Supersonic Civil Aviation THE BRITISH-FRENCH CONCORD STANDS AT DECISION POINT

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31081, 9 June 1966, Page 16

Supersonic Civil Aviation THE BRITISH-FRENCH CONCORD STANDS AT DECISION POINT

(By

MICHAEL DONNE,

air correspondent of the "Financial Times". London)

(Reprinted from the "Financial Time*" by arrangement)

The next few months will be significant for the future of both the British-French Concord and the United States supersonic airliner projects. While the momentum of work on the first prototype Concord increases to meet the target flight date of February 28, 1968, a major British report on the economic and technical aspects of the project has been in preparation by Ministry of Aviation officials for Ministers to study, prior to a decision authorising work on the next phase of Concord, the construction of two “pre-production” aircraft, a static test and a fatigue test aircraft, and the build-up of a quantity production line.

At the same time, more and more United States airlines have been showing interest in the Concord. This is partly due to increasing speculation whether either of the bigger and faster American projects will get started late this year (Boeing, it is understood, is extensively revamping its design and may even drop its “swinging wings” plan in favour of a more conventional shape). If the United States aircraft is delayed now, it will not get into airline service until the late, instead of the mid, 19705, thereby greatly widening Concord’s current three-year lead. In order not to be left at a competitive disadvantage, American carriers are thus looking more seriously at the Concord than they have done in the past, and the closer the aircraft gets to its first flight, the more interested they become. The Order Book For both these reasons, the Concord order book can be expected to rise substantially beyond the present 52 aircraft in the months ahead. New United States orders expected soon include a Pan American “re-order” for two aircraft, a United Airlines deal for at least three (and perhaps as many as six) and an order from Braniff. Those working on the Concord hope that by the end of this year virtually every major airline in the United States will have joined the queue for the aircraft, and that this will touch off other orders, including many in Europe. Rising Costs The market for supersonic airliners has been variously estimated at several hundreds. Dr. A. E. Russell, managing-director of British Aircraft Corporation’s Filton Division, recently suggested that 200 Concords in service by 1975 was feasible. The market for the United States aircraft has been put by General Jewell C. Maxwell, Federal Aviation Agency Supersonic Transport (S.S.T.) development director, at around 400 aircraft by 1980, with another 800 over the following decade.

Figures for the cost of the programmes are equally loose. The last official estimate for Concord, two years ago, was £l4O million each for Britain and France, with another £5O million for development flying to Certificate of Airworthiness standard, making a total of £330 million, or £165 million each by 1971. This is now being officially revised upwards, and seems likely to come out at around £4OO million, or £2OO million each. The cost of the United States aircraft, originally estimated some time ago by the F.A.A. at about 1500 million dollars (more than £5OO million), is now being discussed in terms of 4000 million dollars. The price of a Concord is 16 milbon dollars (£5.7 million). That of an American S.S.T is hkeiy to b e at last 35 million dollars.

LPS s It is to clarify the cost issues as well as the technical aspects of the project that the private Concord report has been prepared. But a public “status report” presented recently to a New York meeting of United States aviation writers by Dr. W. Strang, of the British Aircraft Corporation, declared that the project was on schedule, it was fully feasible technically, and that economically it was up to standard for the airlines, with over 4000 miles range on full payload plus reserves (and “we expect to do much better,” said Dr. Strang). The private officials’ report will convey all this information in great detail to Ministers, so that they can take the most significant decisions yet on the Concord. If these are delayed, there is likely to be a major gap in the production of the aircraft after the first flight of the prototype, which would substantially cut its lead over the American project, assuming that the latter itself gets going on time. So far as can be ascertained, there is no serious suggestion in Britain that the Concord should be axed. Britain, in fact, must now accept the fact that the Concord has major political, as well as technological, connotations.

Joint Programmes

To try to axe it without the full and voluntary approval of the French would be to damage Britain in other directions—there would probably be no chance of ever going on with an AngloFrench air-bus or such joint military programmes as the Jaguar jet strike-trainer and the supersonic variablegeometry project. Accordingly, if the Government is really worried about the cost, it must weigh the £2OO million figure, spread over about six years, against these political factors and also against the technological gains to be derived from Concord (it is the key to the advanced technologies of the 1970 s and beyond), and the now very real possibilities of it beeom-

ing a commercial success in its own right

4000 million dollars. A more favourable cost division, now suggested at 80-20 per cent, still means a big slice of Government money. Efforts to try to arrange American S.S.T. funding on the basis of Governmentguaranteed bond issues to the public do not seem to have had a warm reception. Congress has yet to have its say, and it is already being argued that if one big manufacturer, Boeing, is prepared to spend up to 15C0 million dollars of its own money on funding the “Jumbo” 747 subsonic Jet, then industry ought not be frightened of financing the S.S.T.—especially if it is going to be the big bonanza that manufacturers’ brochures to date have tended to suggest Decisions Needed As with Concord, some decisions will have to be taken this year. Either the Government comes to an agreement on cost-sharing with industry, or the S.S.T. is delayed. Noone in the United States really wants to see the latter, although there are still many voices raised there (as in Europe) against the whole concept of supersonic civil aviation. But the airlines are not taking any chances. For comparatively small sums they can ensure themselves a place in the supersonic era by reserving their positions on the Concord line, and this is just what they are doing in increasing quantity. The Concord thus stands at a critical point. To go on firmly now could mean big rewards, but the high cost involved means an equally big risk and a heavy price for failure. It is really this that the British Ministers will have to consider as they study their officials’ report over the next few weeks.

The present order book, if all the aircraft are taken up, is worth about £312 million, excluding spares, and by the end of this year is likely to be worth £450 million (say, 75 aircraft). What is beginning to worry Concord’s manufacturers is not whether it will be successful—they are confident it will—but whether the production rate currently envisaged is too slow. It is felt that production of three a month will lengthen delivery dates too much and deter would-be buyers, and they argue that a rate of five a month would be more realistic. This would cost more money, and would be a major gamble but they feel it is the only way to cash in on the market they foresee. Meanwhile, the timetable for the American S.S.T. (currently in what is known as Phase 2C, or detailed design study) grinds on. Today is the final date for the two airframe contractors, Boeing and Lockheed, to provide the engine contractors, General Electric and Pratt and Whitney, with the size and performance requirements for the engines. By September 6, all contractors must submit their final proposals to the Government, Boeing probably putting in a 1600 miles per hour design and Lockheed its 2000 miles per hour study By October 31, Government and airline evaluations of the two competing designs are expected to be completed, theor etically leaving two full months in which a final choice of prototype constructor can be made, enabling Phase 3 (prototype building) to start on# January 1 next. Government Fears

Whether this timetable is held remains to be seen. The doubts appear to be over whether a clear-cut decision on who shall build the prototype will be reached in time for work to get started on January 1. The airlines, too, are fearful about the cost, but not as fearful as the United States Government, which sees itself being obliged to put up as much as 90 per cent of the money if the project goes ahead at all. During Phase 3, the really big spending will come, and the United States Government, faced with the mounting cost of Vietnam, does not feel too happy spending some 90 per cent of up to as much as