Special Operations

Press, Volume CV, Issue 30983, 12 February 1966, Page 4

Special Operations

Baker Street Irregular. By Bickham . Sweet-Escott, Methuen. 278 pp.

In the specialisation of organisations that were grouped as “secret service” during the War, the S.O.E. (Special Operation Executive) had many critics, especially in the beginning When Britain was on the defensive and not much was being accomplished. There was a view that anyone connected with S.O.E. could not be quite nice, the organisation being committed to assist conduct of the war by methods the government preferred not to acknowledge. The task was sabotage, political subversion, underground propaganda to be organised in occupied countries. An interpretation of the initial directives could well be, in the Victorian tradition: “Do what you like and how you like but don’t frighten the horses. . . .”

However, politics was always close at hand. For instance, assistance or otherwise to the resistance groups was approved in the context of whether the elements seeking assistance, even though fighting the Germans, were in fact favoured by the Allies in the long-term and expected postwar view. Thus the Mikailovic and Tito situation in Jugoslavia the E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S. in Greece, and very much so the problem of working with the comparable American secret organisation 0.5.5., whose political thesis was antagonistic to any action that would assist dispossessed French, Dutch or British to recover colonial dominance in places like Indo-China, Indoesia, India, Burma, Malaya. Because individual exploits like blowing up bridges, viaducts, railways, of the many brave “field staff” dropped be-

hind the lines, have been well publicised, the author in this book has aimed to trace the development of the controversial but undoubtedly successful organisation, through his own personal experience during five years as an administrator. It appears that someone banned the manuscript from publication for a ten year period, possibly because in places the story shows what an amount of muddle and confusion characterised some activities. Also, although the author does not say so in so many words, the organisation seemed to be at times a place where “jobs for the boys” at high rank were found. There are plenty of references to jealousy and intrigue that embittered relations between various secret departments—it is asserted that at one stage there were four secret British organisations working in Istanbul and none would tell the other what iVwas up to. The writing carries in places a tone of frustration and disappointment, probably entirely justified, and there is a rather significant emphasis on the others who sooner or later, were decorated, honoured or spectacularly promoted. Fortunately, Mr Bickham SweetEscott (his name may not have helped him) was philosophical and he had a dry sense of humour which he has drawn on nicely to dispose of some unpleasant personal and general situations. His experiences with top brass and leading politicos, all of whom came out of the war with great honours, gives the book a measure of human interest. However, though attractively written and dominantly objective in approach, is likely to be sought mainly by students of the almost inexplicable poser: “How did we win the war?”