The Press MONDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1966. The Manila Meeting

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31198, 24 October 1966, Page 10

The Press MONDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1966. The Manila Meeting

South Vietnam s allies begin talks in Manila today against a background of considerable scepticism about the timing, purpose, and outcome of the conference. Many Americans see the talks as a device, engineered during the visit to Washington by President Marcos of the Philippines, to be used mainly to bolster Democratic chances in the United States Congressional elections next month. President Johnson's tour through the Pacific and South-east Asia is also regarded as a dramatic gesture, added for good measure, and calculated to make Republican arguments about American involvement in Vietnam—and other demonstrations against United States policy—untimely and awkward. Critics inside and outside the United States have said that the talks look more like a council of war than a council of peace. If Mr Johnson decides to visit South Vietnam to meet the generals and fighting men, what he gains in the American electorate may be outweighed by opinion elsewhere that he has left the conference table only to associate himself more intimately with the war. Viewed from this part of the world, which is not much concerned with domestic politics in the United States, the cynicism is surely misplaced. No effort to end the war is untimely, least of all an effort which seems a necessary preliminary to talks with the Communist leaders. The political arm of the Viet Cong, the National Liberation Front, has lately acquired more prominence in speaking for the Vietnamese Communists. North Vietnam and the N.L.F. would enter peace talks with a common front. South Vietnam and its allies cannot yet do this. Personal exchanges among the leaders of the seven allied nations may iron out some of the differences, especially those between Air Vice-Marshal Ky’s Government and the United States on meeting the Viet Cong and on the conduct of the war with or without peace talks. The presence of all the allies—lacking at the meeting between President Johnson and South Vietnamese leaders in Honolulu —ought to smooth out these differences.

The conference will achieve most if it can produce a peace plan which Hanoi will not easily be able to reject as a “sham” as it has rejected all other peace proposals. United States thinking on a stage-by-stage withdrawal of forces by both sides will be much more convincing if it has the unmistakable concurrence of the Saigon Government and the other allies. Mr Johnson has decided that a cease-fire, a phased withdrawal of combatants by both sides, the removal of American bases from South Vietnam, and the acceptance of any Governments chosen by the peoples of North and South Vietnam will not throw away the sacrifices already made nor the future of South-east Asia. France and other countries have not been convinced by his assertion of this attitude. Britain has another plan.

Discussion in Manila of the economic future of South Vietnam and South-east Asia is another reminder for New Zealand of responsibilities it will be invited to shoulder. The announced withdrawal of British forces from South-east Asia sharpens awareness of our role. Can New Zealanders be sure that there will be less debate over what the country should do with peace in South-east Asia than over what should be done in war? The Manila talks suggest that now is not too early to consider seriously what sacrifices may be needed to maintain a settlement and to ensure peace in the area of which New Zealand must regard itself as part.