STIFFER ATTITUDE IN EGYPT LIKELY

Chronicle (Levin), 29 August 1946, Page 7

STIFFER ATTITUDE IN EGYPT LIKELY

(Snocial Gorrespoudent.)

DOMINIONS' INFLUENCE ON BRITAIN

LONDON, Augusf 27. Beveral London newspapers publisli today i sports that as a result of repre sentations from tlie Dominions Britain is likely" to adopt a rnucli stifl'er attitude in negotiations with Fgypt for revision of the treaty. New Zealand has not made represen | tations on the matter, but both Field j IMarshal Smuts and Dr. Evatt are re ported to have urged tliat the full with-j-d ra wai of the British troops from Egypt at the present inonient would dangerously weaken Meditcrraneaii coinmunicatious at a time when it is felt that there should be 110 weakeniug anvwhere. Teclinically, if the British Government decidcs to make 110 further concessions to the Egvptians and to stand on treaty riglits- it need not withdraw the troops furtlier tinui the canal zone.j and could maintain them there until j 195(5, when the treaty finally expires It is doubtful, however, wliether technical riglits would prove sufficient. 1 Keports from Fgyjit suggest that thej fate of Bidky Pasha's Goalition Gov- 1 ernment liaugs largely upon the success| ot the Fgy ptian proposals for treaty I revision*. Sidky Pasha can not depend j upon any soiid body of supporters, and I the Wafdists, under the ieadership oi j Nahas Pasha, are alrcady maklngj strong political capital out of tlie Breakdown of the negotiations with J Britain. lf the negotiations nnike 110 j further progress and 110 way is found j by Sidky Pasha of saving face, the j present regimc niay be displaced by anj adiniiiistratioii backed by the Wafdists. j I11 view of the weil known opposition! by King Parouk to Nahas Pasha, it is] u'nlikely that the Fgyptian wartime} Premier would return to oflice, but it; is virtually certain that the W'afd, as; the most inlluenliul siugle- party in the i-ouutry, would doniinate the new administ ration. Any Governinent which repluces Hidky Pasha is bound to do so 011 ihe claim that it can succeed where Sidky Pasha has i'ailed, and in tlie prc-| sent temper of Fgyptian politics, this1 is likoly to take the for 111 of renewed 1 anti-British agitatioii. Cucli agitation; in Fgypt by the leador of tlie Arab! League would prove most embarrassing ! to Britain 111 the [iresent delicate state: of Middle Uastern affairs. The Egvptians, of course, know this,. and are "likely to use Ihe weapon.: YYhether they will know when to stop, i however, is another question. British Influence Still Strong. ! Despite the anti-British riots and; other hostile demonstrations, British ] influence is still strong in Fgypt, ninihi the light oi' recent experience the, more responsible Fgyptian politicians are not likeiy to I'orget the necessily for British iirotection. Unfortunately, the Fgyptian policy to Britain has beconie a shuttiecock of Fgyptian doiuestic politics, and in the rough-and- i lumlde which is certain to ensue if the; present tulks break down nationnJist | prejudices and the lieat of domesticl arguments niay upset discretion. ! Oue argument which niay dissuade; "('he' '' 'Fj/ypti'ari "Teadefs from further ; alienating British sympathy is tlie growing spread of Communism in thein country. Kecently -'tyhe Moslem leaders in Fgypt proclaimed Communism to' tio coutrary to the laws of islam, and , ihough the movement probabJy . re]ireseats clnefly an upsurging of the under-, privileged classes, the big landholders and politicians who still doniinate the, country are likeiy -to think carefully, about precipitating any intenial trouble they may not be able to cont ro 1. 11 is perhaps significant that IheWafdists recently proclaimed a close allinity with Socialisin, aad 011 this1 scoru they cannot alford to be indill'er-] ent to the good will of Mr. Attlee's] Governinent. Causes of Breakdown. The present suspension of the talksi is due to failure to agree 011 three! iuajor counts. Tlie first is the time - table for tlie British evacuation, tho': second the conditions nndei- wliich; British troops will have Ihe right of re- ; entrv upon Fgvption soil, and third — i ihe future of iSudan. At the nioment 1 the second is the main stumbling lilock. j i'lie Fgyptians claim tliat only war 01 ] .111 immediate tlireat of war against, Fgypt of her near neighliours should] entitle the British to re-enter Fgypt.; Plie British argue that as war is niade] these days, this is ihsufficienl. and tliat ( in the event of tlireat of w^tr to aj iarger area Britain should still be eri-i titled to re-occupy Fgypt. In view of; the opinions of auiiic of the Doininionsl and the reported recommeiidations oi j Ihe British Chief of GtalT, the Foreignt Minister, Mr. Bevin, is not likeiy to ( give way on this issue. Britain is also most unlikcly to givei way to the Fgyjitian clainour for tho i .Sudan." It is fe.lt that neither Fgypt 'sj prior recurd as an administrator in tho i Sudan nor her hislorical claims justifyj her demaud to reassert her scn ereignly over tlie Sudanese. Oue question that is being asked is wliether, if .Mr. Bevin adopts a 'tnugher" liae with Fgypt, BritaiiL has the troops available to maintain order in the event of violent repereus-j sions. ]