Mr. Churchill Stresses Gravity of Decision

Chronicle (Levin), 9 May 1946, Page 8

Mr. Churchill Stresses Gravity of Decision

—Press Association

ir. Atflee Defends Step As Ohligation To Egypt

By Teleyraph-

LONDON, May 7. The aimouncement that it was proppsed to withdraw all British naval, army and air forces from Egypt was made in the House of Commons by AIi*. Attlee. Ati*. Attlee added that it was l'urther proposed, in the treaty negotiations with Egypt, to make possible mutnal assistance in time of war or imminelit threat of war. Mr. Churchill described the annonncement as one of the most . momentous ever heard in the Ilonse, as it authorised complcte evaeuatioii of Ihe naval, military and air forces at the beginning of the treaty neg'otiations. Mr. Churchill saicl he was bound to place on record that the Government had not consulted anyone else in the conntry and had actcd entirely on its own initiative. Therefore, the whole responsibility must rest on it. "The Opposition is boiind to mark the gravity of this occasion, " he added "Things are huilt np with great labour and cast away with great shame and folly." Mr. Churchill moved an adjournment to discuss "a matter of public importance; that is to say, the statement eoncerning the neg'otiations with Egvpt." The whole of the Opposition rose in their scats to snpport him.

Mr. Eden, in opening the debate to-i 'night, said Mr. Attlee 's statement on I Egypt had caused grave concern. The ! British troops in Egypt were not an ' army of ' occupation, bnt were there j under the ■. Anglo-Egyptian Treaty oi i Alliance of 1936. They were there under i a joint agreement hetween the Allies I for the defence of the Suez Canal, I which was an essential means of com1 munication hetween dilferent parts oi | Enipire. That position had heen ac- | cepted by Britain, by the Egyptian ' Government and by all parties in the House of Commons on countless occasions. An Egyptian statesman had i told him that they thought that that 1 was the true basis for relations hetween the two countries. ! His iirst complaint was that the an- ' nouncemant gave the impression that 1 the purpose of the troops in Egypt was something otlier than merely defence oi the canal.

Mr. Eden said he was astonished that the Government, at the outset of the negotiations, should propose withclrawal of the troops without any explanation as to how the purpose for which they were there would he fullfilled when they were withdrawn. ' "Has the Government satisfied itseli' that the defence of the canal can b3 effectively carried out without stationing British and Egyptian forces there i and without the availability of air and 1 naval bases in the vicinity of the canal?" he asked. "Is the Govern- ' ment satisfied that strategically the I canal can he secured without these ! t'acilities and without the presence of j troops in the canal zone? Will it tell ' u.s wliat its plan is?" Mr. Eden continued: "If there is no such plan, how does the Government propose to carry out' what is still its ofcligation under the treaty?" Mr. Eden asked wbether the Government, on the advice of the Chiefs oi Staft's, believed that the time was now ripe for the Egyptian Army to carry out the task. If the Government did not believe that, Mr. Attlee 's statement ran directly counter to the treaty terms. "May I ask our Egyptian friends to suppose what would have happened if Mus.solini and Hitler had succeeded in fcheir plan. What opportunity would there have heen for national aspirations to find expressidn?"

Mr. Attlee Repiies Mr. Attlee, rep lying, said that Mr. fvlen had succeeded in obtaining the \ existing treaty of 193(5 when the world . was atready eloudv with aggression, for which reason the British and Egyptian relations were more favourable tlian pruviously. That treaty opened with the statement that the military occupation of Egypt was at an end. "That came ai'ter a great many years in which wc had been in Egypt, and we had said we were going and had not gone. One must remember that these things remain in the minds of the Egyptian people, ' : he said. Provision then was made for the pro- : lection of the canal, and the evaeuatioii of the troops from Cairn, but the war came and so the troops had to be kept- in Cairn and great installntions Iniilt up. Mr. Attlee said he agreed that the Egyptians should remember that : Britaiii and her Dominions had rendered great service to Egvpt, saving her from aggression, but it did not alter the fac.t that the continued presence of troops in ; Cairn and elsewhere affected Egyptian , Xationalist sentiment, which was per- ! t'eetlv under'standable. ! "Tlie fact remains that there is a | suspicion, which we must dissipate, and j the idda is strong in Egypt still that we j want to occupy the country. We are | seeking a treaty of friendship and an j alliance of strength. Such a treaty does , not rest on standing out on the terms oi | some written document, but on real i friendship among the peoples." j Mr. Churchill intervened: ''That is ; exactly what was said about the Irisn j ports. ' ' Mr. Attlee: The right honourable gentleman made the treaty. j Mr. Attlee went on to say that the 1 British proposal was made bccause all | (he advice available to the Government j indicated that, in order that the t'lliance should continue with mu tuai [conliAence and success, it was essential ! to taho as a point of departure the cora I plete freeclom and indepentlence of | ES-vpt. • ^ j "The Egyptians today do not coiij sider freeclom tlieirs so long as foreign troops are retained, even bv a treaty, j on Egyptian sbil," said Mr. Attlee. "We are satisfied that the proposals to Egvpt reallv offer us the best means of getting an agreement on the t'acilities we should need o.n Egyptian soil to make the alliance a reality. ' ' Mr. Attlee said that the proposals

would enable Britain, in case of an emergency, to go effectively to Egypt 's assistance. ' ' We wisli to treat Egypt in everv way as an ally and equal, whose interests are identical with ours. We want complete conlidence. Egypt is. after all, iirst and foremost an Egyptian responsibility, but it is the British Gov-c-rnment's dutv to go to Egypt 's assistance in the exereise of tliis responsi bility and to have facilities enabling ii to do so. " "We have discussed the matter with the Chiefs of Staff," continued the i?rime Minister. "They agreed that it was the best way of approach. We dis cussed it with the Dominion representa tives. We are perfectly ciear why we are doing this." Mr. Eden asked Mr. Attlee whethe. the Dominions had agreed to the plan. Mr. Attlee replied: "Yes. The draft was before the Dominions' Prime Ministers. ' '

A number of Opposition members called out: "Did they agree?" Mr. Attlee replied: "I did not com': to this House — " but was interrupten by Opposition cries of: "Answer!" Mf. Attlee: The Government take/. full responsibility. I discussed this with the Dominion representatives verv fully. They agered it was the bes. method of approach. Mr. Churchill: I hope the Prim. Minister won't leave us in any doubo Is it a fact that they were consulteci before the decision was taken, or were they told afterwards? Mr. Attlee: ? Of course they were con sulted before the decision. Mr. Churchill shakes his head, but he was not there. We defcided on this draft and decided that it was the right line oi" ap proach. We then brought it before the Dominions, but I am not attempting to shelter myself 'by putting the responsi bility on others. I say that they wert fully consulted.

Mr. Churchill said that Mr. Attlee s statement had caused him a most pain ful sh'ock. "Tt is a very serious thing to begin nogdtiations of tliis- charac.ter with a statement that you give way o:: tlie main point. " Mr. Churchill added that he understood Air. Attlee to sav that, if the canal was not affectively proteeted as a result of the negotia tions, we should revert to the ^193(i Treaty. Air. Attlee interposed: "Obviously it the negotiations broke down, the orig- ' iual treaty still stood. " Air. Churchill Worried J Afr. Churchill said this was a very j important admission, which relieyed his anxiety to some extent, but in no wise improved the view which he toolc on the i way the Government intended to lia'ndle 5 the matteir. -flie.Oppdsitioii had hither I to been char'y of commenting on the ! Government 's external affairs, but hau j now reached the point wligfe there was ja serious division of purpose and I method. No military man could say | that there was any method of keeping j the canal open, except by having troops I there. Egypt. had been effectively deI fended in two wars by British troops, 1 Australians, New Zealanders, and Soutli ' Africans, wlio had shed - their blood ifreely to prevent Cairo and Alexandria j from being looted, ravished and sulijuj gateds-- The Dominion Prime Alinisters I had not been consulted in the sense of partieipating in the discussions and j sharing in the poliey. They had been j told what was the poliey after the | British Government had arrived at its own conclusions. "If there was a (question on which the Alinisters of Bouth Africa, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada should have been takeu right into council. it was Egypt," Mr. Churchill said. "The Opposition was bound to mark its protest and misgivings by vote. " Mr. Herbert Morrison, replying, saia Air. Churchill °f orgot that 1946 was not 1936, and that things in Egypt were moving on. The Government would not have chosen this particular moment for the treaty discussions, but the Egyptian Government had exercised its rights under the treaty and Britain cbuld not resist the right of discussioh. Egypt sought three things: Pirstly, a decisibn on the principle of withdrawal ; secohdly, a discussioh into the ways, means and time of withdrawal ; thirdly? the question of a future alliance, including how ittilitary aid could be forthcoming. The first stage had been reached aho the seeond and third would follow. The Government 's advice was that, unless the principle of withdrawal was acchpted, there wonld be no favourable pl'ogress in the negotiations at all'. This was the attitude not only of the Egyptian Government, but also of the Egyptian people. If Britain had refused to adcept the principle, Sh6 WOUld hax'-e hhd to faee the -consequences. There

would have been almost certain disturb ances. The British forces would almost certainly have been attacked. Britaiii in =uch cireumstances could not have expected sympathy from friends in a civilised world. ' ' We reluctantly agreed on the course announeed by Air. Attlee, because it was right in principle and because it was expedient vvitli a view to getting the best possible agreement." There were cries, "Why reluctantly?" to which Ah'. Alorrison replied, "Certainly we did not rush to get om of Egypt, but we have to face the facts. ' ' Tlie Opposition motion for an ad journinent, on which the debate tooiv place, was defeatert by 327 votcs to 15S.