The Press FRIDAY, JUNE 24, 1966. East Of Suez—How Long?

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31094, 24 June 1966, Page 10

The Press FRIDAY, JUNE 24, 1966. East Of Suez—How Long?

The substantial vote of confidence which Labour members, at a party meeting, gave the Prime Minister, Mr Wilson, on his East-of-Suez policy may mean the crushing of incipient revolt; it may mean no more than the temporary silencing of the critics. Feeling among members of both the Right and Left wings of the party has been running high on defence issues: there is a clamant demand for drastic pruning of expenditure. Some members, the former Navy Minister, Mr Mayhew, prominent among them, have alleged that the Government’s attitude has been equivocal. Mr Mayhew asserted that on the one hand the Australian Government was assured that Britain had no plans for the early withdrawal of forces based east of Suez while on the other hand the Parliamentary Labour Party was told that withdrawal would take place. There had been, according to Mr Mayhew, a “disgraceful muddle”. Now the Prime Minister has said positively that troops will remain in Singapore, Malaysia, and other places east of Suez because the Government believes that Britain still has a vital contribution to make to the stability and security of that region. Nevertheless, Mr Wilson added, the ending of Indonesia’s confrontation of Malaysia would permit a reduction of British forces in the area. “ The House will not expect me, in ad- “ vance of a settlement, to specify the scope and “ timing of our withdrawals ”, Mr Wilson told the Commons. “ I can, however, give an assurance that “we intend to take speedy action in withdrawing “ from the Far East every unit whose continued pre- “ sence there ceases to be necessary ”.

What can be made of these statements? The Government’s policy seems to be just as fluid—or opportunist—as it was before the rumpus started. The 1966 Defence Review, issued in February, insisted that Britain would maintain a military presence east of Suez, but said that reductions would be made “as soon as conditions permit ”. The review, of course, was prepared and issued before any move for the easing of confrontation had been made. Now Mr Wilson would obviously like to interpret it as elastically as possible. The party critics had called for withdrawal by 1969-70. The review, in rebuttal, argued that the Far East and Southern Asia were regions where the greatest danger to peace might lie “ in the next decade ”, and that the Malaysia and Singapore bases should be retained as long as the governments concerned offered acceptable conditions for manning them.

In another context, critics of defence policy have quoted Mr Wilson’s undertaking that the Government was determined to save £5O to £lOO millions in overseas military expenditure, and have asked how, in that case, she could afford to continue the role of a “ world policeman ”. The annual budgetary cost of the forces in Malaysia alone, including the Far East Fleet, has been £255 million. Hong Kong adds another £l5 million, and when the Middle East is Included the total reaches £330 million a year. Recently the “ Guardian ”, Manchester, said that the armed forces in the Far East were spending as much foreign exchange in a year as the shipping industry could earn in three years, and submitted bluntly that whatever Britain's commitments to the people of Malaysia and Singapore might be, this spending could not continue.

Yet the Government’s dilemma is real enough. The “ continuing role ” policy has been opposed within the Cabinet, not merely on the party fringes. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Callaghan, and the Minister for Economic Affairs, Mr Brown, are said to agree on the “ dangerous folly ” of trying to keep the peace, with strained forces and at high cost, in regions no longer important to Britain’s own defence. It is small wonder, in these circumstances, that Mr Wilson’s interpretation of policy gives the appearance almost of day-to-day improvisation. Should Indonesian-Malaysian relations take a marked turn for the better, as the portents suggest, Mr Wilson may expect to have the party dissidents again snapping at his heels—supported, conceivably, by the Treasury. Mr Callaghan and Mr Brown have called the tune in other policy crises. They might do so again to resolve the East-of-Suez muddle.