Compromise In Saigon?

Press, Issue 31095, 25 June 1966, Page 14

Compromise In Saigon?

The protective arrest in Hue of the fasting Buddhist monk, Thich Tri Quang, will be linked with the efforts of Marshal Ky’s Government to end the Buddhist revolt by bringing the leader of the extremist wing under control. The need for Buddhist unity, as a vital factor in defeating Communist plans to take over Vietnam, has been recognised by many prominent Buddhists. In Saigon, the leader of the moderate Buddhist movement, Thich Tam Chau, still insists that its objective is the resignation of the Prime Minister, Marshal Ky, and the Head of State, Nguyen Van Thieu. Ky’s offer of a September election and the immediate broadening of the military junta by the addition of 10 civilians may well, however, provide a new basis for negotiation. Despite the difficulty of compiling accurate rolls and guaranteeing proper electoral procedures in a war-torn country, it is thought that voting could be conducted in areas containing about three-quarters of the population of South Vietnam. Useful elections, it is recognised, could not be held without Buddhist participation. The electoral commission recommended that a constituent assembly, when elected, should be empowered to enact laws and later transform itself into a national assembly which could choose a new government; and it hoped that this might meet one of the chief Buddhist demands and open the way for a settlement between the moderates and the generals. Obviously, where the future distribution of power is concerned, Tri Quang’s motives are suspect. He had emerged as the most militant and most ambitious of the Buddhist leaders, and had organised strong student support for his anti-American campaign. Tri Quang was behind the campaigns that brought down regime, also, on the ground that it was denying the Huong, and had pledged himself to end the Ky regime also, on the ground that it was denying the people their basic rights. He began his fast ostensibly to force the withdrawal of American support for the military junta. In 1963, when he was being hunted by the Diem regime, the United States Embassy sheltered him for 64 days. Now he is regarded as the most dangerous and potentially disruptive political force in South Vietnam-willing even to enter into a convenient alliance with the Vietcong to further his own aims. He has no wish to see agreement between the Saigon Government and the Buddhist movement without the assurance of a place of power for himself. His removal to Saigon at this stage—which seems certain—will enable the authorities to check any move he might attempt against the early establishment of popular government The Americans are hoping for the emergence of a government capable of negotiating the genuine neutralisation of South Vietnam. Tri Quang says American policy is not to be trusted because it gave birth to the Vietcong and helped it to expand “ through clumsy “ interference in Vietnamese internal affairs ”. Views of that nature clearly would not assist, the spirit of compromise, between the Buddhists and the generals, now thought to be appearing in Saigon.