OUTLOOK REGARDED AS MUCH BRIGHTER

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23967, 7 June 1943, Page 4

OUTLOOK REGARDED AS MUCH BRIGHTER

SHIPPING LOSSES

♦ (By R. A. MALEY. Staff Washington of the "Sydney Morning (Published by Arrangement.) aiiiph shinning losses since the war began have been great—wl/rest that when they are eventually revealed the world will be astounded; but the worst has passed and the future looks good. In authoritative quarters it is stated that the position to-day is than it was in May last year, besides which the outlook is fa?brighter both in the war against submarines and in prospective building than it was a year ago.

It is a curious fact that the losses, which certainly should be known to the Allies themselves, are at present a hot subject of controversy here between official sources, with avowedly the best access to accurate information. . , .. ' Seekers of authoritative information progress so far, and then encounter a brick wall of silence beyond which it is impossible to progress. All estimates of Allied shipping resources at any given moment fall down on the question of shipping losses on which the Navy, both in London and Washington, preserves a close-lipped silence. This compels one to talk only in general terms and to make more or less fair guesses on this perplexing topic. Guessing at Losses Present shipping strength equals resources at the outbreak of the war, plus subsequent building, plus vessels acquired by conquest, minus losses since the outbreak of the war. There are two ways of guessing at the losses, first, you may take, month by month, the German claims of Allied sinkings, and reduce it by whatever amount you judge to be necessary to compensate for German exaggeration. This is not very satisfactory." Second, you may list the number of Allied sinkings that are admitted, take whatever you believe to be a fair average tonnage per ship, and multiply the two. This, too, is open to very serious error, but is perhaps slightly better than the first method.

certain which method is being used for official announcements, althoujdj, generally, it is either deadweight or gross, but when a method is stated it often runs counter to the method being used by another Government agency, or by the British,” That, is what happened with the Truman Committee and Colonel Knox, I when each apparently used a different measuring rod. wy The position can be clarified slightly * as follows:—American construction is M stated in deadweight tons, During 1942, this amounted to 8,090,800 tons, To this must be added construction by other Allied countries, which might be generously estimated at 3,000,00# tons. Less Gloomy Picture The Truman Committee announced a loss of 1,000,000 tons a month during 1942, which, if the committee reckoned in deadweight tons, would mean a net loss during the year of approxlmately 1,000,000 tons deadweight. Ihe Navy announced a net loss in gross tons of more than 1,000,000 tons during 1942, with the additional point that > some Allied construction was unaccounted for, and presumably would reduce this net loss. Gross tonnage to deadweight tonnage is a variable proportion, but; generally is about seven to 10. Thus, a 10,500-ton Liberty ship deadweight is about 7000 tons gross.

But there are other confusing factors in the situation. ‘On some occasions lately there have been statements from authoritative quarters dealing with shipping losses in the roundest figures. These statements came in turn from the special Senate committee which is investigating the national defence programme, known popularly as the Truman Committee, from the Secretary of the Navy, Colonel Knox, in polite partial refutation. then from the Navy in supposed clarification of both the previous statements.

Helping to make confusion worse confounded has been the fact that some of these statements neglected to indicate what type of tonnage the calculation has been based on. The Truman Committee reported that German submarines had taken a heavy toll of our shipping, but not a disastrous toll. 1 Our losses in 1942 "averaged approximately 1,009,000 tons a month, and in the aggregate exceeded new construction by the United States and Britain.” Type of Tonnage Colonel Knox then said: “I assume that Senator Truman got his figure of 1.000,000 tons from some uninformed source, probably common gossip.” Finally, the Navy announced: "Stated in terms of gross tonnage, and including all losses of Allied ships in 1942, net loss in gross tons has been in the neighbourhood of something more than 1,000,000 tons. These figures, however, do not include new construction by all the Allied nations, and include all losses, not losses die to submarines alone.”

It should be noted that the Truman Committee did not indicate whether it was talking in terms of gross or deadweight tons. Recently President Roosevelt announced at a press conference that he had asked the Navy and the shipping administration to try and arrive at some uniform method of reckoning the tonnage for public announcements, constructing, sinkings, etc. This is most important, because there are now six fiiethods of computing ship tonnage, the best of which is probably deadweight, which states the carrying capacity, including cargo, fuel, stores, and accessories, and represents' ■' the difference between displacement when ships are loaded and light. Gross tonnage means entire internal capacity, expressed in terms of 100 cubic feet a ton. Britain uses this measurement. The Washington correspondent of the “New York Times” pointed out recently: “It is often un-

Therefore, it seems reasonable to presume that the Truman announce* ment was deadweight, became it would then more nearly conform with the Navy figure. If the commits meant gross tonnage losses of 1,000000 a month, the figure would be some* ; thing well over 15,000,000 tons trans* lated into 'deadweight, and a far 5 greater net loss in Allied tonnage over 1942. This would paint a picture in floomier tones than would seem juitii ed, especially in view of the fact that the Allies, during 1042, were able to launch at least one big seaborne ex* ; pedition, which would have been hazardous, indeed, if tonnage wai dwindling so alarmingly. Let us presume, then, that in 1942 ’ say, Allied shipping resources were reduced by a figure in the vicinity of 1,000,000 tons a month. It does not matter much now whether that figure " is deadweight or gross, because 1942 was a hump, so to speak, over which the Allies had to climb in order to survive.

In 1942 the American shipbuilding industry was given the task of tiding over and keeping pace as nearly fag , possible with sinkings until the ship. . building plans for 1943 began tothrow their ponderous weight Into - the scales against the Axis, in th« battle of supply lines. Allies’ Steady Gain Now, it can be said with safety, the scales are gradually being weighed down, The only thing which ' could restore the .balance in Germany’s favour would be an extraqrdinary increase in submarine sinkings. American shipbuilders will have - produced, when 1943 comes to a dote,' something like 19,000,000 tons in the year. That is at the present rate of launching—about five merchant, ships a day. Production in April was 1,606,600 tons, bringing the total thus far in 1943 to 536 ships, aggregating 5,370,200 tons deadweight. It can be seen that even if , Axis submarines had continued to destroy 1,000,000 tons deadweight a month,; as in 1942—and they, have; hot don?, that in the last six montbs-rAmeri- „v can launchings alone would .have s , represented a gain of at least I,ooo,ooo’fc' tons deadweight to date this year. sfcj Shipping circles in Washington are' ‘cv confident that that gain will continue, and grow right through this year, because, along with merchant shipbuilding, is a growing programme! tor the construction of vessels designed to protect merchantmen against submarines. ■