The Press MONDAY, MAY 1, 1961. France And Algeria After The Four Generals

Press, Volume C, Issue 29501, 1 May 1961, Page 12

The Press MONDAY, MAY 1, 1961. France And Algeria After The Four Generals

The abrupt collapse of the four generals' revo lt in Algeria added another important victory to General de Gaulle’s astounding record. Even more significant, however, will be the likely effect on peace prospects and on the removal of expensive military burdens. Prom its beginning the revolt bore the stamp °f a desperate adventure conceived without any real appreciation of the profound changes in France since the demise of the Fourth Republic. It was inspired much more by personal ambitions than by realistic concern for the welfare of France; by a diehard resolve to maintain at all costs a plainly untenable Position, rather than by

well-founded confidence ir the political solution that the Army dissidents sought to impose. No “father"figure” such as General de Gaulle was waiting, as in May, 1958, for a call tc “save France"; no instability or weakness oi government in Paris invited the wrecker’s blow; no upsurge of popular acclaim had followed Right-wing demonstrations against the Gaullists’ Algerian policy. In Algeria itself the Foreign Legion was an obvious instrument for applying neofascist pressure against the regime; but within the conscript army, both in France and overseas, suostantial opposition to the Government was improbable. Against the irrefutably liberal aims of the French President the mutineers—for mutineers they were could pit only a discredited philosophy of the kind that, through the Algerian war, had brought the Fourth Republic to its knees and France to economic and diplomatic poverty. Ironically enough, because of his assumption of the extras ordinary powers that invest his office with all the potentialities of a fascist dictatorship, General de Gaulle could quickly frustrate the opposition to his policies. In words of archaic nobility, he rallied the French people to him, and with characteristic firmness put in train measures against which the four generals, irrespective of the forces at their command, could scarcely hope to prevail. Because the

generals failed to evoke widespread or unanimous enthusiasm among the French forces, the President's precautions were doubly effective; and they attracted world - wide respect and admiration. After the generals, what? Probably the question should be, what after de Gaulle? The results of the revolt will be both bad and good. Divisive elements in the French camp may have been revealed more quickly and completely than General de Gaulle* had expected; but while French disunity is purged, the position from which France negotiates with the Moslem rebels is not being strengthened. Confidence in the loyalty of

the French armed forces, which must yet keep order in much of Algeria, has been severely shaken. The bitterness of Algeria's European settlers has been confirmed by another failure to avert Moslem ascendancy. Those rich enough to leave the country may be resigned; those too poor will continue to foment unrest • Internationally the revolt has undoubtedly enhanced General de Gaulle’s prestige; the public messages of goodwill from President Kennedy, Mr Macmillan, and Dr. Adenauer—all of whom might normally be reluctant to meddle in a matter on which France has jealously protested it s domestic jurisdiction—have testified to this. Moreover General Chaile and his colleagues helped powerfully to lessen the attractions of Soviet interference in Algeria, not because their anti - Communist bias counted for anything but because they provoked General de Gaulle into a conclusive defence of the unexceptionable principles on which he intends to base Algerian freedom and independence. Many of the French exchanges with the Moslem rebels and their leader, Mr Ferhat Abbas, have been secret. It is impossible, therefore, to predict how soon peace will be negotiated. Equally impossible is any forecast of French national unity or political freedom after the all - pervasive, moderating influence ,of an aged but brilliant President is permanently lost.