General Pinochet’s failures

Press, 25 June 1983, Page 16

General Pinochet’s failures

Nearly 10 years ago a coup by the Chilean armed forces attempted to restore order to the economic and social chaos of Chile under President Salvador Allende. Less than three years of socialism had reduced Chile to bankruptcy. Farms and factories were in the hands of armed revolutionary gangs and production had declined rapidly. Inflation reached 190 per cent in the year before the coup. At the time, the take-over by the armed forces may not have been welcomed by Chileans as a whole, but most seem to have accepted the change with relief. A period of military rule, distasteful in a country with a long democratic tradition, was accepted because the alternative — a dictatorship of the far Left — appeared worse. Ten years is a long time for a military regime to continue to justify itself by the need to rebuild social and economic stability. After a promising start, General Pinochet’s system has run out of steam. The regime is floundering without a policy as production falls; inflation and unemployment are rising sharply again; Chile’s international debts are overwhelming. All that the General has been able to offer is more repression and a declaration that democratic rule will be restored, in stages, between 1989 and 1997. The political consequences of the regime’s failures began to emerge earlier this year, even though political activity and political parties are supposed to be banned. In February, a small group of moderate politicians asked, politely and publicly, that the military chiefs remove General Pinochet from office and restore democracy. In March, a group of former opposition leaders, ranging from conservatives to socialists, also asked for a return to democracy. They were supported by the conference of Roman Catholic Bishops and by many of Chile’s newspapers. There was no official response, and no action was taken then against those who made the appeals. For the last two months, strikes and demonstrations have become widespread. General Pinochet’s response has been to arrest trade union leaders. He has also tried to win

favour by announcing that more than 100 political exiles will be permitted to return. Unless he is prepared to resort to harsh repression by the army and police, something much more positive and promising will be needed to calm the demonstrators and strikers. In spite of suggestions from the regime that the disturbances are part of a Soviet conspiracy, the opposition to General Pinochet appears to have become deep and widespread. Copper workers and truck owners may be leading the strike; the General has also lost the support of a good many of the middle-class Chileans who have been hit hard by the economic recession. The General remains convinced that he has the passive support of the overwhelming majority of his countrymen. Events in the next few weeks may well prove him wrong. The General has so far had no difficulty in retaining the support of the armed forces on whom he depends. The Army and police could not keep Chile quiet and at work in the face of prolonged and widespread disturbances; nor would they want to. Dissent is spreading to the sections of society on whom the armed forces depend for support. Nor can the General expect help from elsewhere. He has quarrels with his neighbours in Peru and Argentina. The United States, however much it may have approved of the General’s anti-communist vigour, will have no wish to get involved by supporting a remote and unpopular military regime. If General Pinochet manages to hang on to office, he is likely to gain only a little time before another and more vigorous outburst of opposition. Chileans were outraged by the economic and social policies of their country’s far Left. The military regime, after a more than generous time in which to show what it could do, has turned out also to be a failure. Chile’s best prospects must surely be a return to political activity and an early opportunity for moderate civilians to take over economic management. If the object is change without further violence, the political parties need to be given their chance soon, before Chileans are driven further towards the extremes of the political spectrum, and towards a civil war in which everyone would lose.