Death Sentence Passed On Sweeney

Press, Volume C, Issue 29516, 18 May 1961, Page 8

Death Sentence Passed On Sweeney

(New Zealand Press Association)

WELLINGTON, May 17. After retiring for two hours and threequarters, a jury in the Supreme Court at Wellington today found Edward McMillan Sweeney, aged 36, a workman, guilty of the murder of Isabella Black Taylor, also known as Elizabeth Sweeney.

A crowded Court heard Mr Justice Hutchison pronounce the death sentence. Sweeney was charged with the murder of Taylor at Wellington on March 8. When asked whether he had anything to say why sentence should not be passed, Sweeney answered: “No, sir.”

His Honour said that only one sentence was provided for the crime of murder.

Mr F. D. O’ETynn. with Mr Q. M. Smith, appeared for Sweeney. Mr W. R. Birks, with him Mr J. D. Murray, appeared for the Crown. When the Court resumed this morning, Mr O’Flynn said no evidence would be called for the defence. Mr Birks, in his final address, said there could be no doubt Sweeney killed Taylor by stabbing her with a knife. There was the evidence of Mrs Reynolds who was an eye-witness of the actual stabbing, and this was largely corroborated by Sweeney’s own statement to the police.

There was the evidence of the pathologist as to the nature of the wounds inflicted, two of which had penetrated the heart. Knife In “Far Enough’’

When told of this by the police. Sweeney had replied: "I must have got it in far enough.” After the stabbing, Sweeney had gone to the church in Hill street seeking a priest. When told none of them was at home, he said he could not come back later as he had murdered his wife. He produced the knife to prove it. Was that the act of a drunken man? Mr Birks asked.

Sweeney’s statement then had to be taken at its face value. Also he had been able to take the police to the spot where he had disposed of the knife. That indicated he must have been sober enough to know what he was doing. Defence Address

Mr O'Flynn, in his address, said the faet Taylor met her death by wounds inflicted by Sweeney was. of course, quite certain. But apart from the obvious corollaries of that, it was practically the only fact that had emerged in two days from “a welter of evidence from alcoholics.”

Referring to the rules regarding drunkenness. Mr O’Flynn said that, generally, it was no excuse for crime but could provide a defence in two ways. It could produce a condition amounting to temporary insanity, such as delir-

ium. In that case. Sweeney should be acquitted under Section 31 of the Mental Health Act.

The onus of proof of that rested on the defence, but the standard of proof required was not as high as that imposed on the Crown. It was enough to show’ it was probable. Strained State

From the evidence, it could be inferred that Sweeney had no less to drink than Taylor. He was in a strained physical, mental, and emotional state. In that befuddled condition, and resulting from an argument with Taylor, he temporarily lost his senses and inflicted wounds that were plainly the work of a madman. His conduct and his affection for Taylor negatived a deliberate attempt to kill. Another aspect of Sweeney’s defence was that of provocation, which was a passion which overmastered reason, so that no intention could be formed—because the act performed was one of unreason.

“Reducible To Manslaugher” A person could not go scot free because of it. but the offence was reducible to one of manslaughter. That was the case if the crime was carried out in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation, sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of his self-control.

The provocation was the sudden refusal of Taylor to return to the accused after saying she would do so. It had been tantalising of her to leave, and return, on two or three occasions. Mr O’Flynn said the deceased’s death was a tragedy amidst low life in a backwater of the city, where there was drink, little food, and hardly any sleep. It was more probable than not the accused was out of his mind when he did the deed.

Judge Sums Up Summing-up his Honour said some of the evidence might appear confusing, or perhaps unreliable, but that was for the jury to say. But perhaps it might be thought that the circumstances at the time made such discrepancies not important. Referring to the defence of temporary insanity, his

Honour said the law presumed everyone was sane at the time of committing an act until the contrary was shown. If a person was sane before and after an event, that did not prove he was’ sane at the time of the' event. His Honour said he suggested, however, there: was no evidence that the accused was at any time insane.

Referring to the question of intoxication, his Honour said that, as a genera! rule, it was no excuse for crime, unless a person was so drunk as to be incapable of forming a specific intent. If a person by his own voluntary act got drunk and killed another, it was still culpable homidide. Referring to the question of provocation, he said this did not affect the issue whether or not it was culpable homicide. But it did affect the question whether it was murder or manslaughter. 7716 jury then retired.