“NEAR HYSTERIA” U.S. POLICY IN JAPAN

Chronicle (Levin), 25 August 1947, Page 7

“NEAR HYSTERIA” U.S. POLICY IN JAPAN

Fear of Growth of Communist Influence

Reeeived Sunday, 7.0 pr.m. •; . . TOKIO, August 23. Denis Warner, A.A.P.-Reuter correspondelit, in tlie third of a series of ai'ticles on Japan, says that a'newcomer to Tokio camiot fail to be impressed with two ovei'whelming currents of. opinioh common alike to many S.C.A.P. and Japanese officials. The first.is • the .acceptance of the inevitability of another war and the. second . preoeeupation with "Japan 's position in world strategy. A member of the House of Commons who visited Japan some weeks ago descril>ed the Russophobia of S.C.A.P. officials as "neardiysteria." - That may be an exaggeration, but certainly no consideration is shown by S.C.A.P. for members of the Soviet delegation to Japan". On the Allied Council Lieutenant-C4eneral Derevyanko was eitherdenied information hy Mr. Ceorge Atcheson, ehairman of theCouncil, or made the target of his attacks. In h is intervie ws- with foreign pressmen even Oeneral McArthur himself make§ no seeret of his fears of post-treaty Russian intervention in Japan.

Tlie thirty-eighth parallel, which divides Korea into American and Soviet zones, is regarded as 'the oniy really important frontier in the world. Guarded 011 either side by armed Russian and American troops it has many dangerous possibilities, but in the world pieture it is probablv subsidiary to Hungary, Turkey or Iran. These beliefs, however, largely aecount for tlie emphasis placed 011 various aspects of the Japanese situatiou todav\ Tliey are responsible for tno1 Japanese Foreign Offiee's lack of inhibition in openly lobbying for an army of 100,000 men, an air foree and a coastguard service, and for articles uow appearing frequently in the Japanese press deploTing- the eonlinement of Japanese people to the four home islands. Apart from the humanitarian idea they are perhaps the principaj reasons behind General MacArthur's determination to put Japan 011 its eeonomie feet as soon as possible. They are interpreted even by many people as the basie factor in MacArthur's acceptance of the faint deinocratic stirrings among tlie Japanese people as the signs of a spiritual regeneration. They govern the major S.C.A.P. approach to the occupation. They are responsible for the fear of the growtli of Coinmunism and the determination to avoid creating conditions that would make Japan vulnerable physicallv or morally after the withdrawai of the occupation t'orces. Many conipetent observers who have watched the occupation since its first days believe decision to retain tlie emperor system and tlie ready acceptance of Hirohito's war innocence are directly attrihutable to this fundamental distrust of Russia. S.C.A.P. disapproval of tliose who would bring Hirohito to trial is so marked today that it is even an oflfence now to refer to the Emperor by his wartime name oi " Big Ghurlie. " From his biological studies in his little* laboratory in tne wooded moat surrounding tlie Imperial Palace Hirohito now makes periodicai tours of remote urban and rural areas. I11 its enthusiasm over oue visit the Osaka Shimbun wrote: "Because we

see more of Him (capital H) now it seems worthwhiie to have lost tho war. ' ' Eaeh day evidence aecumulates. pointing to Hirohito's direet guilt in ordering the war to begin, but no aetion is likely as his arrest inevitably would lead to ehaos. There would be an uprising, shootings and generstl disorder and the scaled-down occupation force might easily find the situatiou beyond its control. The whole structure built up so painstakingly since the end of the war would probably topple and Japan 's economic recovery would be set baek for'vears. Wlien people go doivn on their knees in the Imperial Plaza to bow in the direction of the Son o'f Heaven, wlifcn thousands weep hysterically or shout "Banzai" you have little doubt that today 's constitutional monarch is still very much the source of inspiration and the ultimate and most influential authority in the land. The Japanese programme of cooperation with the occupation forees produced such excellent results— a completely peaceful administration, little interference with the norma] Japanese life and the promise of an early peace troaty — that politicians and leading mdustrialists who survived the purge were not slow to follow the anti-Soviet cue. Today the Prime Ministcr, the Chrislian, inefticient Tetsu Katayania, and the Liberal Partv (Conseravtive) leader, Shigeru Yoshida, both speak with fear of Russia externally and fear of Comnmnism internally. It is anvbody's guess wliat the external dangers mav be. The internal assessnient is a good deal easier. Trade developments with the Soviet and Soviet-dominated countries of East "Asia' may' one dav cause a change, but for the next two or three years Comniunistic influence in Japan is likely to be very slight. "The Japanese do not like Communists. Fof one tliing the Communists .are eager to have the Emperor 's- head; for anotlier the major politieal pa,rties are prunouncedly anti-Communist. And for a third most of thetother Japanese have only the v.aguest- jd.ea wha,t it is all abolit. .«