The Press MONDAY, MARCH 7, 1966. East Germany’s Bid To Join U.N.

Press, Volume CV, Issue 31002, 7 March 1966, Page 14

The Press MONDAY, MARCH 7, 1966. East Germany’s Bid To Join U.N.

The move by the East German Government for membership of the United Nations has been described as a peace initiative. “ The national desire “ of the German people ”, the official statement from East Berlin says, “ can only be achieved through a “ policy of peaceful co-existence of the two German “ States, through their renunciation of atomic “ weapons . . . and their integration in a German •* confederation The East German application for United Nations membership invites comparisons between the two Germanys and the two Chinas. One part of the pre-war China (capitalist Formosa) is a member, so why not one part (Communist East Germany) of the pre-war Germany? The main motive for the application, it may be assumed, is to focus world attention on German desires for reunification. The German problem as it exists now may prove insoluble, it has been argued, unless the United States, Britain, France and Germany’s other neighbours are able to agree on a common German policy. Reference in the East German statement to a confederation, however, presupposes a general acceptance of the separate status of the two German states. It presupposes also, so far as West Germany is concerned, acceptance of the Polish Oder-Neisse frontier. It is probably safe to say that responsible West German thinking already recognises that the frontier is there to stay. The Bonn Government, however, does not make that admission. Its attitude is that, while it has renounced the use of force to change the border, its legal claim to the lost lands must be kept alive and abandoned only in exchange for East German concessions on reunification and a peace treaty.

It is certain that reunification will never be obtained on the basis of a Communist surrender. Membership of the United Nations would give the Communists an invaluable forum for the exposition of arguments claiming, on allegedly legal grounds, a separate identity for East Germany and a status entitling it to enter a federation on terms of equality with the Bonn Republic. In the General Assembly also, an East German delegation could be sure of securing a considerable body of support for its submissions. Membership, in brief, would be good politics.

The East Berlin move can have caused no surprise in Western quarters. It fits in with the extensive campaigns which have been launched by the two governments for extensions of trade. The Bonn Government in particular has been active in a bid to penetrate the Communist-controlled countries of Eastern Europe, a region which it regards as a traditional German market. The East German Government is equally determined to keep Eastern Europe as a selling area for its own products, so far as that may be practicable. Diplomatic observers, especially in France, have been conscious for some time of the growth of political rivalry between the two German governments. The violent Communist opposition to the N.A.T.O. proposal that West Germany should have a greater share in the Western nuclear deterrent is only one aspect of that rivalry. It was predicted in Paris three months ago that the German leaders must soon attempt to bring their political influence to a level corresponding with the economic power they have already achieved. The bid for the United Nations membership by the East German Government could be an early justification of that prediction. It will fail—just as the idea of a German confederation, as an alternative to reunification, would seem to be impracticable. The West German economy is largely in the control of private enterprise, as in other democratic countries; the East German economy is characterised by its collectivised agriculture and nationalised industry. In the event of reunification, would West German firms and farms be taken over by the new state, or would the East German firms and farms be taken over by private enterprise? As long as the alternatives are stated as starkly as this they will never be acceptable to all Germans. Unless some willingness to compromise is shown on both sides of the Iron Curtain—as, for instance, by West Germany promoting the growth of nationalised industry, and by East Germany allowing the development of privately-owned farms—the goal of reunification may never be realised.