South Korean Coup

Press, Volume C, Issue 29516, 18 May 1961, Page 14

South Korean Coup

Political movements in South «Korea often belie appearances. For example, the Liberal Barty is identified with extreme conservatism, and the Democrats reject within their own party the majority rule common to truly democratic organisations. The latest coup was professedly directed against communism and neglect of social and economic reforms. Its real causes may have been personal and sectional rivalries among South Korea’s rulers since the fall of the Rhee Government little more than a year ago. After a decade of political repression, followed by the extraordinary student demonstrations of April, 1960, the republic was given a new constitution providing for a governmental system similar to that of Britain. Under United Nations surveillance, elections were then held in a freer and fairer atmosphere than the Koreans had ever known. But because these elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Democrats, a stable, united government was far from assured. The Democrats were split irreconcilably into the “Old “ Guard ” and the “ New “ Faction ”, These were essentially two parties, which had been forced together in opposition to Dr Rhee.

Dr. John Myun Chang, leader of the “ New “ Faction ”, became Prime Minister only after the National Assembly had rejected the nominee of President Po Sun Yun, leader of the “Old Guard.” Thus from its birth the Chang Government lacked the enthusiastic support needed for a vigorous programme to rebuild the nation on a sounder footing. Dr. Chang, who was educated in the United States and served there as South Korean Ambassador, has been de-

scribed as ineffective and uninspired. Though regarded as a man of high principles, he has been accused of acting, dressing, speaking, and thinking as a Westerner. His antagonism to the Communists has not been doubted; indeed, in March his anti-Communist legislation was thought so

oppressive that students in the four main cities demonstrated against it He has been notably conciliatory towards Japan, with which trading relationships have been restored. But he has nit achieved much against the most pressing problems of his fellowcountrymen. Unemployment is high; food is short; the country still depends heavily upon financial and other assistance from the United States (whose con-

tribution now exceeds 2.5 billion dollars); and the prospect of reunion with North Korea is remote. Dr. Chang’s unspectacular methods of attacking the social evils ignored by the Rhee Government have not commended him to the astonishingly articulate student groups to whom, in the ultimate analysis, he owed his rise to power.

Military commanders who overthrow constitutional governments usually disclaim political ambitions —at least in the meantime. The numerous South Korean forces were used by Dr. Rhee to buttress his regime, even to the extent of rigging elections for him. There have been disquieting reports of continued unrest among these forces, in spite of dismissals and transfers of troublesome officers. Moreover, pay scales are low; but the troops have feared that because civilian employment is so scarce, retrenchments would increase the general misery. The present “neutrality” of some units seems to imply acquiescence in the establishment of a regime less likely than Dr. Chang's to curtail the influence as well as the strength of the armed forces. Certainly the military leaders have availed themselves of an excellent opportunity to capitalise on civilian criticisms of poverty, corruption, and concessions to their historic enemy, Japan. It is feasible that President Po Sun Yun endorsed their move. Their success will depend partly upon the reaction of the students and their teachers, who would be improbable apologists for Dr. Chang’s shortcomings. In a situation bristling with complexities even the United States State Department must be unwilling to predict the outcome.