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U.S. plan endangers Australian base

NZPA-AAP New York Australia’s North-West Cape communications base could become an early nuclear casualty if a controversial United States Navy strategy is used at the start of a conventional SovietUnited States conflict. This is the view of some defence strategists in the United States who are worried that the policy could trigger rather than prevent an all-out nuclear war.

Although the strategy had been discussed for nearly two years, and was disclosed to defence analysts last year in a background briefing by the Navy Secretary, Mr John Lehman, it was not until recently that the issue surfaced in the mass media.

The “New York Times” reported in a front-page article on January 6: “The Navy has officially acknowledged that if a major nonnuclear conflict broke out between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it might seek to attack Soviet submarines that carry long-range nuclear missiles.

“The contemplated action, using conventional weapons, would be intended to tip the nuclear balance in favour of the US and induce the Soviet Union to end the conflict on terms favourable to American forces,” said the Navy. Military experts said the joint American-Australian communications base at North-West Cape could be the relay station for instructions from the United States for its hunter-killer submarines to attack Soviet nuclear armed submarines in the first five minutes of the war. What had previously been

a debate confined largely to congressional committees and the defence community is now provoking widespread concern. Mr Tom Stefanick, a Boston based submarine warfare specialist, said the strategy made “North-West Cape a primary (nuclear) target.” Some critics warned that surprise attacks against Soviet submarines carrying long-range nuclear missiles encourage the Soviet Union to retaliate with nuclear Weapons. They .argue that this would increase the risk that a conventional conflict would quickly turn into a nuclear war.

Admiral James Watkins, the Chief of Naval Operations on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledges the shift in naval strategy in an article “The Maritime Strategy” published by the United States Naval Institute.

He concedes that the strategy “is not without risk” and that “neither we nor the Soviets can rule out possible escalation.” Mr Peter Hayes, an Australian with the Nautilus Research Centre said: “This is just the latest in a series of unilateral decisions made by the United States to change the strategy supported by the base, without consulting its junior partner.

It indicates the inability of Australia to obtain meaningful participation consistent with Australian sovereignty in these decisions.” An official of the Australian Embassy in Washington said that to his knowledge Australia had not been consulted about the new naval strategy. The Foreign Minister, Mr

Hayden, has repeatedly said that North-West Cape is not involved in American coun-ter-force first-strike plans, because Trident nuclear armed submarines no longer receive communications from it.

“What this new strategy indicates is how difficult it is for even the Foreighn Minister of the country to know what the base is supporting in strageic terms, because here is a communications system supporting a stragegy to another component of the nuclear force, which clearly he didn’t know about,” said Mr Hayes. “If anything, this is more pre-emptive than land based missiles such as the MX and SSlBs on the Soviet side.

“In my opinion, this is the single most pre-emptive and dangerous portion of the American nuclear arsenal, and this change in strategy came about, not through a considered decision by the allies, or even the security establishment in Washington, but by an internal elite in the American navy. “It didn’t come about because there is a new force. It’s simply a change in their doctrine. “It shows how difficult it is to be an equal ally in a nuclear alliance.”

A Navy official said the decision to prepare a plan for a pre-emptive strike against Soviet nuclear armed submarines was made public to rebut criticism that the Navy had no clear strategy for fighting a naval war.

Mr Hayes said that because North-West Cape is an automatic relay station, the timing of decisions in an escalating crisis would preclude consultation with Australian officials.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19860208.2.164

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Press, 8 February 1986, Page 31

Word count
Tapeke kupu
687

U.S. plan endangers Australian base Press, 8 February 1986, Page 31

U.S. plan endangers Australian base Press, 8 February 1986, Page 31

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