THE PERSIAN GULF UNEASY QUIETNESS PERSISTS IN STATES AND SHEIKDOMS

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31097, 28 June 1966, Page 16

THE PERSIAN GULF UNEASY QUIETNESS PERSISTS IN STATES AND SHEIKDOMS

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CHRISTOPHER TUGENDHAT

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Middle Eastf (Reprinted from the "Financial Times’* by arrangement)

Throughout the Middle East British diplomats are preparing for the full weight of Arab nationalist propaganda to be mounted in an attack on their country’s remaining responsibilities in the Persian Gulf. These are Bahrain, which is to take over from Aden as the main British base in the area, the oil-rich state of Qatar, and the seven Trucial states, which include Abu Dhabi with oil revenues of £25 million a year, Dubai, where oil was discovered offshore earlier this month, and Sharjah, which may also soon become an oil producer.

Their relationship with Britain is quite unlike that of the colonies and protectorates to which Independence has been granted during the last few years. All the Persian Gulf territories are already independent and ruled by their own sheikhs. Britain is responsible only for their defence and foreign relations, which means upholding their independence in face of threats from the larger Arab countries, and attempting to settle the border and other disputes in which the rulers themselves are permanently engaged. These obligations were taken on as a result of a number of treaties mainly dating from the 19th century in order to ensure peace along the route to India, and to suppress the slave trade. At the time it seemed unnecessary for Britain to become involved in shiekhdoms’ internal affairs, and the sheikhs themselves are still entirely responsible for administering their countries and disposing of their oil revenues. The British political agents can only offer advice, which is frequently ignored. Slow Development Consequently, political and social development has been much less than if the States had been colonies under direct rule from London. In Bahrein where oil was first discovered in 1932 the schools and social services are fairly highly developed. But in the other territories the bulk of the population live in conditions that are among the most backward in the Arab world.

Although this is the fault of the rulers the fact that they enjoy British protection means that this country is being held responsible for allowing such conditions to continue. It is being argued that if Britain really wanted to it could bring irresistible pressure on the rulers to set their houses in order. So it is Britain which is being blamed for Sheikh Shakhbut

of Abu Dhabi’s unwillingness to spend his oil revenues on developing his country, for the way the Qatar royal family uses its oil wealth to imitate the notorious ex King Saud of Saudi Arabia, and for the fact that Dubai relies to a large extent on smuggling gold into India. Until recently the sheikhs were able to carry on their activities without attracting much attention. Public opinion in Britain was concerned with the problems in Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East, while in the] Middle East itself the Persian, Gulf sheikhdoms were regard-: ed as being of less import-] ance than Aden and South!

Arabia. But now that the decision has been taken to evacuate the Aden base in 1968, after the Federation of South Arabia achieves its independence, Bahrein has become an obvious target for attack. At the same time the rapid growth in Abu Dhabi’s oil revenues, which are expected to reach £4O million in 1970, and the prospects of further discoveries along the Trucial coast are attracting an increasing amount of attention. Answerable to U.N.? For Britain the new situation is full of difficulties. As in Rhodesia before U.D.1., the Government is i*> the unhappy position of being held responsible for what goes on in the Sheikhdoms, and may be called upon to answer for it in the United Nations, yet it does not have the power to control the actions of the rulers. In official circles it is freely admitted that this is an impossible state of affairs, and that a definite terms of years must be put to the commitment to defend the rulers.

' This, however, is easier said than done. While Britain stays in the gulf the area at least remains an oasis of stability in a generally troubled region, and a large part of the oil revenues finds its way to London. If Britain were to go without making adequate provision for the future all this would change. Iran claims Bahrein, while Saudi Arabia claims part of Abu Dhabi, and a struggle for power between these two plus Iraq and, of course, the United Arab Republic would almost certainly result. Under these circumstances the flow of oil to the West might be interrupted and tension leading possibly to fighting could engulf the whole Middle East. Federation Ruled Out

Finding a way out of this dilemma will be even more difficult than working out the constitutions and federations that were so laboriously put together in Africa and Asia and which have since so quickly been overturned.

To begin with, that old stand-by of forming a federation is ruled out from the start. Last year the nine rulers held their first-ever conference and all sorts of ambitious plans were made for closer economic co-opera-tion, including the construction of a metalled all-weather road to link five of the Trucial states. A Trucial States Development Office was also established last year, and the British hope is that the three sheikhdoms with oil —Bahrein, Qatar and Abu Dhabi—will contribute some of their earnings to their poorer neighbours. But unfortunately nearly all the rulers have conflicting claims to each! other’s territory, and the normal form is for a ruler to be on bad terms with his immediate neighbours and to have a reasonably harmonious! relationship with those at one. remove. Joint ventures are! therefore very difficult to get! off the ground, and Sheikh' Shakhbut, whose revenues will soon be much the largest, is particularly opposed to them. Complete independence with membership of the United Nations and the Arab League for each of the separate states is still more impractical. In the first place none of the rulers wants to give up British protection since they know they could never survive alone in the world, and as soon as the decision to withdraw from Aden was made known the ruler of Bahrein, Sheikh Isa, sent his brother to London to seek reassurances that he could continue to rely on us. Secondly, if the rulers wanted to become independent their countries are too small even by African standards. Bahrein, with a population of 165,000, might just about be able to set up the apparatus of an

independent state, but none of the others could. Qatar, with 55,000 people, and Dubai, with 40,000, are about the same size as the Isle of Man, while most of the others are much smaller. Even Abu Dhabi has a population no bigger than Andorra, and in addition to anything else none of the states has more than a handful of people with secondary education. “Pax Arabica”? Under these circumstances the British Government has decided- that the best thing to do is to work towards an understanding with King Feisal of Saudi Arabia in the hope that in due course “the

Pax Britannica can be replaced by a Pax Arabica” with the sheikhdoms maintaining some kind of semi-independent position. This is partly because Saudi Arabia is the only power vitally involved in the area which has a land frontier with the states and partly because King Feisal is coming to be regarded as a useful counter-weight to President Nasser in the Arab world, in addition, a Saudi take-over of the British protectorates would be far less distasteful to the Shah of Iran than the arrival in the gulf of Arab nationalists drawing their inspiration from Cairo or Bagdad. Moving towards this goal will be a slow and difficult process. Most of the rulers are distrustful of Saudi Arabia, and Abu Dhabi even has an important border dispute with it over the Buraimi oasis. Indeed probably only the prospect of British withdrawal could persuade the rulers to have anything to do [with the idea, and their coI operation cannot be taken for ! granted. I Then there is the position [of Saudi Arabia. In spite of [the modernisation efforts of King Feisal the country is still incredibly backward with [only the barest outline of the f ithe administrative machinery [needed to run a 20th-century [state. Everything depends on King Feisal and if he died or was assassinated it is far from certain that country would survive in one piece since its component parts were only brought together by the great [ibn Saud as recently as the |mid-19205. The King is now 62 and although he is report'ed to be in good health his lefforts to establish a system of government suitable to the [modern world and to ensure the succession for the Crown Prince, his younger brother Prince Khaled, are obviously a race against time. Effects of Time Limit All this makes it extremely difficult for Britain to know how to handle the rulers. If a time limit is put on the defence commitment, then it is feared that in order to safeguard their position after British troops have left the rulers will refuse to co-oper-ate with this country and seek support among the nationalists. So Bahrein was given the assurances it asked for, and the political agents in the other states are doing nothing to warn the rulers of the fact that one day, and perhaps in the not very distant future, Britain will retire. Everything is allowed to go on much as it always has done, and the rulers, knowing that they have the support of Britain at their elbow, continue to disregard much of the agents’ advice about how ito bring their territories up to date. The danger of this policy is that nothing is any longer the same as it used to be. , Events are moving fast. Last year there were labour and i student riots in Bahrein, and ; this year two key C.I.D. ; officers were gravely wounded after booby traps had been put in their cars. The country is now completely quiet, but as those Europeans who remember Cyprus and Aden warn their friends, riots and attacks on policemen can be the first signs of impending trouble.