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IDEA OF U.S. ATTACK

Press Assn.-

D1SCU SSXONS PRIOR TG PBARL HARBOUR.

By Telegraph

-Copyright

Received Thursday, 8.30 p.m. WASHINGTON, March 21. The Pearl Ha'rbour Investigation Coiainxtt.ee released a statemtnt oy the former Secretary of War (Mr. K. L. Stiixison) uisclosing that Presidtni. Rooseveit s Cabinet nine days beiore the Pearl Haroour attack discussed and rejected an American attacx on the Japaneso forces without furtner warning. Mr. stimson related that early on the morning of ivovemoer 28, i94i, he received informatfon of Japaness niovements aiong the Asiastic eoast wiiicii were of so fornudanle a charueter that he visited the White lxouse without delay and suggested three altern.ati.ves: Firstly, do nothing; secondly, send a uitimatum; tnirdly, fejjnt« iinmediately. Mr. Rooseveit agreed that to do nothing was out 01 tne question. The most desiraole tniug was to take tne initiative and attack without warning, as tne be.se dexence was off'ence. On the other hand, it was felt from the viewpoint oi pumic opimon, tnat a furtner warning should be given, nocwithstanding that the President nad given one in viugust and the Japanese new southward movement liioicated. mtended dehance. Mr. Stimson said : " It was decided that v,e couid not attack without further warning. It was also deadeu that Mr. Rooseveit should send a letter to the Bmperor ac the same time the President would deliver a special message to Ccngress pointing out wiiat America would have to do to meet the Japanese menace. How- : ever, this course was not followed, because it was later learned tnat the i japanese were landing in Indo-Cnina, ; rather than going into the Gulf oi ; Siani. This appeared to give us some \ respite, since it w.as indicated that i the Japanese were not invadmg j Thaiiand immediately."

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHRONL19460322.2.33

Bibliographic details

Chronicle (Levin), 22 March 1946, Page 5

Word Count
289

IDEA OF U.S. ATTACK Chronicle (Levin), 22 March 1946, Page 5

IDEA OF U.S. ATTACK Chronicle (Levin), 22 March 1946, Page 5

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