as February 16, 1945, the number of 450 U-boats in commission, was the' peak of the whole war. Of these, 237 were in active operation and the number stood at 101 as late as April 8, less than a month before the collapse. He had some slight increase in their depredations to report, too, but often had to explain why those were not greater. Meanwhile his activities were varied. He constantly assured the Fuhrer that his new U-boats — ever on the point of being passed into ser-vice — V-weapons and other developments might at any moment turn the scale in Germany's favour. Even as late as March, he had a long discussion with Hitler on what should be the , composition of the German Navy after the war. It is clear that he had eventually become Hitler's principal military adviser, the only one whose loyalty seemed to remain unshaken.