Chur chill-Alanbrooke—Two Great Men In Partnership

Press, Volume XCV, Issue 28262, 27 April 1957, Page 3

Chur chill-Alanbrooke—Two Great Men In Partnership

The Turn of the Tide. 1939-1343.' A Study based on the Diaries ! and Autobiographical Notes of Field-Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke. By Arthur Bryant. Collins. 766 pp.

[Rjeviewed by Str HOWARD K KIPPENBERGER, Editor-in-chief New Zealand War Histories.} ’

Field-Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke. Sir Alan Brooke until he was ennobled, was Chief of the Imperial General Staff from November, 1941, until after the end <rf the war. He had commanded a corps in France in and had been Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces while Britain wes threatened with invasion. He was undoubtedly one of the chief architects of the Allied victory.

Instead of writing his own memoirs he handed his diaries, or parts of them, to a well-known and popular historian, Arthur Bryant, perhaps with the hope of getting a completely impartial account of his services.

“The Turn of the Tide,” a typical Bryant title, consists of an account of the war to September, 1943, illumined by extracts totalling about 60.000 words from the diaries, the field-marshal’s postwar notes on them, and his notes

not yet published, altogether said to contain 1.000.000 words. There are really two authors concerned’, and it must be presumed that Alanbrooke approves of what Bryant has said. It is not quite clear to me what Bryant set out to do, probably to exhibit his client as one of the great war leaders, something which the slowly appearing Official Histories are doing in any case. In the process he found it necessary, not only to relate the -history of the war and the processes and agonies which led to the great and the not so great strategical decisions (which it seems to me he has done very well, using the right sources) but to show that the British Prime Minister was not all-knowing and all-wise, in fact that he was often very much the reverse. And as Churchill was the greater man the main interest and value of the book inevitably centres on him, and Alanbrooke is left where he was. a supremely able professional and a man of character.

It is not news that Churchill | was often impatient, unfair, uni reasonable, interfering, that he never really planned—where would he find the time—that he was not a heaven- (or hell) made strategist, though those who have read only his own masterpieces may not realise this. Cunningham, the greatest British Admiral since Nelson, wrote indignantly about some of the projects pressed on him and bitterly about the prodding and interference to which he was subjected. So did Wavell. in an extraordinarily bitter final paragraph to his last dispatch. The British official histories, written with great reserve and discretion, make it clear that the Norway fiasco was largely the fault of the First Lord of the Admiralty, though by a fortunate irony it led immediately, not to his retirement, but to the Prime Ministership. Auchinleck. Alexander, and Montgomery all were harried almost beyond endurance, and gained their victories by resisting violent pressure to attack before their armies could possibly be ready. Auchinleck met misfortune when he yielded. The expedition to Greece, which it can be argued postponed victory in the Mediterranean for two years and might well have led to the loss of the Middle East, was entirely Churchill’s conception, driven through by him over the qualms of the Greeks, and in defiance of the facts. Alanbrooke remarks that his confidence in Dill, the then C.1.G.5., was shaken by his yielding to the Churchillian pressure in this case. Incidentally it is surprising to find that Bryant still thinks that chivalrous motives had much to do with this affair. Only the New Zealand Government seems to have been greatly concerned on that count, and it was not in possession of all the facts. It is probable, as the diarist says that Churchill never doubted that he had inherited the strategical genius of his very remote ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough. but there is much room I for doubt on the matter, reinforced by some of the revelations here made.

In fact. Hitler seems to have been, until he succumbed to a much more realistic strategist, and left to his own Jhtuitions Churchill might have made mistakes as catastrophic as those of Hitler’s later'years That is where the difference between the two emerges and where Churchill’s true greatness as a war-leader lay, apart from his infinite superiority as a man. He had the saving grace, albeit a long : way down, of humility, or a little of it, or perhaps he remembered I some misjudgments and misfortunes. He had his intuitions, his impulses and obsessions, but he did not ensure that he was surrounded by yes-men. and passionately as he might argue and Urge, he never, in the long run. overruled the strong and able men whom he chose as his principal

advisers and supporters. Hitler, to nis own and Germany’s undoing, dispensed with almost all who gave him honest advice and kept thelick-spittle Keitel at his side. This all comes out clearly both m the narrative and in the diary extracts. Brooke must have been a man of steel to stand up to his master as he did. The intensity of the struggle is well conveyed, almost exhausting to read. One example, McNaughton, the Canadian C. in C., was called to Chequers to discuss Churchill’s favourite plan of seizing a base in northern Norway from which the convoys to Russia could ba supported. The map shows that this w*as a good idea and in fact Hitler greatly feared such a move. “On the following Monday a limp-looking McNaughton -walked into my room and literally poured himself into my armchair. . . He informed me that he had had a ghastly week-end. He had been kept up until all hours of the morning until he did not know which way he was facing. Winston’s control of the English language . . . had left him dumbfounded.’’ No-one could produce a plan with any prospects of success and the Chiefs of Staff would have nothing to do with it, but they had to fight hard and long and often.

There is nothing wrong with : this. It was the Prime Minister’s business to have ideas, which he emitted in a ceaseless stream, to press for urgency and aggressiveness. When one notion, in itself sound enough, was turned down■ for lack of means 6r sheer impracticability, he promptly produced another. It was the duty of the Chiefs of Staff and especially of Brooke as their chairman and of their planning staffs to examine the feasibility of his proposals and to do the planning and of the field commanders to exercise their own discretion. Once convinced, whether or not against his will, or once committed to any action. Churchill threw in his whole weight and power. But we can be thankful that he chose and retained advisers brave and tough enough to stand up to him. “My next trouble.’’ Brooke wrote after Rommel’s last offensive at Alam Haifa, had been repulsed “will now be to stop Winston from fussing Alex and Monty and egging them on to attack before they are ready. It is a regular disease he suffers from, this frightful impatience to get an attack launched.*’ Montgomery refused to attack before he was ready, and this precipitated a crisis, amusingly described in the diary. Alamein was a near thing, and if Montgomery and Alexander had yielded to Churchill’s importunity it must have failed, with grave results. “At the root of it all,” wrote Brooke, “lay his everlasting desire to speed up the date of all attacks irrespective of the effect such measures might have on the preparations.”

There are many such instances, and the cumulative effect of readins? of them is disturbing. There. I think, is the chief defect in Bryant’s part of the book. The impression grows that Churchill almost always was wrong and wrong-headed, Brooke always wise, far-seeing, consistently right. The diary extracts themselves do not give that impression, and it seems to me that the position and the real relationship between these strong and heavily burdened men is perfectly stated in the last of the six British official volumes on Grand Strategy*. “The Chiefs of Staff, moreover, may have drawn strength from the knowledge that in the last resort the Prime Minister would not move, on a purely military matter, without their consent.” It mus‘ not be forgotten that the Prime Minister had responsibilities on levels even higher than those which concerned his Chiefs of Staff and immeasurably wider The British historian continues: ‘“The virtues were on the grand scale; and the defects were peculiarly those of the virtues. Thus, confidence could become dogmatism, resolution obstinacy, and exhortation—despite all protests to the contrary—interference. . . But that there was genius no-one could doubt, or that the flaws occurred in a glass of exceptional strength and brilliance. . . . We have only to imagine the absence of Churchill from the scene . . . to see the effect on the country, on the Government, on the Chiefof Staff, and on the Alliance.” Certainly no-one could have taken his place, and there may have been some who could have taken Brooke's.

Like every other reader 1 have I found the principal interest in this almost exciting book in the picI tures it gives of the great Prime Minister and of the fierce clashes between him and those who served the State under him and by his choice. There is much else to make it probably the most iml nortant and valuable book on the I war yet published, apart from Churchill’s own memoirs. There are many sharp, penetrating, and often critical character sketches and anecdotes of the great personalities. “When argu-. ! ing with Marshall I could never get him fully to appreciate the close connexion that existed between the various German fronts. I have often wondered since the war how different matters might have been if I had nad MacArthur instead of Marshall to deal with. From everything I saw of him I put him down as the greatest general of the last war.’’ This was written while lamenting the refusal of the Americans to f ollow up the conquest of Sicily and the fall of Mussolini by immediate attack on the mainland of Italy before the Germans were firmly established there. “Marshall had a holy fear of Winston's Balkan and Dardanelles ventures

Actually Brooke cannot have seen McArthur during the war It must be an opinion formed from study of his campaigns and in fact before knowing all about them. Little has yet been published and at least up to a couple

•J. R. M. Butler, ed„ Grand Strategy. Volume VI, by John Ehrman. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956, page 337, Volumes 11. V and VI are the only ones yet published.

of years ago McArthur had not disgorged most of his records. Churchill told him that he contemplated giving Mountbatten the Supreme Command in Southeast Asia and he commented —“He will require a very efficient Chief of Staff to pull him through.” Montgomery was one of his divisional commanders in France was his choice—not Churchills—for command of the Eighth Army. Those who remember him will enjoy reading—“My morning interview with Monty was another of those instances when 1 had to haul him over the coals for trouble he was creating,” which was to do with Montgomery taking seriously the promise of a Fortress aircraft for his personal use jokingly made to him by Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff. Noone ever suspected the Eighth Army Commander of having much sense of humour though he made jokes and laughed at them. The aiary note is—“A difficult mixture to handle, brilliant commander in action and trainer of men, but liable to commit untold errors, due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people’s outlook. ... I do not think that Alex is sufficiently strong and rough with him.” It is rather pleasant to read of these great people lambasting one another. Of Alexander, who also commanded a division in his corps in the Dunkirk period Brooke says the he was an admirable commander in a tight place, completely imperturbable and efficiency itself but giving the impression that he never fully realised the unpleasant possibilities. This is much the same impression as other memoirists record both of the time and in Burma later. Brooke thought highly enough of his divisional commanders to press for their appointments in the Middle East when Auchinleck was relieved in August, 1942. The diary gives the first full account of this matter. Churchill wanted Gott as commander of the Eighth Army. Brooke preferred Montgomery, thinking that Gott was tired, as he well rryiy have been, but in this case did not insist Gott was appointed and within a few hours was shot down while flying to Cairo in a slow transport plane. “In his tired condition he would not have had the energy and vitality to stage this battle (Alamein) as Monty did. It might well have resulted in stalemate on this front, a failure to achieve a turn in the tide.’’

Stalin, he thought, had a crafty, brilliant, realistic mind, devoid of any sense of human pity or kindness. “Gives one almost an uncanny feeling to be in his presence.” There is an extraordinary account of a visit to Moscow, of Churchill’s conversations with Stalin and what they said to each other, of Marshal Voroshilov insisting on drinking yellow vodka, nearly slipping under the table, but rallying enough to click glasses with Stalin. I have heard of an occasion when he did slip under the table.

He is fairly critical of Eisenhower, saying of him in Tunisia—“lt must be remembered that Eisenhower had never even commanded a battalion in action when he found himself commanding a group of Armies. No wonder he was at a loss as to what to do. . .. He learnt a lot during the war. but tactics, strategy and command were never his strong points. Where he shone was his ability to handl: Allied forces and to get the best out of them. . . .”

He later noted “As Supreme Commander what he may have lacked in military ability he greatly made up for by the charm of his personality.” It will be interesting to see what he has to say in the second volume about Eisenhower’s strategy in 1944-45. when there were intense differences of opinion.

Smuts, Weygand, Gort, Wavell. Pound, King and many others are similarly discussed. Sometimes the comments are so critical that one wonders what the unpublished passages of the diaries may contain.

The' account of the Moscow conference in August, 1942, is the most revealing yet published; il shows a very strange Ally indeed.

and disputes with the American leaders, resulting nevertheless, thanks to the wisdom of the President and the Prime Minister and the strong sense of their selected subordinates, in the most effective alliance in history There are numerous astonishing anecdotes about Churchill, none of them maliciously told, but astonishing and very well related. A clear picture does emerge of Brookes himself, a little obscured by some of Bryant’s ecstatic eulogies. An immensely capable professional soldier, cultivated and in times of stress religious. There is a striking contrast between Churchill’s delight and exaltation of spirit when he assumed the Prime Ministership and Brooke's praying for guidance—“by 4 a.m. I was still tossing about without sleep.” The Allied cause, “the good cause” as General Freyberg said on the night of Alamein. was fortunate that this strong, masterful and extremely able soldier was entrusted by a great Prime Minister and retained his confidence until the end. That, I think, is not quite the impression that Arthur Bryant intended to give, but I believe that it would satisfy Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke.