NEW FIVE YEAR PLAN REJECTION OF KHRUSHCHEV’S OVER-AMBITIOUS TARGETS

Press, Volume CV, Issue 31005, 10 March 1966, Page 16

NEW FIVE YEAR PLAN REJECTION OF KHRUSHCHEV’S OVER-AMBITIOUS TARGETS

IBy

ISAAC DEUTSCHER]

A Soviet citizen who would fancy buying himself the “Programme of the Soviet Communist Party” would not nowadays be able to find it in any of the bookshops of Moscow or Leningrad. That document, hailed only recently as “epoch-making,” compared with Marx’s and Engels’ “Communist Manifesto,” and solemnly adopted at the XXII Party Congress in 1961, has, since Mr Khrushchev’s downfall, been suppressed like anv piece of subversive literature. Together with the “Programme,” the famous “Twenty Years Plan of Economic Development,” which formed part of it, has been confined to oblivion. No one mentions it any more; and when Messrs Kosygin and Brezhnev announced, on February 19. a new Five Year Plan to be placed on the agenda of the forthcoming Party' Congress, they were in fact quietly burying that other far more grandoise Plan.

Mr Khrushchev’s blueprint it will be remembered, spanned the years 1961-1980, the period during which the U.S.S.R. was to make its “transition from Socialism to Communism.” Half - way through that period, around 1970, the Soviet Union was to “surpass the United States of America ... in industrial output per head of population and ... to assure material wellbeing to all its workers,” according to the resolutions of the XXII Congress. Targets Compared So confident was the former Prime Minister and Party leader of this prospect that in 1961 he set out fairly detailed production targets also for 1970. As the BrezhnevKosygin Plan also ends in 1970, it is easy to compare the targets of the two Plans. The comparison reveals that Mr Khrushchev’s targets have been definitely abandoned as over-ambitious; and that Messrs Brezhnev and Kosygin acknowledge tacitly that the grand scheme for Sovieit-Ame-riean competition, adopted at the previous Congress, was unrealistic; and that for the time being the Soviet Union must admit itself to be defeated in the competition. Unless the American economy is hit hy a catastrophic slump in the next few years, the Soviet Union, far from surpassing the U.S., will still lag behind it at the end of this decade. However, one need not overdramatise this setback to Soviet hopes and Soviet prestige. The Soviet economy, especially Its industrial sector, is certainly not stagnant. The Seven Year Plan now concluded represents a record of impressive growth and expansion, even if quite a few of its original targets have not been reached. The new Plan, though less sweeping than Mr Khrushchev’s vision of the future, still provides for a very fast rate of growth. Between now and 1970 the volume of Soviet industrial production is to expand by about 50 per cent: net national income is to grow by 40 per cent, while the real incomes (per head) of workers and farmers are to grow by 30 per cent. True, the planners have climbed down from the Khrushchevian

. “peaks”—in some cases the ■ targets have been reduced by • 20—25 and more per cent—- : but the Plan still aims at a ; level of production which in i many important respects - comes very close to the I American level. i Some Comparisons To give only a few illustra- ’ tions; the U.S.S.R., having in recent years doubled its out- ’ put of electricity, is now planning to raise that output from about 500 billion kilo-watt-hours to 850 billion, where Mr Khrushchev’s Plan • provided for an output nearer ■ the 1000 billion mark—the : American output is still somewhat higher than that. The , Soviet oil industry, small until . recently, is now yielding about 250 million tons and is planning an output of 350 million for 1970, which is only 20 or 30 million tons below current American production —Mr Khrushchev aimed at 390 million tons. (The Soviet coal industry has been producing over 50 per cent more coal than the American for quite a few years now.) In steel, an increase is planned from the present 90 million tons to about 120, slightly above the American peak output so far, but 20 million tons below Mr Khrushchev’s target. Another indication of the scale of development is the supply of cement This is to be increased from the 73 million tons produced in 1965 (which is already 20 per cent or so above the American level) to over 100 million tons in 1970 (Mr Khrushchev’s target for that year was 122 million tons). In chemicals and especially in synthetic fibres the reductions are much more drastic and amount in some cases even to 50 per cent Consumer Industries The slowdown is felt most strongly in the consumer industries. During his lasi years in office Mr Khrushchev used to argue that the Soviet Union no longer needed to give top priority to heavy industry and that it could afford developing its light in dustry much faster than hitherto. This issue was at the centre of a tense behind-the-scenes controversy before and after Mr Khrushchev’s downfall; and now his successors have once again decided in favour of heavy industry. The output of consumer goods in the coming five-year period is to be increased bj' about 45 per cent, while the supply of producer goods is to grow by over 50 per cent. > However, Messrs Kosygin and . Brezhnev have avoided going ' to the extremes of the old anti-consumptionist policy; ' the discrepancy between pro- : ducer and consumer goods is , less than it used to be; and 1 although the targets for cloth- < ing, footware, and synthetic . fibres have been sharply re- ■ duced, those for cars, refrig- ] erators, television sets, and other durable consumer goods

• have been conspicuously ,• raised. i Farming Stagnates 1 In one large and funda--5 mental sphere of the eco--5 nomy, farming, the planned rate of growth is so slow that in relation to the needs of a growing population the . prospect is one of virtual j stagnation. A 25 per cent rise . in farm output is expected to r take place during this fivet .vear period. In grain the hope . is for a 30 per cent increase from the rather low “average J harvests” of recent years. r This would amount to a total > yield of between 170 and 180 ’ million tons of grain by 1970. , It should be recalled that Mr I Khrushchev, hoping for a 75 t per cent rise from the same . statistical base expected a . grain crop of 230 million . tons! Soviet spokesmen blame President Johnson’s and Mr Khrushchev’s policies for this slowdown. In its paper on the new Plan, the Central Com- . rnittee speaks gravely of the ■ new defence allocations that had to be made because of the “accentuation of internali tonal tension by American imperialism . . . and because . of its military aggression in : various parts of the world." . No figures of the additional armament expenditure are . mentioned: but if the loweri i-ng of sights in the civilian i sectors of the economy offers ; any guide, then the volume , of resources re-directed to armament must be very considerable indeed. Influence of Vietnam It may well be that if the new defence production were included in the over-all balance then the total volume of nroduction planned for this Five Year period would nnt appear to be much smaller than the volume envisaged in earlier Plans. And it is only fair to recall that Mr Khrushchev himself also pointed out on several occasions that he based his economic hopes on the assumption of an international “detente” and of a slackening of the arms race The Vietnam war has obviously rendered these assumptions null and void. Nevertheless, part of the slowdown has undoubtedly been due to domestic reasons, namely to the chronic marasmus in Soviet agriculture. The new Plan holds out some promise tor overcoming the difficulties, but it is vague about the means and it is far from bold. So far Messrs Kosygin and Brezhnev, speaking about the Soviet national cake and its growth in the coming years have not been able to guar antee its flour content. Perhaps they will say more about this at the Party Con gress in the last days of March. Otherwise, it will become painfully obvious that the much praised “sober modesty" of their Plan—an insufficient virtue in any case —conceals lack of policy and helplessness. (World Copyright Reserved by Isaac Deutscher)