U.S. Made 'A Bold Gambl'

Press, Volume CV, Issue 30976, 4 February 1966, Page 13

U.S. Made 'A Bold Gambl'

(N.Z. Press Assn. —Copyright) NEW YORK, Feb. 3. The United States decision to bring the Vietnam problem to the United Nations was a bold gamble taken against the advice of most United Nations diplomats, according to Max Harrelson, of the Associated Press.

Harrelson wrote:

The United States has won the opening round—even by the narrowest possible margin—and is now expressing confidence that its decision will be vindicated. One encouraging prospect is that the issue will be kept out of public debate and returned to quiet diplomacy. Although the Security Council agreed to place the Vietnam conflict on its agenda, it promptly adjourned without setting a date for the next meeting. This means that the council members are going to have a try at private negotiations. This will have two advantages: it will avoid an almost certain veto of any resolution

dealing with Vietnam peace and it will avoid a further aggravation of the situation by bitter exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. More Difficult

Just how big a victory the United States won yesterday in the council’s 9-2 vote depends upon what the United States objective was. Few United Nations diplomats believe that public debate and formal voting is going to settle the Vietnam problem.

Until last week that also was the thinking in Washington. United States officials agreed with the SecretaryGeneral, U Thant, that public debate might force the Russians to take a tough stand and that this, in turn, would make it more difficult for Moscow to exert private pressure on North Vietnam for a settlement.

This analysis proved to be at least partially correct. The Soviet stand in the council debate was rigid, even to the extent of trying to block debate on the problem.

Because of the reluctance of the non-aligned countries to become involved in a cold war contest, the Russians came very close to killing the United States move.

Why did the United States reverse its previous position against bringing the issue to the Security Council. No authoritative answer has been forthcoming, but several theories have gained wide circulation.

It is possible, of course, that President Johnson decided that all other avenues had been explored and that it was worth risking a Soviet veto to give the council a try. Most United Nations diplomats found it hard to reconcile this with earlier United States views.

A rebuff by the council undoubtedly would have been received by many Americans as a gesture of hostility to the United States. It would have been interpreted by others as evidence of the council’s impotence to deal with a major conflict.

If the Soviet Union eventually uses the veto to tie the council’s hands some will consider this also as evidence of a serious United Nations weakness, but Soviet vetoes have paralysed the council in the past and have come to be expected. Refusal of the council to consider a United States proposal might have hurt the United Nations prestige much more.