THE PRESS THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 1979. After the Rhodesian election

Press, 26 April 1979, Page 20

THE PRESS THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 1979. After the Rhodesian election

Rhodesia, or “Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,” is about to come under the rule of a black Prime Minister with an elected black majority in Parliament. As recently as two years ago such a development was all but unthinkable to many white Rhodesians. The country’s new constitution, and the elections and government which are derived from it, still appear to be unsatisfactory on many counts: it is still worth recognising how far the white settlers have gone in surrendering their entrenched political power The most remarkable aspect of the election is that it has been held at all in the face of a threat to disrupt polling from the guerrilla armies of the Popular Front. That threat appears not to have materialised and the guerrillas’ prestige must suffer inside Rhodesia and in the outside world. Polling was lowest in areas of the greatest guerrilla activity, but a turnout of more than 60 per cent of voters compares well with the percentage of people who bother to vote in British general elections or in American presidential elections. Bishop Muzorewa can claim to be in power as a result of popular opinion more democratically expressed than that which has installed the leaders of any of Rhodesia’s neighbours — Zambia, Mozambique, South Africa, and Botswana. He can also claim to have committed himself to a test of popularity in which the guerrilla leaders refused to take part.

Assertions of irregularities at the polls have already been made. It might be some time before all the journalists and political observers who flocked to Rhodesia for the election make known their findings. It will be surprising if incidents of intimidation and voting malpractice do not come to light in a country which is under martial law, and where the great majority of those who voted have not taken part in an election before.

Rhodesians will congratulate themselves that the guerrillas failed to disrupt the election: the new Government has to recognise now that the election is not going to stop the war. Nor is it likely to bring a speedy end to the economic sanctions and political isolation imposed by the rest of the world. Bishop Muzorewa must now persuade other States with a concern for Rhodesia that he is something more than a puppet of the whites, who still retain a disproportionate share of power in the Cabinet and in the administration of the civil service and the war effort.

Even if the Conservatives win the British General Election next week

they are unlikely to move rapidly towards recognition of Rhodesia, however much sympathy some senior members of the party have shown for Rhodesia’s political progress while they were in opposition. If the Labour Party is returned. Mr Callaghan has already promised no more than another "fact-finding” mission.

The new Government must hope to find a way to a lasting and peaceful settlement by persuading the guerrillas that there is a place for them now in a new, black-dominated Rhodesia, and that if they continue the fight the new Government will continue to prosecute the war at least as vigorously and successfully as Mr Smith’s Government has done. Already there have been suggestions that a faction of the Zimbabwe African National Union, which is based in Mozambique and headed by Mr Robert Mugabe, might be prepared to come over to the Government’s side. Such a defection would reduce the scale of the guerrilla war, but it would also increase the likelihood of new civil strife. Bishop Muzorewa and the Z.A.N.U. guerrillas both draw their support from the Shona, the largest of Rhodesia’s tribes. The more militant, but less numerous Ndebele lost the election and have also produced a smaller guerrilla movement. Faced with being in permanent political opposition they might well turn to increased violence.

The real key to a permanent settlement remains recognition of “Zimbabwe-Rhodesia” by the rest of the world. With freedom to trade openly, and with political support from Britain and the United States, the new Rhodesian Government could reasonably expect the guerrilla war to wither away as the underlying wealth of the Rhodesian economy was spread more evenly among people of all races. Without recognition, Bishop Muzorewa’s Government must expect to soldier on for months, even years, in a country which will become increasingly impoverished and ungovernable.

Western Governments, especially in Britain and the United States, will have to decide before too long whether to accept the new Rhodesian regime, with its faults and weaknesses, and its existence based on reluctant concessions by the white minority, or whether they are prepared to keep Rhodesia in the international wilderness and so encourage the war. Bishop Muzorewa’s regime offers a slim chance of peace with honour of a kind for all parties. The alternative must be increasing violence leading, almost certainly, to foreign intervention