The Press MONDAY, MAY 15, 1961. Geneva Conference On Laos

Press, Volume C, Issue 29513, 15 May 1961, Page 10

The Press MONDAY, MAY 15, 1961. Geneva Conference On Laos

The procedural difficulties that have delayed the Geneva conference on Laos indicate the fundamental obstacles to a negotiated peace, and the dangers of applauding the cease fire prematurely. Although it appears common ground that a permanently neutral regime must be ensured for Laos, there is a serious conflict of opinion on the meaning of neutrality. But before this hurdle is jumped it remains to determine how the Laotians themselves are to be represented at Geneva —by the Right-wing Government of Prince Boun Oum, recognised by the West; by the neutral “ Government ” of Prince Souvanna Phouma, endorsed by the Communist bloc: by the Pathet Lao, headed by Prince Souvanna’s halfbrother; or by a coalition of the three, which might be tolerated by everyone. Perhaps, therefore, the most hopeful news is that the three Laotian groups are trying now to form a stopgap coalition which could accredit delegates to Geneva. Both Prince Boun Oum and Prince Souvanna recognise King Savang Vatthana as Head of State; and the King might influence them to sink their differences if he himself were not emphatically opposed to the Geneva conference, which he regards as an illegal interference with Laotian domestic affairs. An additional complication is the withdrawal by Prince Sihanouk, the Cambodian Head of State, of his support for the conference, the calling of which he suggested four months ago. Originally it was hoped that Cambodia would preside at the Geneva negotiations. Prince Sihanouk has •repeatedly complained of the delay in convening the conference. Recently he has expressed fears that because (in his view) proWestern elements in Laos are now weaker than the Communists, there is much less chance of international accord on Laotian neutrality —whatever that neutrality is construed to be. After announcing the Cambodian delegation to Geneva, Prince Sihanouk appears to have learnt of King Savang’s opposition to the conference, and thereupon disso-

elated himself and his country from the Geneva meetings. Prince Souvanna’s brand of neutrality is favoured by Moscow and Peking because it would facilitate the creation of links with the Communist bloc. Moreover, Prince Souvanna insists on Pathet Lao participation in a neutral government. Recent statements by the United States have called for a “truly neutral” regime—a qualification that excludes Communist membership. The Western Powers are uncomfortably aware of Prince Souvanna’s closer relationships with the Communist Powers as a result of his overseas tour; and they regret the cancellation of his visit to Washington. It appears unlikely that the three Communist countries most concerned— Russia, China, and North Vietnam—will agree to a settlement on terms other than those agreeable to Prince Souvanna. Already the Prince has been promised Communist assistance to develop the Laotian economy, which hitherto has been buttressed by very large American subsidies. Inevitably the United States will be pressed to allow the Laotians to accept aid from both Western and Communist sources. While the Americans would agree to the channelling of aid through the United Nations, China and North Vietnam, which are not yet members of the United Nations, would not tolerate the

compromise. In the meantime, and perhaps for a considerable period, the most pressing danger is that the Communists, already strongly entrenched, will use the cease fire to further their military and ideological ends in Laos. The West could not envisage a territorial division corresponding to that of the twin Vietnams. In a deteriorating situation the Western negotiators must decide whether to continue, probably unavailingly, their opposition to Prince Souvanna’s remedy for the political stalemate; to concede the urgency of agreement. even though it entails concessions to the Prince; or again to threaten military action—and, if necessary, make good the threat.