AXIS FEARS OF INVASION

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23966, 5 June 1943, Page 5

AXIS FEARS OF INVASION

LANDINGS ADMITTED TO BE POSSIBLE STATEMENT BV BERLIN RADIO (8.0. W.) RUGBY, June 3. The Axis Powers are now more openly discussing the probabilities of an Allied invasion. They admit that invasion is possible, but they claim that the Allies are not likely to achieve more than costly footholds. The Berlin radio states: “British and American invasion of southern Europe would be an extremely risky venture because the transport difficulties would be similar to those which the Axis armies experienced in North Africa. The British and Americans might, nevertheless, succeed in crossing the Mediterranean and effecting a landing. The British and American chances of invading Norway are far from good. German air reconnaissances are keeping Norwegian coastal waters, also the British invasion ports, under constant observation. Any British or American invasion fleet would be reported early enough to enable the German authorities in Norway to take effective counter measures. The British and Americans, however, might still succeed in obtaining a costly foothold at some points on the Norwegian coast.” The Rome radio, commenting on British and American raids on Italian cities, states: “Counter-action and reprisals are the only medicine that will cure our enemies. The Sardinians’ hatred of the British and Americans increased that for a century no British people and no Americans will be able to set foot in Sardinia without being torn to shreds. The Sardinians hate more deeply than they love. They will therefore repel any enemy invasion with any weapon available.” Possible Allied Objectives Other reports from Axis sources indicate that the enemy views with growing alarm the prospect of landings by Allied troops dn the Continent of Europe. The reports seem mainly concerned with the Italian coast, but while public expectations in Britain are mainly fixed on that theatre, other parts of Europe are by no means neglected in reviews of the situation. It is recognised that the possibility of a Continental land offensive has been created by the resistance in Russia, which continues to absorb some twothirds of the land forces, about half the air strength, and the greater part of Sie military and industrial resources of the enemy. In the first place, Sicily and Sardinia are regarded as likely objectives, since an invasion there would have a fighter umbrella. The two islands in Allied hands would be stepping-stones to the north shores of the Mediterranean and safeguards to shipping passing through to the east. Nevertheless, it is pointed out that Italy has disadvantages, as well as advantages, as an objective. Its conquest would give access to southern Germany, France, and the Balkans, and would eliminate a large hostile fleet. On the other hand, the Germans, by stiffening the Italian army with troops and specialists, could make the undertaking very formidable. They hope, by fighting a rearguard action throughout the summer, to delay the Allies while they make a third attempt to defeat Russia. Even if they lost Italy they would still keep Italian labour in Germany and would no longer need to supply coal, steel, and oil to their ally. The southern rampart of their inner fortress would still be intact along the Alps. Another possibility for the Allies in the south is thought to be a descent on Greece and its islands from Cyrenaica and Egypt. They would be helped here by the population and might therefore hope to establish landings in spite of the distance across the sea from their shore-based aircraft. It is recognised that Greece leads to no vital objectives except across vast stretches of mountains, but the possibility, with the help of friendly populations, of crossing those barriers and reaching the Danubian plain, is taken into account. The coasts of northern -France and the Low Countries are probably the most strongly held area on the Continent, but they offer a long stretch of coast within easy reach of all types of aircraft from England, and flat campaigning ground leading at no very great distance to vital objectives in Germany. “Norway Ruled Out” A fourth possibility envisaged is Norway. The long Norwegian coast offers many opportunities, but its isolation from the main theatres is thought to rule it out as a main objective. No doubt is felt, however, that at the most important points of the coast the Axis defences are likely to provide means of resistance which may prove costly to overcome. The fortifications may be immensely strong at the most vulnerable and accessible points; at others they would be less so, and over long stretches they do not exist. The value of such defences, however, is seen to depend on the strength of reserves and air forces available to support them. Not only must tactical reserves be ready to seal breaches, but a strategic reserve is needed also, to defeat the offensive and expel the invader. Perhaps the Allies’ biggest problem is the assembly and arrangement of shipping to transport men, equipment, and supplies, and to maintain them for an indefinite period. This problem is now in some ways simpler than it was for the North African landings, because the distances at present involved are so much shorter and shipping resources have been increasing for many months past. The situation as seen from the enemy’s viewpoint is thought to turn cn the ability of the Germans to hold the Allies in the outworks of their Continental fortress until they have a third opportunity to attempt to cripple Russia. Another powerful blow at Russia is still thought probable, though the Germans themselves have been discounting such an event. Confidence, however, is expressed that this year’s campaign will be more favourable to the Russians than last year. Meanwhile, the air offensive against German industries and German and Italian airfields and communications is universally regarded as an essential preparation which will facilitate the task of the United Nations’ troops. “We have now come to the great crisis in the war, and in the next few months four tremendous issues will be decided, upon the fate of which the outcome of the war will depend," said the Minister of Economic Warfare (Lord Selborne), in a speech in London. The four issues were the Battle of the Atlantic, the impending German attack on Russia, the Allied bombing offensive, and the impending Allied invasion of the Continent. Referring to the invasion of Europe the Minister said: “Hitler does not know whpre it is going to come and he does not know when it is going to come. The secret has been well kept, like the landing in North Africa. The whole under-belly of the Axis is exposed and the whole topside of the Axis is also exposed. The attack may come in Greece, Jugoslavia, Italy, France, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, or Norway, but Hitler does not know where.” ESTIMATE OF GERMAN AIR FORCE ■ / (Rec. 11 p.m.) LONDON, June 4. The “Aeroplane” estimates Germany’s total bomber force at present at somewhat under 2000 aeroplanes, with, a total bomb load capacity of not more than 4500 tons. To these can be added a force of fighterbombers, each of which is capable of carrying only one 5501b bomb. If the whole Luftwaffe, including night-fighters, concentrated on one area, its total bomb load capacity would not exceed 6000 tons, which is 300 tons less than the Royal Air Force dropped on Germany last week.