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Velizh

A report from Berlin, by way of Algiers, that the Russians have taken Velizh cannot justify more than speculative attention to the importance of a drive in this direction. It should be remembered that the report is not confirmed by Moscow, nor even supported by any reference to ground action in this sector. Nevertheless, it has been the Russian practice to reserve announcements of any large offensive until it is well under way and its progress assured. The German report adds that a counter-attack is proceeding; and this is enough, on the tentative assumption that the report is based on fact, to explain why Moscow is silent. In the meantime, it can only be said that a successful Russian offensive at this point would be shrewdly placed. The immediate results would be large; potential results, strategically far-reaching. When the Russians advanced to Velikye Luki, between November and the first days of January, they came within 30 miles of the great north-south railway behind the German front at that point, and within 20 miles of it a little further south at Neval. Velizh. further south still, is also within striking distance of the line. Now if it may be supposed that the Russians design to press forward on the southern bend of the Velikye Luki salient, success would have several consequences. First, if the railway were cut, the whole German supply and strategic communications system would be badly disrupted. Second, if the Germans (as is frequently suggested) intend to make a new thrust at Moscow, the inten-

tion would be countered or at least could only be pursued at great risk. The Russians would lie immediately on their left flank and menace their rear. It is in fact inconceivable that such a plan would be pursued against such risks; and it must wait till counter-attacks restore security

on the flank or otherwise be abandoned. Third, if such a Russian offensive drove deep,' it could be developed either towards Latvia and the Gulf of Riga, endangering the German army groups in the north, or south, to the recapture of Smolensk, shaking the whole German centre. These are of course purely abstract comments; but the development of a Russian offensive on the Velikye Luki-Velizh-Vitebsk front would be illustrated by them.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19430616.2.14

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23975, 16 June 1943, Page 2

Word count
Tapeke kupu
378

Velizh Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23975, 16 June 1943, Page 2

Velizh Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23975, 16 June 1943, Page 2

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