West New Guinea

Press, Volume C, Issue 29505, 5 May 1961, Page 12

West New Guinea

By the belligerence of his latest statements on West New Guinea, General Nasution, the Indonesian Minister of Defence, may already have forfeited the goodwill earned during his recent visit to Australia and New Zealand. Because of its proximity to New Guinea Australia has good reasons for discouraging any move that might facilitate Communist encroachments or the political and physical strife that often precedes the process. Moreover Australia recognises its moral duty not only to support the Dutch in conscientious attempts to advance the status of West New Guinea but also actively to encourage political self-determination for the Papuan inhabitants of the territory once they have been prepared for responsible government. Members of Dr. Soekarno’s Administration habitually read too much into Australian official pronouncements. About three years ago Dr. Subandrio, the Foreign Minister, returned to Djakarta from New Zealand and Australia believing, apparently, that resistance to Indonesia's claim upon West New Guinea had weakened. In his talks last month with General Nasution and subsequently in a statement to the Federal Parliament, Mr Menzies carefully emphasised that Australia had no “military “ arrangements with the “ Netherlands in respect of “ West New Guinea that Australia’s interest in preserving Dutch sovereignty was not motivated by any hostility towards Indonesia but by legitimate concern for the Netherlands’ pledges to the Papuans; and that Australia would take the gravest view not only of an armed invasion but also of conflict arising out of armed infiltration. General Nasution can hardly interpret this as a declaration of complete neutrality in any circumstances (including a forced settlement of the dispute). So much for the diplomatic issues, on which New Zealand’s policy is unlikely to differ materially from Australia’s. There remain sober reasons why General Nasution can speak so

glibly of armed intervention. Although the political and economic stability of the Indonesian Republic is still uncertain, good progress has been made towards suppressing the rebellion that began in 1958. In Sumatra many rebel units have surrendered; and in Celebes cease-fire agreements have been negotiated by twothirds of. the rebel strength. According to reliable reports from Djakarta the number of rebel fighters has in three years been reduced from 100,000 to about 31,000. Although 75 per cent, of the Djakarta Government’s Army of 200,000 men continues to fight the rebels, strong forces could now be deployed elsewhere; and their numbers could be increased progressively. Indeed, some of the erstwhile rebel leaders might join in an invasion of West New Guinea. General Nasution, who is regarded as a key figure in the New Guinea dispute, is notably less enthusiastic than Dr. Soekarno about Communist alliances; that explains why the former’s advocacy of the Indonesian cause in Western capitals could be the more successful In January General Nasution is believed to have insisted that, instead of a pro-Communist colleague, he himself should head a mission to buy arms in Moscow. His purpose was apparently to secure a fair allocation of purchases to the various components of the Indonesian forces, and to acquaint himself as well as possible with official Soviet thought. Together with a similar warning by Dr. Subandrio in Washington, General Nasution’s plain speaking suggests that this year Indonesia will be sorely tempted to turn its Russian weapons against West New Guinea. Clearly, in the long-term interests of peace, Australia and New Zealand must cultivate neighbourly relations with the Indonesian Republic; but this objective does not entail acquiescence in a territorial claim founded on the flimsiest of justifications. At the present time firm backing for the legal and moral interests of the Dutch and Papuans is more than ever necessary.