SPHERES OF INFLUENCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Chronicle (Levin), 30 March 1946, Page 5

SPHERES OF INFLUENCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

SECRET PACT WITH RUSSIA EVIDENCE AT NUREMBERG Received Friday 10.20 p.m. NUREMBERG, March 29. Ribbentrop bad a great admiration for Hitler, and in carrying out Hiuler's task was exceeding ruthless, said Ribbentrop 's secretary (Fxaulein Blank), who was a member of the Nazi Party since 1937 and was Ribbentrop 's secretary from 1933. i Sbe told the War Crimes Tribunal tbat Ribbentrop offered bis resignation several times*- because he felt tbat foreign affairs were being dealt with by other ngencies. Franlein Blank repeated tbe suggestion made at a trial four days ago tbat tbe Russian-German pact of non- • aggression in 1939 contained a seeret ' agreement about spheres of influence in ' Central Europe.. The Soviet prosecutor (Mr. Rudenko) objected tbat such evidence was not within tbe competence of a secretary. Counsel for Hess (Dr. Seidl) asked that the Soviet be ordered to submit a •eopy ,of the pact to the Tribunal. He said tbat only two copies existed. Ribbentrop carried one back to Berlin,' where it was confiscated by tbe Red 1 Army.

Mr. Rudenko repeated bis objection, upon which Dr. Seidl said he was- ready to repeat his application to call Mr. i Molotov to ask him about tbe pact. After an adjournment to consider tbe - objection, Lord J'ustice Lawrence said the Tribunal ruled that Fraulein Blank might be questioned about the alleged treaty. Fraulein Blank said she received knowledge of tbe conclusion of the pact when sbe saw a special cover inscribed " German-Russian secret agreement". Witness said sbe was responsible for keeping the secret of the pact. Ribbentrop, who was then in London, heard with surprise that Austria was being taken over in 1938, continued Fraulein Blank. Ribbentrop had in mind an economic union between tbe two countries. Ribbentrop made repeated attempts to end the war, none of them being authorised by Hitler. Witness added tbat Ribbentrop sent a German named Birger to Switzerland in tbe winter of 1944 with instructions to request the German Ambassador in Madrid to try to contact Allied sources. Similar instructions were sent to the German Consul at Lisbon and the Ambassador to the Vatican, while a former member of Ribbentrop 's office was also instructed to try to contact tbe Eritish Government. Hitler 's interpreter, Dr. Paul Otto Schmidt, gave evidence about Ribbentrop reading tbe German memorandum to Sir Nevile Henderson two days before the invasion of Poland. Witness said be doubted whether Sir Nevile grasped all tbe details. His knowledge of German was good, but. not perfect. The atmosphere was eleetric. Ribbentrop was most nervous and said to Sir Nevile, "You can see tbat tbe situation is d serious." Sir Nevile pointed a warning finger and said, "Tbat is not the language of a statesman in so serious a situation. ' ' Dr. Schmidt described tbe scene when be . translated the British ultimatum to Hitler in tbe presence of Ribbentrop. Hitler sat staring straight ahead and said notbing for fully a *iinute. He then said to Ribbentrop, "Wbat are we going to do now?" Hijler and Ribbentrop began discussing things and Dr. Schmidt left then and entered an anteroom, where many members of the Cabinet were present. He noticed Goering looked most depressed. The atmosphere of the room was ohe of depression. Ribbentrop seeined to drag one 'foot after the other as he went to the wit ness-box to give evidence. His head was bowed and he took the oaih with a tremor in his voice. He sat with downcast eyes as he told of his early years, including some when he studied languages in London. Ribbentrop reviewed what he described as Germany's hardship- after the Versailles Treaty, tbe tt^ms of which had. bred hatred and revenge. He declared that the other nations soon abandoned their obligations under the treaty and, because of Germany's lack of equality, he interested himself in politics. Goering congratulated him at tbe adjournment.