Solidarity In Havana— Or Schism?

Press, Volume CV, Issue 30958, 14 January 1966, Page 8

Solidarity In Havana— Or Schism?

An African delegate tentatively suggested in Havana a few days ago that the anti-imperialist solidarity conference, currently in session in the Cuban capital, could emphasise solidarity less than schism. It is certain that Dr. Castro, speaking on the eve of the inaugural meeting of the conference, made deliberate use of the occasion to refer to what he called a “ commercial ultimatum ” from Peking, which would substantially and disastrously reduce the flow of commodity goods from China. Whereas an exchange of goods on a 250-million-dollar basis had been arranged, the Chinese Government had indicated that the total would now not exceed 170 million dollars, mainly because of China’s need to retain reserves of rice “in case of attack by the United States and to “ supply the Vietnamese ”. Dr. Castro apparently did not actually criticise the Chinese decision, but he “ appeared to indicate that Cuba had been caught in “ a squeeze between Moscow and Peking ”, There need, in fact, be little misunderstanding of Chinese intentions. Cuba has been leaning more obviously towards Moscow than Peking, in spite of Dr. Castro's apparent earlier alignment with Mao Tse-tung. The Soviet Union accounts for more than half of Cuba’s external trade; and Soviet goods, oil, machinery and grain among them, are essential to the island’s well-being. Cuban sugar sales to Russia—five million tons a year until 1970, at a price about three times higher than the current world level—are only one indicator of the extent of Russia’s involvement. The Soviet Government has, in fact, told Dr. Castro that any further economic assistance will have to come from other quarters. From Dr. Castro’s viewpoint, the emergence at the conference of the ideological dispute between Moscow and Peking must have been dismaying. The Chinese had not wanted Havana as the conference venue at all, particularly as all the Latin American delegations were to be representative of pro-Russian communism. The Cuban Communist Party has been purged of all pro-China elements and the Cuban economy is more dependent than ever on trade with Russia. Dr. Castro has not yet succeeded in getting W’estern credits on any useful scale, to strengthen the island’s tottering economy, but' he must continue to seek them.

The permitted departure of Cubans not in sympathy with the revolution may give some semblance of political stability to the island scene. On the economic side, however, and more especially in the light of Mr Mao's virtual repudiation of the trade pact, Dr. Castro’s dilemma is starkly obvious. He faces economic sanctions both from Communist China and the United States, but only the United States can save him. Very soon the question is likely to be heard: What price are Cuba and Russia willing to pay for America*- aid? The New York “ Herald- “ Tribune” thinks that Dr. Castro and his Soviet creditors, facing political and economic bankruptcy in Cuba, must be looking for someone “ to bail them “ out ”. Only the United States, the newspaper claims, can restore the Cuban economy, offer subsidised prices for Cuban sugar, reopen Western markets, and, finally, “relieve the Soviet Union of “ the heavy burden of carrying Castro ”.