VIEW FROM SAIGON LOOKING AT AMERICA’S NEW-LOOK VIETNAM POLICY

Press, Volume CV, Issue 31002, 7 March 1966, Page 14

VIEW FROM SAIGON LOOKING AT AMERICA’S NEW-LOOK VIETNAM POLICY

IBy

UN WARD.

writing to the “Daily Telegraph.” London, from Saigon )

(Reprinted from the “Daily Telegraph" by arrangement.l

Until America began committing vast numbers of troops to South Vietnam, the war against the Viet Cong was being rapidly lost. Gruelling Government casualties, the galloping spread of V let Cong territorial control, coupled with political chaos in the major cities, signalled immiment victory for the Communists. In the year that has passed since then the strength of United States forces within the republic has burgeoned from approximately 20,000 to the current 201,000. “We’re not losing the war any more,” American civilian officials claim with measured optimism. When pressed further, though, the stock answer usually follows: “Of course, we haven’t started winning it vet, either.”

The last 12 months have, however, taught American civilian and military officials alike one hard lesson. Any gains derived from the buildup have been severely limited by an inability to match increased firepower with an effective follow-up programme geared to winning back the rural population to the Government cause. Involved are such issues as land reform, refugee rehabilitation, health, education, agricultural reconstruction and control of corruption. These form the very crux of the crisis, yet all have been swamped by the year’s staggering emphasis on the military aspects of the war. Contrasts In Costs Statistics reflect the startling discrepancy in American spending for civilian projects on the one hand and the prosecution of the military cause on the other. During the fiscal year 1965 American economic aid to the republic totalled 326.6 million dollars as opposed to military spending in the billions. Of the total economic aid figure 222.8 million dollars were consumed by the commercial import programme and surplus agricultural commodities from the United States. The remaining 103.8 million dollars financed specific projects which, broadly speaking, were designed to help the nation help itself. A further breakdown suggests that funds channelled directly to village level from which the rural peasant could expect to receive immediate and tangible benefits failed to reach 50 million dollars throughout the year. This becomes meaningful when measured against statistics showing 85 per cent of South Vietnam’s population living in rural areas, and the B-52 bombing costs for a year’s “in-country” raiding amounting to approximately 500 million dollars. The historic Declaration of Honolulu suddenly re-estab-lishes the guide lines. From Washington’s standpoint, its accent on pacification and land reform represents a firm decision that effective civilian counter-insurgency techniques must go hand in hand with

the military effort. So it! seems America's bitter dilemma on the correct! modus operand! for Vietnam is finally settled—at least in the minds of Washington theorists. The Hawaii talks thus constitute a notable victory for America’s Ambassador to Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge, counter-insurgency expert General Edward Lansdale, and their supporters who strongly opposed the Pentagon’s insistence that the war’s prime target be the military effort, after which the appropriate civilian projects could follow. Readjustment Of Aid It now remains to be seen whether America’s “new look” Vietnam policy, with the special shot in the arm it purportedly carries for rural development, can provide the long-awaited solution . . - indeed, can even be effectively implemented. Readjustment of the aid infrastructure to accommodate an expanded drive seems an essential preliminary. Somehow the bureaucratic snares created by American inter-agency rivalries must be quickly circumvented. So too must tihe numerous supply bottle-necks which prevent vital materials flowing to the countryside. On the Vietnamese side it now becomes essential to accelerate the conversion of the Civil Service system, still largely functioning along antiquated French colonial lines, to a modern administrative machine. At the same time the civil servants themselves, unsettled by constant political turmoil, must be imbued with a new sense of urgency and purpose. Failure to accomplish these precise reforms in the past, it is said, accounts for most of the aid programme’s shortcomings today. Clearly, everheightening confusion could only follow attempts to force new and expanded measures through the same creaking mechanisms. For this reason alone the first returns from America’s invigorated drive may be somewhat delayed while the necessary ground work is preparedProblem Compounded For economists and fiscal experts wrestling with South Vietnam’s mammoth monetary problems, the prospect of increased aid spending to- ! gether with further military expansion compounds their problem. With the United States’ amplified military effort, far too much money chased far too few goods. Off-duty servicemen spent their pay packets in bars, on women and for the usual handicraft souvenirs to send home. Second and third ripple effects of this sent market prices spiralling, particularly for the lesser household luxuries such as sewing machines, typewriters, fans and refrigerators. To accommodate the buildup, the already huge American construction concerns within the republic further extended their operations. In a few months the price of construction materials had jumped 80 per cent, labour costs increased 100 per cent and the “safe” urban centres of South Vietnam were soon experiencing conditions of full employment. All the warning signs for complete fiscal disorder were flashing when American and South Vietnamese experts produced their tailor-made anti-inflationary remedy involving a massive infusion of American goods. By expanding the American-sponsored commercial imports programme—originally designed so that Vietnam could meet import needs without jeopardising foreign exchange—it was hoped a wider range of goods would soak up the excess money and give the piastre some solid foundation. Commercial imports to the republic totalled 5150.8 million in 1965, a figure which is expected to double during 1966. Wealthy Clique The theory was fine on paper but practical application of it has been plagued! with snags. As it calls for the American Government to purchase the goods, private Vietnamese business concerns to import them, and payments at the regular dollar value in piastres to be made to the South Vietnamese Government, monumental bureaucratic snarl-ups have resulted. Devious licensing procedures ensure that only a “chosen few” receive the necessary permits. Daily the wealthy clique gets wealthier and the rumblings of discontent get louder.

Serious economic complications have arisen through the inability of South Vietnam’s major port facilities in Saigon to handle concurrently the increased civilian and military imports. Freighters bank up for weeks in Mekong Delta waters awaiting berth space. With essential military equipment receiving first priority the lag in civilian aid and

' commercial programmes ! grows. I Thankfully, relief is in sight. Impressive port construction is under way at Vung Tau, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay and Danang. Plans are also drawn up for future installations at Tuy Hoa and Phan Rang. On the Saigon river itself a new port complex is unfolding with four quayside berths and five others located at buoys. On completion in about seven months these extensions will increase Saigon’s cargo turnover 300 to 400 per cent. Perhaps the greatest danger for America during the crucial build-up period lies in the political capital for the Viet Cong among both rural and urban populations. For in spite of concentrated efforts to maintain close co-ordinated control, anomalies are bound to continue. The Rural Poor While wealth floods into the “safe” cities and that vague 25 per cent of the countryside supposedly Governmentcontrolled, inhabitants of the other 75 per cent remain financial outcasts. The urban rich get richer, the rural poor get poorer, and to the peasant farmer of the hinterland. Communist propaganda appears more credible every day. Past history has shown that the severe economic measures to be introduced against the predictably heavier inflationary trends to come can have only moderate success. Inevitably the middle-class and lower-middle-class salaried workers, including the civil servants, will suffer further hardships. These groupings represent a Vietnamese education level far above that of the peasant masses Their increased susceptibility to Communist propaganda, together with their position in society, constitutes a grave threat to Government stability. Just as dangerous is the threat from xenophobia that breeds on the presence of foreign servicemen. Admittedly there has been remarkably little local resentment to the year-long transformation ... a transformation that has seen a hauntingly sophisticated Asian capital, albeit the product of two conflicting cultures, become a garish boomtown, streets choked with enormous American cars, dotted with dingy cocktail bars, and littered with pimps, prostitutes, and pornographers. But observers are now detecting the initial signs of political movements with strong xenophobic undertomes. It is therefore not surprising that recently captured Communist documents show that Viet Cong political cadres are under strict orders to accentuate anti-American-ism. World Business Undaunted the United States aid officials remain enthusiastic about the future. The idea of South Vietnam as Asia’s “sick man” is out, say the economists. A truncated Vietnam is economically viable. Furthermore, they argue, the republic’s natural resources and its energetic and adaptable labour force offer prospects for limitless advancement. International business interests are beginning to agree; there is at least confidence that America is remaining on to guide and assist the Vietnamese economy. Shell International, which holds two-thirds of the commercial oil and petroleum market in Vietnam, is said to be investing on a grand scale. This is the largest single British investment in the republic and could well lead to other British companies following suit. American business interests, understandably, are expanding rapidly, and the Vietnamese Government, in an effort to encourage both foreign and local capital, has established an industrial development centre -—long-range talk—but until the countryside is secured and the people won it is difficult to see how such “big business” can benefit anyone but its promoters.