Vietnam General Ousted

Press, Volume CV, Issue 31007, 12 March 1966, Page 15

Vietnam General Ousted

(N.Z. Press Assn.—Copyright) SAIGON, March 11.

The ousting of a powerful member of South Vietnam’s ruling military junta yesterday has exposed the first crack in the clique of young generals who have rigidly held power together since 1964, writes Peter Arnett, of the Associated Press.

Arnett says:

The generals kept telling one another that “as long as we stick together, we can weather all storms.” They came unstuck yester-

They came unstuck yesterday when they purged Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi, a flamboyant paratrooper who very nearly overthrew the former President, Ngo Dinh Diem, in a lightning coup d’etat attempt in 1960, spent three years in exile, land who came back to cotnImand central Vietnam up to

the time of his ousting. The purge was apparently unanimous, and United States authorities reportedly welcomed it.

“Thi was the only irritant in the whole junta,” one United States official said. “Now we have unanimity.” But the recent history of Vietnamese politics tells an entirely different story. Generals have been purging one another in Vietnam to get “purity” of effort ever since President Diem was overthrown in November, 1963.

Struggle For Power

It all boils down to a struggle for power, whether by Major-General Duong Van Minh, General Nguyen Khanh, or in this case, Premier Nguyen Cao Ky.

Both Minh and Khanh held total power for a time, lost it, and went into exile. The ousting of Thi may well be the beginning of a bid for total power by Premier Ky. Certainly, Thi was the Premier’s greatest rival.

The divisive nature of Vietnamese politics is well illustrated by the Ky-Thi relationship. They leaned on each

other in the early days of the generals’ partnership and were the most powerful members of the group. When Ky became premier last year he asked the paratrooper officer to send to Saigon some of his trusted aides from Da Nang to take key positions. But as Premier Ky’s power increased, the friendship lessened in intensity. Part of the reason, some observers believe, was the reluctance of General Thi’s men in Saigon to take orders from the military junta. The junta was prepared to let General Thi run central Vietnam as he wanted without interfering in Saigon affairs, which they felt was their own domain.

And Premier Ky was developing protegees of his own who were desirous of the jobs that Thi’s men were holding Thi went out of his way to upset the central Government in January when he vetoed a fare increase on Air Vietnam commercial airline flights. The Government had already approved the rise in fares. Thi said he would not let the airline’s planes land in Da Nang or Hue, the two ke" northern cities.

The Government had to back down on the fare increase, and lost face in doing so.

A Warlord

Thi was obviously enjoying being warlord of central Vietnam.

There was no doubt in the minds of Americans associated with him in the central Vietnam region that he was doing a competent enough job under the circumstances. His region is flooded with North Vietnamese troops. Thi proved a master irt dealing with the extreme political factions in Hue and Da Nang, and kept them under control.

Militarily, United States officers tended to be critical of some of Thi’s field commanders. The First and Second Divisions in central Vietnam suffered some devastating defeats during 1965. At the time of his dismissal, there were no indications that Thi was about to make a bid for power to topple Ky or the junta.