STALEMATE WITH RUSSIA

Press, Volume LXXXII, Issue 24900, 13 June 1946, Page 5

STALEMATE WITH RUSSIA

IMPATIENCE IN U.S. AND BRITAIN BEVIN EXPECTED TO INDICATE POLICY (From E. G. WEBBER, N.Z* Press ■Association Correspondent.) (Rec. 9 p.m.) ' LONDON, June 12. The annuel conference of the British Labour Party at Bournemouth this week is expected to do two important things—to give Mr Bevin an opportunity to confirm the British intention to support a settlement in Western Europe whether or not the Russians agree, and to reject uncompromisingly the efforts of the British Communists to affiliate under the Socialist banner. Impatience after postponements, procedural arguments, and lack of results at the recent Ministerial conferences, has become so definite in the United States and Britain that it is certain that both Mr Byrnes and Mr Bevin will make the strongest efforts to break the present stalemate with Russia. The Foreign Secretary’s speech at Bburnemouth is expected to give an indication of the lines Britain and America will adopt to achieve this. The only substantial disagreement in Britain upon British policy towards Russia is how much further the British Government should go in endeavours to reach understanding with the Soviet. All parties are united in wanting agreement, and Mr Bevin was obviously in tune with moderate opinion when he told the House of Commons he had made one more effort to achieve it.

It cannot be said that prospects are regarded optimistically, however, and the question Britain is facing is: “If Moscow continues to disagree, then what?” Although political spokesmen are making obvious efforts to be cheerful, the probability that Russia will continue to disagree predominates. It is underlined by the comments of “Pravda” on Mr Bevin’s speech in the House of Commons and by the announcement of the British and American plan to separate Germany into 12 confederated States. British opinion, of whatever party colour other than deep Red, appears to have reached a stage at which it is tired of Russian rebuffs and lack of understanding, and determined to get on with the job of post-war reconstruction, if not with Russian co-oper-ation, then' without. The possibility that the Russian hand is not as strong as is generally supposed is also being discussed. It is suggested that the real basis of Russia’s acquisitiveness in Eastern Europe is her fear of the power of the British and American democracies and her totally unjustified suspicion that this power may be used against her. No one appears able to suggest practical means of removing these Soviet misgivings and of convincing Moscow that neither British nor American public opinion would conceivably tolerate any Government with aggressive intentions against the Soviet. Although the Bournemouth conference will undoubtedly give members of the Labour Party an opportunity to let their hair down in reasonable privacy, it is already plain that Mr Bev ; n xyill receive an overwhelming endorsement of his foreign policy and backing for his determination to end the stalemate, even .if this means that Britain and America will proceed independently of Russia. On this important issue at least, it is recognised that Mr Bevin has not only the great majority of his own supporters solidly behind him, but also the bulk of the country. In these circumstances British opinion obviously derives the greatest encouragement from the fact that British and American official policy and public opinion are thoroughly in accord

It is also plain, in spite of Professor Laski’s last-minute effort to reassure the Russians, that the decided rejection of the Communist overtures likely to be given at Bournemouth will reflect the present temper of the British people. They agree with Professor Laski that “it is inconceivable that this, the greatest working class party in Western Europe, should lend its support directly or indirectly to any Government which sought to threaten Rucsia.” But they are becoming noticeably impatient with the Russian refusal to be convinced of the fact.