REVELATIONS BY DOENITZ

Chronicle (Levin), 1 February 1947, Page 5

REVELATIONS BY DOENITZ

LONDON, Jan. 30. ' Germanv in oue sense lost the war before it began, because Germany was uever prepared for a naval war again.u England, according to Grand Admiral Doenitz in historical doeuments dealing with Germany 's naval war, whieh have b.oen published by the British Office oi Naval Intelligence. The doeuments comprise an essay liy Doenitz covering the whole eourse 01 the war and also appendices, oue oi' which reports the interrogation ot Doenitz in September, 194(5. I11 the essay Doenitz atfrilmtes the in adecpiacv oi the German navy to the fact that the German armed forces were (lesigned for a Cuntipental war, with England either neutral or 011 the side of Germany. Germany did not en visage the possibility of a naval war against England until 1938, because thc Government was ill-advised politicallv, Doenitz says that Germany 's failures to inv.ade England, to oceupy thc Eastern Me.diterrauean and to prevenl the Alli.ed invasion of North Af'rica and Europc were all due largely to ina.dequate naval forces. The factor in the last months of the. war which contributed most direetly tu Germany 's collapse was the over\vh.elming Allied aerial bombardment which, among other things, delayed the production pf a new type of U-boat. Doenitz says that Germany failed before the war to reeognise the signilkance of radar, whieh was a deeisive Jisadvantage in the conduct .or the war at sea. Do.enitz eritieises Hitler 's deeision to iorm th.e flying units needed by the navy within the framework of thc Luftwaffe, which preeluded the forma,tion of an° efficient naval air arm. f Do.enitz says the destruetion of the British Expeditionary Force in Franee and the weakness of the English land defenee "caused us to entertain the idea of deciding' the war in our favour by a rapid invasion of England." Hitler therefore began to prepare for an attempt at invasion before the autumn of 1940, but decided to abandon the invasion when the Luftivafl'e failed to def'eat the K.A.F., since it was clear that the German navy ;ould not protect the invasion forces against the Royal Navy. Doenitz says that, when the battle of fcjtte U-boats ended, 3(0,000 men had been lost of the U-boat arm's approxitnate ^trength of 38,000. Germany had sxp.ected in' March, 1945, that the ff-hoat warfare 'would enter a new and mccessful phase with the operation oi 1 new type of pre-fabricated U-boat. Dne type had a range of 20,000 miles and was capahle of scouring all waters )f iippqrtanye to the U-hjoat war with)ut surfaciag, hut "thie German capit'u . ation cut short this new effective less".